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Volume I

Social Justice

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SPO DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

The Future of English in Pakistan

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THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

This paper aims to evaluate the future of English in Pakistan and to propose directions for a future language in education policy. In order to do this, we will first look at the political history of English in Pakistan and then look at the results of a language attitude study. The discussion will then be based on the findings of these two studies.

Historical Overview

English Language in British India from 1835 to 1947

The British came to India to conquer and rule it. However, there were differences in the way that the officials and advisors to the government thought it should be governed. During the early British period, there were two major schools of thought: the Orientalists and the Anglicists. One school of thought, the Orientalists, appreciated the past greatness of the natives and knew that there was much to learn from the Indians. They believed that Indian history, languages, religions, and traditions needed to be studied and that Indians should be ruled in accordance with their own traditions and culture. The Orientalists established schools to study the vernacular and classical languages of the region and maintained the established norms of the society. Persian, the official language of the Mogul Empire, was maintained. In contrast to the Orientalists, Anglicists believed in the 'supremacy of English and Western culture' and held 'oriental learning in contempt' (Rahman, 1996). The Anglicists felt that it was their duty to civilise the native Indians by introducing Christianity and other English values and traditions. Introduction of the English language and English traditions was also considered to be of economic value to Britain. The Anglicists wanted to promote English by teaching European 'literature and science through the medium of the English language' (Lord Bentinck, 1835, in Spear, 1965:127).

After an initial reign of power, the Orientalists lost their control and the Anglicists took over. The significance of 1835 is in this symbolic victory of the Anglicists over the Orientalists. Macaulay's Minute of February 2 of that year was the argument that was approved by the Governor-General of India, Lord Bentinck. The purpose of Macaulay's Minute was to create 'a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste and character, in morals and in intellect' (Curtin, 1971). On 7 March 1835, Lord Bentinck (Rahman, 1996: 34) announced that:

The great object of the British government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India; and that all funds appropriated for the purpose of education would be best employed on English education alone.

This change from an Orientalist to an Anglicist viewpoint did not occur without strong criticism from the Orientalists. Mackenzie predicted that such policies would antagonise the Indians and might lead to problems (Basu, 1952); however, his views were ignored.¹ Although the Orientalists strongly opposed this step, they had lost their influence and their views were not taken into consideration. Macaulay recommended that publication of books in Arabic and Sanskrit should be stopped. A number of people lost their jobs and financial security as a result of this policy. This Anglicist philosophy led to the establishment of English medium education in British India. And according to the *Dictionan/ of Languages* edited by Dalley (1998):

¹ It can be argued that the adoption of Anglicist policies was one of the central factors that led to the great 1857 uprising in which the Indians fought the British army. The British won this war (which is called the 'War of Independence' by South Asians, and the 'Mutiny of 1857' by the British) and dethroned the Mogul emperor. Thus, in 1857, the British officially became the rulers of India.

With the establishment of the first university...English for all practical purposes became an Indian language' (S. Mathi). By the time British rule in India had flourished and declined, to end with independence in 1947, the English language was so solidly entrenched in education and in communication among speakers of the various indigenous languages that it was impossible to do without it. Its constitutional position has varied but English remains, in practice an essential lingua franca...

Spring (1998) has elaborated the economic reasons behind the shift in language policies in the British government.² According to Spring, the colonisation was grounded in a combination of psychological motives that included:

... a desire for wealth, civilizing less-than-human barbarians, and converting pagans to Christianity. What better situation could there be than to make money and do good at the same time...Europeans could return with wealth while feeling bathed in the glory of God and with the knowledge that the uncivilised were being civilised, (p. 32)

Spring further states that in the early days of colonisation, the colonisers were engaged in exporting goods from the conquered lands to their home countries, and later, with industrialisation, to finding new markets for their produced goods. The industrial revolution in the West influenced a change in the administrative and educational policies in the colonies as well. To create a market for European goods, policies were switched towards an integration of the indigenous people of the colonies to the European views—and education was seen as the most powerful instrument for accomplishing this. Spring cites Charles Grant, who said, 'To introduce the language of the conquerors, seems to be an obvious means of assimilating a conquered people to them...this is the noblest species of conquest, and wherever, we may venture to say, our principles and language are introduced, our commerce will follow' (p. 15). Thus, Spring argues that the debate between the Orientalists and the Anglicists was essentially a reflection of the industrial revolution and the economic changes in Britain.

In 1837, Persian was abolished from the courts. However, instead of replacing Persian with English, the Governor-General replaced it with Indian vernaculars. This policy had significant results. A single official language had united the people who spoke different languages. This language functioned as the official language, the national lingua franca, the language of science and education, and the language of high literature. It was a symbol of the Mogul rule in India. By destroying this symbol of unity and by replacing Persian with other vernaculars at the local level, for example in local courts, nationalistic sentiments in linguistic and ethnic groups were fanned, as language allegiance and use of language as an identity marker developed. The British used this rise in nationalism to their advantage by adopting a policy of 'divide and rule'. The deposing of Persian also created a gap: there was no other local language that could be used as an internal lingua franca or as the language of education. English was therefore a natural replacement for Persian. It was the language of the new rulers who brought with them new sciences.

The divide and rule policy increased the differences between Urdu and Hindi speakers and was exploited by the British (see Rai, 1991; Beg, 1996; and King, 1994 for a detailed study of the origins and development of Urdu and Hindi). Urdu was used as a symbol of Muslim nationalism during the

2 Other sociolinguists have also looked into the economic aspects of language policy. For example, Paulston (1983) refers to Heath's (1972) study of language policy in Mexico in her discussion of the economic and political motives behind language planning. Heath illustrated that policies are made by people who have political power and are made for economic and political purposes and not necessarily for linguistic purposes or to solve linguistic problems. This supports Cooper's view of language planning, in contrast to the problem solving aspect of language planning as discussed by Rubin and Jernudd (1971), Karam (! 974), and Neusiupny (1983).

independence movement by the All India Muslim League and served as a symbol of Muslim unity.³ Urdu was marked as being different from Hindi even though they share the same grammar and an overwhelming number of lexical items. The difference between the two languages lies in their scripts: Urdu uses a script based on Persio-Arabic characters and Hindi employs the Devanagiri script.⁴

The political parties in British India made use of non-linguistic differences between Urdu and Hindi for their own purposes.⁵ This was similar to the use of *language* as an identity marker in the development of national identities in contemporary Europe. Thus, it can be argued that the mobilisation of attitudes of the masses to develop and change their religious and ethnic identities in India based on so-called linguistic distinctions was engineered in the fashion of nineteenth century Europe. In this sense, the ethnic and linguistic nationalism in South Asia today is a result of imported western notions of linguistic identities.

Cobarrubias (1983) identifies nationalism as one of the four major ideologies that can motivate language attitudes. He points out the significant role language can play in national identity development. However, he is careful in pointing out that, in its own turn, such use of a particular language can lead to policies that suppress other regional and ethnic languages. This is clearly the case with Urdu, which has suppressed the other vernaculars in Pakistan.

English was adopted as one of the language of education in 1847 *after* considerable debate. The Governor-General did not believe in the total elimination of vernaculars from education, therefore, two different types of schools were created: English schools and vernacular schools. Job opportunities for natives who had a good command of English were excellent and their pay scale was higher than those educated in vernacular schools. However, admissions to the English schools were restricted to people with money- The moneyed class comprised of the rajas and feudal landlords who were loyal to the British authority. Hence, only people who could be depended on to be loyal to the government were given access to education in English. The vernacular schools were not as expensive as the English medium ones: the average cost of sending a child to an English school was twenty to seventy five times higher than that of sending him/her to a vernacular school (Rahman, 1996). The amount of money spent by the government on the different students was also very different: the government spent two to ten times more on students who went to the English schools. This dual system of education created two different classes of educated natives who were trained for different purposes. According to Rahman (1996:55), the vernacular schools served at least two purposes: 'the policy of spending less money on producing subordinate staff and generating the political support of the nationalists'. The English schools, on the other hand, served Macaulay's purposes of creating an Indian elite, which would be educated in English and be employed by the British in the government as local representatives.

Modern Politics of the English Language in Pakistan

This section is further divided into subsections representing time periods that coincide with major political changes in Pakistan. These political changes influenced the language policy of the country. Daoust (1997: 440) realises these effects of political changes on language policies and states, 'Language planning policies sometimes seem to develop as an afterthought following a period of sociopolitical

3 However, it has been suggested that Urdu was not initially used as a language of pro-Pakistan emotions. Ahmad in his survey of literature in Urdu (1993) points out that there was no significant pro-Pakistan literature in Urdu until the 1965 Indo-Pak war. He also indicates that Urdu was not just a Muslim language and that, in fact, the first Urdu language newspapers and magazines were actually brought out by Hindus.

4 This division of Urdu and Hindi as two different languages based on non-linguistic reasons is similar to the case of Nynorsk and Riksnorsk in Norway (Paulston, 1983 and Wardhaugh, 1998), PauWton (19K3: 59) states that in Norway, ...each code has its own written grammars and dictionaries, fiction and non-fiction are written in both codes and recognised and accepted as such by the Norwegian people, and most importantly, political parties have espoused the adaptation in lolo of one code or the other for reasons of nationalism, socialism and other ideological values.

5 The Urdu-Hindi controversy was used symbolically in the political arena and was among the factors that led to the partition of India in 1947.

turmoil, such as when a country gains independence or when a political party is overthrown’.

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At the time of Independence, Pakistan, like most other ex-colonial countries, was faced with the problem of developing a language policy. Like many other countries, the problems in designing and implementing such a policy were complicated by languages and language groups competing to be recognised as national languages. Among these languages, the two dominant native languages were Urdu and Bengali. Urdu was used as a symbol of Muslim unity. Bengali was the native language of East Pakistan or Bengal (modern Bangladesh). Bengal was the largest and most populous province of Pakistan. According to the 1951 census, Bengalis made up 54.6 percent of the total population of Pakistan. Bengal also produced the most revenue. However, the prominent leaders of the Pakistan movement, including Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the first Governor-General of Pakistan) and Liaquat Ali Khan (the first Prime Minister of Pakistan), supported Urdu as the only national language. Jinnah, in a speech he delivered in English in Bengal, said, ‘...it is for you, the people of this Province, to decide what shall be the language of your Province. But let me make it very clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan’ (Government of Pakistan, 1989: 183). While this speech recognised Bengali as a provincial language, it also made it clear that Bengali was not to be officially recognised as a national language. Furthermore, it labelled those who wanted Bengali to be recognised as a national language as anti-state elements, giving them negative stature. The Bengalis protested against this speech and friction was created between the two units of Pakistan, East and West Pakistan. The Pakistani leaders believed that there had to be only one national language and that more than one national language could not hold the nation together. In trying to develop a national identity for Pakistan, the Urdu Committee, which was set up by the Advisory Board of Education to cultivate the Urdu language in Bengal, even tried to introduce a uniform script for all languages spoken in Pakistan. Needless to say, this policy was highly criticised by Bengalis and people of other linguistic groups who had their own scripts and literary traditions. This policy of the government towards Bengali was symbolically treated as a sign of suppression of the Bengali culture and was therefore used as a symbol during the Bengali nationalist movement that eventually led to the separation of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh in 1971,

The purpose of the reference to the Urdu-Bengali controversy above was to show how complex the situation in Pakistan was after Independence. In addition to the political problems associated with an Urdu-Only policy, lack of materials (corpus planning) was listed as a handicap for having Urdu as the only official/national language. Thus, in order to run the government smoothly, English was maintained as the official language, Urdu was recognised as the national language, and one local language from each province (Bengali, in the case of East Pakistan) was recognised as the official provincial language. This gave Pakistan a three-language structure. Such a structure is not unique to Pakistan. Nadkarni (1983: 152-3), investigating linguistics problems in a multilingual country, states that:

Most multilingual countries have consequently evolved a language policy which has a three-language structure with a distinct major communication role or function assigned to each language. Nida (1971) identifies these communication roles as follows: (a) communication with people of the in-group (the language of each cultural group), (b) communication with people of the out-group (common or national language), and (c) communication involving specialized information (a world language such as English). An individual member of a multilingual society who wishes to participate at all levels of communication is obliged to acquire the necessary communication skills in all these three languages. It is the responsibility of the educational system of each country to provide him with the opportunity for acquiring these skills.

In Pakistan, the vernacular fulfilled the first role; Urdu, the second role; and English, the third role. In order to be fully functional at all levels, a person has to be multilingual.

Another option for the young Pakistan would have been to adopt an approach of linguistic pluralism. Cobarrubias (1983) has pointed out that linguistic pluralism can be a successful policy in a multilingual society. According to Cobarrubias (1983: 65), linguistic pluralism is the 'coexistence of different linguistic groups and their right to maintain and cultivate their languages on an equitable basis' and can help to foster a feeling of equality between various ethnic and linguistic groups in a country. However, such a pluralistic policy was considered negative by Pakistani politicians because it was contrary to the ideal Pakistani image that they wanted to create. As a result of the complexity of the language situation and to not make Urdu the only language of the state machinery, English was maintained as an official language in Pakistan. The people running the government were trained to do their work in this language and therefore it was not hard to convince the people of its usefulness as an official language. Haque (1993:14) states that:

The use of English was inevitable for system maintenance: the ruling elite were trained to do their official work in English. English perforce continued to be the official language of Pakistan. It also had the compromise candidate, at least for the interim, since the adoption of one of the two languages of indigenous origin, Urdu and Bengali, as the national language could have meant the alienation of large sections of the populace, especially in an atmosphere charged with political activism generated by Bengali nationalism. And the switch to both would have meant confusion, not least for being premature.

Thus, English was anchored in Pakistan and was ready to play a crucial role in the structures of power and dominance in this new country.

The situation on the educational scene reflected the general feelings of the government towards Urdu. The government wanted Urdu to be the language of education. As early as 1948, Urdu was declared the language in which instruction should be given at the primary level. However, the role of English was not specified. In general it was decided that Urdu would be developed to take over the functions that English fulfilled and that Urdu would replace English within 10 years. The argument that there was a need for corpus planning before vernaculars could be used in education or in an official capacity was not a new one. Rahman (1996) reports that, in 1867, the Secretary to the Government of India, E. C Bayley, used a similar argument. Bayley stated that materials were not available in the vernaculars to be used in higher education, and their role should be restricted to primary education.⁶

In addition to the Urdu medium schools, English medium schools were maintained. Thus, there were two systems of education. The policy of the government to continue the two mediums of instruction in education side by side reflected the British policy. It also served the same purpose: to create two classes of people, one that was to be trained to govern and the other to produce subordinate staff. The elite preferred sending their children to the English medium schools, while the rest sent their children to government schools or other non-elite English medium schools.

6 These same arguments have been used ever since to provide validity for maintaining English at the higher levels of education, especially in the better-known and well-reputed schools. Admission to these institutions*, requires English language proficiency. Thus, only students with previous background in the English language can ever hope to enter these prestigious institutions. As a result, the English medium schools were considered the elite schools. These included pre-cadet schools (schools which prepared students for military services), schools that prepared students for the civil services (a highly respected profession), and schools that prepared students for specialised professions (e.g., medicine, engineering or law)

1958-1971

1958 saw the first martial law government in Pakistan. Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief and the military ruler, believed that the army was superior to the politicians and also that the most qualified personnel acquire their knowledge in English medium schools. Ayub Khan was openly pro-English, something that the previous governments were afraid of stating. All training for military officers was in English and cadets were not allowed to use ethnic languages. However, at the same time, due to increased activities of the pro-Urdu right wing groups, English was not introduced as the medium of instruction in government schools where the majority of the people sent their children.

In 1959, a commission was set up to look into the language issues in Pakistan. The Sharif Commission, which looked into the language in education issues, stated that Urdu and Bengali should be the mediums of instruction in secondary schools (Class 6 to Matriculation [Equivalent to sophomore year of an American high school]) in the government schools. The Commission predicted: 'in approximately 15 years Urdu would reach the point of development where it could become the medium of instruction at the university level' (Mansoor, 1993: 10). Thus, the lack of corpus planning card was played once more. This was a convenient method of maintaining the status quo and satisfying the right wing parties. During a discussion in the Punjab Assembly, the Minister of Education said, 'I would like to say that in the year 1972 the President shall constitute a commission to examine the report on the question of the replacement of English language for official purposes' (Legislative Assembly Debates-Punjab, 8 Aug 1964: 465). Thus, he endorsed the conclusions of the Sharif Commission.

The Commission clearly stated that until such time as Urdu was ready to replace English, 'English should continue as second language since advance knowledge which was in English was only needed for advanced study and research'. The demands for using vernaculars as the language of higher education were thus brushed aside. However, Urdu was instituted as the language of instruction in government schools, with English taught only as a compulsory subject. Elite English medium schools were allowed to flourish. According to Rahman (1996: 234), there were at least 19 private English medium elite schools in West Pakistan alone during this time:

...to which Rs 2,477,285 had been given in 1964-65, and on whose governing bodies there were 73 senior civil and military officers...There was some protest against Lahore Corporation's donation of Rs 1,000,000 to the Divisional Public School, whereas the corporation's own schools were in an impecunious condition. However, nothing was done to make amends, and a motion concerning this was not even allowed to be moved in the provincial legislature...

These figures show a bias of the people in power in favour of elite English medium schools. The government schools were ignored and the limited funds available were allocated to elite schools non-proportionately.

Based on the conclusions of the Commission, Urdu was introduced as the language of instruction in all the government schools. Although this was not an issue in Balochistan, NWFP, or Punjab, in Sindh it became the root of a division that pitched Urdu-speaking Mohajirs (people who migrated to Pakistan from India at the time of Partition, and who mostly lived in the developed urban centres) against Sindhi speakers (mostly living in the under-developed rural areas). Sindhis were very conscious of the Sindhi literary heritage and felt that it was being undermined by the dominance of Urdu. Since Sindhi had also been the medium of instruction in pre-Partition Sindh, Sindhis resented Urdu for replacing it in their homeland. This problem was ignored by the government and has since caused violent Sindhi-Mohajir clashes.

In 1969, Nur Khan proposed that 'the medium of instruction at all levels of education should be changed to Bengali in East and Urdu in West Pakistan' (PNEP, 1969: 17). He stated that the differences created by the two educational systems, i.e., English and vernacular, were almost 'caste-like'. Although his proposals stirred some debate, the education policy of 1970 did not change the status of English and left the language issue to be decided by a commission to be set up in 1972. Thus, the trend of creating two different classes of people continued.

1971-1978

1971 signifies the divorce of East and West Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation. As East Pakistan separated to form Bangladesh, Bhutto gained power in the new Pakistan. According to Haque (1993), the 'separation of East Pakistan also 'simplified' the language situation in the two remaining provinces' (p. 14). By 'simplified' Haque was referring to the removal of the Bengali language problem. However, it is interesting to note that Haque only mentioned two provinces, Sindh and Punjab, in discussing the language situation in West Pakistan, and not the other two provinces, Balochistan and NWFP. The 'simplified' situation did not result in a change in the language policy in Pakistan. In fact, it is debatable whether the situation had simplified at all, because the status of the regional language in the new Pakistan did not change. Bhutto had run for elections with the popular slogan of 'bread, clothing, and shelter' for all, and it has therefore been questioned why he did not replace English with Urdu. One possible reason for this might be that Bhutto's political rivals supported Urdu. Rahman (1996: 238) supports this view:

...Urdu was supported by Bhutto's political enemies. In Balouchistan and the NWFP... the NAP-JU1 ruling parties opted for Urdu as the official language in 1972. In the Punjab, the Islamicists...were more enthusiastic about Urdu than any other language. Thus, Bhutto found himself unable or unwilling to do away with English.

A second reason might have been that Bhutto had recently witnessed the power of language in creating nationalist sentiments in Bengal and could also see the Sindhi nationalists' feelings towards Urdu and therefore did not want to risk further controversy over the language issue. To confirm the view, all groups in Pakistan did not accept Urdu as the sole national language: there were major riots in Sindh over Urdu in 1971-72. These riots left 2 people killed and over 300 injured. Although these riots were a legacy of the previous governments, they illustrated that the language problems in the new-Pakistan were far from 'simplified'. Thus, doing away with English and making Urdu the only national language would also have been an unwise political decision.

However, in addition to maintaining English, Bhutto tried to appease the right-wing political parties that supported Urdu by giving Urdu official recognition in the newly framed constitution. Article 251 of the 1973 constitution states that:

Clause 1. The National Language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.

Clause 2. Subject to clause (1) the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.

This timing of the constitution had coincided with the lapse of the 15-year lease given to English by the Sharif Commission. Thus, the 1973 constitution gave English a new lease for 15 years. In order to achieve the goals in the first clause, language institutions were set up to develop Urdu. Under this constitution, the English medium elite schools were given legal protection.

1979-1988

In 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overturned Bhutto's government and imposed the third martial law government in Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Haq tried to justify his coup by rapid Islamisation and Urdu-isation policies. The 1978 language policy introduced drastic changes towards English. Haque (1993: 15) states that:

The inadequacy of the English-speaking elite...in providing stability, responsible rule, and responsive leadership, and in accommodating growing feelings of national identity has strengthened the conviction among many that there is a need for the establishment of Urdu as the primary official language of Pakistan if the masses are to have a feel of the government.

The 1978 language in education policy advised the English medium schools to shift either to Urdu or to another recognised provincial language. However, only one language was recognised as the provincial language in each province. Thus, people speaking other regional/ethnic languages felt that they

were marginalised, e.g., Siraiki and Hindko speakers in Punjab, where Punjabi was recognised as the only provincial language.⁷

In addition to Urdu and a provincial language, Arabic was introduced as a compulsory foreign language. Arabic is not spoken natively in Pakistan. It is considered the language of Islam and was therefore symbolically important for an 'Islamic' government. Thus, making Arabic a compulsory language in schools served political and not linguistic purposes. This use of Arabic for political purposes supports Whitely's (1983) claim that language policy decisions are 'taken on political grounds and conformity with particular ideologies' (p. 69), and are not always based on linguistic issues or problems.

In 1979, the Muqtadira Qaumi Zaban (National Language Authority) was formed for the purposes of devising 'ways and means for the promotion of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan and to make all necessary arrangements in this regard' (Government of Pakistan, 1979: 2). General Zia-ul-Haq reversed the policy of the Bhutto government, which had nationalised all educational institutions in the implementation of its socialist ideologies, and started denationalising schools, as well as permitting new schools and colleges to open in the private sector, Urdu was imposed as the medium of instruction in all government schools from Class 1, and English was not introduced until Class 6. It was hoped that the students who would matriculate in 1989 would all be educated in Urdu medium schools. Once this was accomplished, it would become possible to change the medium of education to Urdu in colleges and institutions of higher education.

The government imposed the Urdu language policy quite strictly in government schools; however, the elite schools were not affected and were allowed to operate because of the political influence exerted by the people who sent their children to them. Rahman (1996) quotes an elitist educationist, Lady Viqarunnisa Noon, who said 'the General had assured her earlier that she could continue to use English as the medium of instruction in her school' (p. 242). Thus, even during the days of Islamisation and emphasis on Urdu as a means to minimise class distinctions, elite English medium schools continued to operate. This dual policy of President General Zia-ul-Haq was highly criticised. Parents were critical of the Urdu-isation policy, which they saw as hypocritical, and preferred sending their children to English medium private schools. They felt that the Urdu-isation would not be able to continue for long.

⁷ There are at least 66 languages spoken in Pakistan but only one language is recognised in each province in addition to Urdu. Other minority languages are not recognised. This non-recognition of other languages in Pakistan is leading to language death, as in the case of Domaaki, which has only 500 speakers left. People of these languages find that their language is not useful to them to progress in life. To be successful, they have to learn either Urdu or English (or both); therefore, they prefer to abandon their language in favour of Urdu or another more powerful regional language.

Zia-ul-Haq's government realised that the change of language policy had been hurriedly passed. In 1983, the General gave legal protection to the elitist English medium schools and, by 1987, some of the Urdu-Only policies were retracted. English was allowed as the medium of instruction for science subjects and students were given the choice to take their Matriculation examinations in English or Urdu. However, this reversal in policies only occurred after the negative outcomes of the Urdu-Only policy had surfaced. Almost an entire decade of school-going children had had less exposure to the English language than the generations before them. The teachers also stopped working in English. This led to a sharp decline in the competency of people in the English language, from which the Pakistani educational system has not yet been able to recover.

The Urdu-Only movement was accompanied by suppression of all political movements and backlashed, as would have been predicted by Cobarrubias (1983). Urdu was used as a symbol of patriotism while all other languages were neglected. This resulted in the growth of anti-Urdu sentiments, especially in Sindh. It fuelled violent encounters between the Sindhis and the Mohajirs in the mid-1980s. The Zia regime had ignored the language issues that had caused problems in the 1970s and was insensitive to feelings that gave rise to various nationalist movements. A lack of serious and well-researched language planning and policy development can be listed as one of the reasons behind the ethnic and linguistic divide among the people.

1988-1999

General Zia-ul-Haq was killed in an airplane 'crash' in 1988.⁸ The end of Zia-ul-Haq's 11-year rule was followed by a political circus in which Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of ex-Prime Minister Bhutto, was elected in 1988 and then removed on charges of corruption in 1990. Nawaz Sharif was elected in 1990 and dismissed in 1993, also on charges of corruption. Benazir Bhutto came to power once again, only to be dismissed again for corruption. And then Nawaz Sharif came to power again in 1995, this time to be removed by General Musharraf in a coup in 1999. However, the new military ruler, who called himself the Chief Executive of Pakistan, did not declare a martial law and the fundamental rights of the citizens were not suspended as in the previous three military governments.

During the juggling of the two two-time Prime Ministers, the policies of previous government were often reversed. However, the language policy was not changed. In fact, the governments did not frame any real language policies because languages were a politically charged and controversial issue. The 1992 and 1998, education policies did not directly address the language in education issue. Similarly, ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan 2010 Project also did not include a section on linguistic issues.

However, there were some changes in the governments' stance on English. Benazir Bhutto, during her first term, gave an option to schools for adopting English as the medium of instruction in all subjects from Class 1. Her government also announced that English should be taught as an additional language from Class 1 in all government schools instead of introducing it in Class 6. Such a change in policy is supported by the informants who participated in the present study, as well as those who participated in Mansoor's (1993) study of attitudes towards Urdu, Punjabi, and English. Mansoor observed that:

There is great discrimination between Urdu medium and English medium students regarding job opportunities and that the attitudes of the employers display a clear 'bias' in favour of English medium students. Highly favourable attitudes to English and English-speaking community is seen in the responses of all...The motivational intensity and desire to learn English borders on an obsession as English education is preferred over all languages as a compulsory subject and a medium of instruction, (pp. 140-3)

⁸ The actual reasons for the crash have never been officially made public and it is widely believed that the plane was sabotaged.

The provincial governments of Sindh and Punjab took up the central government's lead and introduced English as a compulsory subject in the primary schools. Sindh was the first province to introduce this change, and was quickly followed by Punjab in September 1994. These governments justified the reintroduction of English on the grounds that by introducing English at the primary level of education, the government would provide the 'poor' the same opportunities that were available to the 'privileged class' (Riaz Fatima, Adviser to the Chief Minister of Punjab, 1993). However, the success of such policies in providing 'equal' education has been questioned. One major reason for doubting the results of the policy is the non-availability of a sufficient number of trained teachers. A second reason is that, according to this policy, English is merely going to be introduced in Class 1 instead of Class 6, and will not be used as the language of instruction as in the English medium schools. Thus, both the implementation of the policy as well as the results it would achieve are problematic.

1999-Present

The 12 October 1999 coup, which removed the elected government, has yet to announce its educational policy. Although a native Urdu speaker, General Musharraf gave his first press conference in English and only responded in Urdu if the questions were asked in Urdu. This indicates that the status of English will be developed in his government. Furthermore, one of the justifications for the coup is the poor shape of the Pakistani economy. Improvement of the economy has been set as the primary goal by Musharraf's government. The new government has stressed the need for development in information technology related sciences, especially computer science. In order to achieve these goals, the government will have to take necessary steps to increase the literacy rate. English is a key to the global economy; the government will also have to make arrangements to develop English language skills.

Present Day Attitudes

In this section of the paper, we will look at the results of a language preference study conducted in 1998 at a large public university in an urban centre of Pakistan. The results of this study, along with the historical overview of the language policy changes, will be used to suggest some broad outlines for a language policy in Pakistan.

Study Methodology

Language attitudinal data was collected from 245 freshmen students at the Karachi University, a large public university. The students were enrolled in the English language course for freshmen, which is a required class for all freshmen. A total of 315 students were enrolled in the English language classes during the semester in which data was collected and the students were asked to complete a questionnaire on a voluntary basis. Over 77 percent of the undergraduate population taking the course participated in the study. In addition to the students, English language teachers teaching this course were also asked to participate. All 10 teachers volunteered to participate. Thus, the corpus discussed below was collected from a total of 255 informants. No statistically significant differences were found in responses given by the teachers and the students ($p > .05$) and therefore the two groups have been combined for the purposes of this study.

A brief overview of the biographical background of the students who participated in the study helps establish the statistical validity of the survey results and the generalisations based on them. The age of the informants ranged from 16 to 24, with the mode being 19 years. In all, 164 female and 81 male students participated in the study. The students were enrolled in 12 different departments, including applied chemistry (37), biochemistry (10), chemistry (37), economics (26), education (6), English (12), geography (12), international relations (19), Islamic learning (10), mathematics (41), mass communication (7), and microbiology (27). There was one student who did not list his/her major at the university. The students came from different economic and social classes. Out of 211 students who

responded to the item regarding their family's average monthly income, 23 students came from families whose average monthly income was PRs1,000-4,999 (US\$20-100), 56 from the PRs5,000-9,999 (US\$100-200) bracket, 52 from the PRs10,000-14,999 (US\$200-300) bracket, 40 from the PRs15,000-14,999 (US\$300-400) bracket, and 40 from the over PRs25,000 (US\$500) bracket. (The dollar ranges are approximations.) This shows that the students came from various socioeconomic backgrounds and strengthens any generalisations based on the results.

In addition to the variety in the socioeconomic classes represented, the ethnic and linguistic background was also very diverse. The informants represented all the major regions of the country and represented over 10 different linguistic groups. Among the more common first languages were Balochi, Brushaski, Chitralli, English, Gujrati, Hindko, Punjabi, Pushto, Sindhi, and Urdu. The informants came from different educational backgrounds and the medium of instruction in their schools and colleges was different. However, there was a higher number of students (178) from English medium intermediate colleges (pre-university schools, equivalent to US high schools) than from Urdu medium intermediate colleges (49). There were only 11 students who went to intermediate colleges where neither English nor Urdu was the medium of instruction.

The questionnaire was modelled on Mansoor's (1993) study. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, the questionnaire had already been used successfully in a Pakistani context; and, secondly, this allowed comparison of data from another major city, Karachi, with Mansoor's data from Lahore.⁹ The questionnaire sections covered:

- Biographical and background information;
- Attitudes towards respondents' native language, Urdu (in case it was not their native language), and English;
- Attitudes towards speakers of various languages;
- Attitudes towards language classrooms and teachers; and
- The English language proficiency of the respondents, using a cloze test.

The questions were designed to elicit a variety of quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative items could be coded and run through statistical tests. These included questions such as 'What is your first language?' and 'How many languages do you speak?' The qualitative items were more open-ended questions in which the informants gave their opinions about certain aspects of an issue, e.g., 'Is it useful to study your first language?' In order to focus on the specific issue of language preference in education, this paper only analyses the quantitative and qualitative data collected from the sections on biographical information and on general language attitudes towards English, Urdu, and informants' native languages.

The questionnaire was distributed to all students who volunteered to participate in the study. The participants were given the questionnaire in their English language classes and asked to fill it out at home and return it the following day. The teachers were requested to help explain any problematic items to the students. A total of 280 questionnaires were handed out to the students and 245 students returned the questionnaires. This gave a return rate of 87.5 percent. No incentives, financial or otherwise, were given to the participants and they were requested to fill out the questionnaire only because it would be part of a major language attitudinal study in Karachi. Any items left unanswered by the students were marked as missing data and analysed as such.

The completed questionnaires were collected and then the quantitative items were codified and entered into the SPSS Version 10 software. All statistical analyses were performed using this software. The researcher and another graduate student categorised the qualitative items of the questionnaire. In case of a disagreement in categorisation, the two individuals resolved their differences by discussing the disputed cases.

9 A comparative study of the results from the two studies will be presented in a later paper

Results

It was found that the differences in the background of the informants were not a significant source of difference in opinion about the usefulness of the various languages. Gender, major department of studies, family income, or ethnic/linguistic background were found to have no significant effect ($p > .05$) on language preference.

Analysing the responses to the questions that asked ‘Is it useful to study English/Urdu/your first language?’ developed a general understanding of the relative importance of various languages. Out of a total of 255 informants who responded to the item, 252, i.e., 98.8 percent, stated that it is important to study English; 227 informants out of a total of 254 who responded to the item, i.e., 89.4 percent believed that studying Urdu is useful; and only 22 informants out of a total of 50 who responded to the item, i.e., 44 percent, said that the study of their first language (other than Urdu) was important. These numbers reflect the predominant feeling that English is the language that is most useful in professional life. Urdu is felt to be of some importance, but other native languages are not generally considered worth the effort of studying even by the native speakers of those languages.

This finding is worrying because it could lead to language death of a number of minor languages in Pakistan. Rahman (1996) regards this disinterest in native language a result of the ‘ghettoising’ tendency of these languages. By ‘ghettoising’, Rahman implies the lack of opportunities for social and economic progress of the people who speak these languages. The lack of positive feedback towards first languages other than Urdu might thus be a result of the dominance of Urdu as the national language and of English in the economic world. These findings also support Cobarrubias (1983) as they show that selecting one language (in this case, Urdu) in a multilingual state over all others as a national symbol represses other regional languages.

The questions ‘Should English/Urdu/your first language be the medium of instruction for primary/high school/university education?’ investigated the specific issue of the medium of instruction in education. The results from these questions are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Perceived Importance of Various Languages in Education

Question	Number of Respondents	Yes	No
Is it important to study English?	255	252 (98.8%)	3 (1.2%)
Should English be the medium of instruction for primary education?	250	190 (76%)	60 (24%)
Should English be the medium of instruction for high school education?	248	234 (94.4%)	14 (5.6%)
Should English be the medium of instruction for university education?	250	236 (94.4%)	14 (5.6%)
Is it important to study Urdu?	254	227 (89.4%)	27 (10.6%)
Should Urdu be the medium of instruction for primary education?	246	161 (63.1%)	85 (34.6%)
Should Urdu be the medium of instruction for high school education?	246	91 (37%)	155 (63%)
Should Urdu be the medium of instruction for university education?	245	65 (26.5%)	180 (73.5%)

Is it important to study your first language (other than Urdu)?	50	22 (44%)	28 (56%)
Should your first language be the medium of instruction for primary education?	50	5 (10%)	45 (90%)
Should your first language be the medium of instruction for high school education?	50	2 (4%)	48 (96%)
Should your first language be the medium of instruction for university education?	50	0 (0%)	50 (100%)

Out of a total of 250 respondents to the item, 190 (76 percent) stated that English should be the medium of instruction in primary schools; 234 informants out of a total of 248 who responded to the item (94.4 percent) stated that it should be the medium of instruction in high schools; and 236 informants out of a total of 250 who responded to the item (94.4 percent) stated that it should be the medium of instruction at the university level. Thus, the percentage of informants who wanted English to be the only medium of instruction in educational institutions rose as the level of education increased. Out of 246 informants, 161 (65.4 percent) stated that Urdu should be the medium of instruction in primary schools; 91 out of 246 informants (37 percent) stated that it should be the medium of instruction in high schools; and only 65 informants out of a total of 250 (26.5 percent) stated that it should be the medium of instruction at the university level. For the 50 informants who spoke a language other than Urdu as a first language, only 5 (10 percent) stated that their first language should be the medium of instruction in primary schools, 2 (4 percent) stated that it should be language of instruction in high schools, and none said that it should be the medium of instruction in universities.

The figures given above support a conclusion that the informants consider English the most important language for their academic (and professional) careers. Urdu is considered important only in primary education, and the respondents felt that English should replace Urdu in higher education, represented by the fact that 73.5 percent of the respondents also said that Urdu should not be the medium of instruction in universities. One of the informants (127) said, 'Urdu is good for understanding basic things, but English should be the language of the higher education because that is our future'.¹⁰

The informants believed that Urdu is important at earlier stages of education while English is important for higher education. However, being educated in an English medium school is an unspoken prerequisite in order to be admitted to the better universities. This is true for both private and public universities. Evidence for this claim comes from the observed imbalance in the number of students from English (74.8 percent), Urdu (20.6 percent) and other (4.8 percent) language backgrounds students attending Karachi University who participated in the present study. While the admission policies at Karachi University do not explicitly state that students with an English medium background have higher chances of being admitted to its various programs, the significantly higher number of students from English medium schools in the study is indicative of the higher ratio of students from this background. In contrast to public universities such as Karachi University, private institutions have internal admission tests of which an English language test is an essential component. Students who do not pass the English section of the entrance examination are refused admission.

The feelings towards other first languages are very similar to those towards Urdu. In fact, these languages are considered even less educationally viable than Urdu because they fulfil neither the official nor the communicative needs of the Pakistani citizenry. Their function is restricted to what Nadkarni (1983) has called 'communication with people of the in-group' and therefore they do not play a large role in achieving the social and economic aspirations of the speakers.

¹⁰ The responses cited here are exactly as they were written on the questionnaire. They have not been edited for content or language.

Informants were asked to elaborate why they chose to state that a particular language is useful to study and/or should be the medium of instruction. The responses of the informants to these questions were categorised based on the reasons given. In all, 220 informants responded to the item asking them why they think English is important, 197 informants wrote their reasons for studying (in) Urdu, but none of the informants gave any reasons for studying (in) their first language (other than Urdu).

The responses supporting the usefulness of English were classified into five categories, while there were only two categories of responses about the usefulness of Urdu. Some of the respondents gave more than one reason and therefore their responses were put in more than one category (It is for this reason that the percentages given here add up to more than 100 percent).

The five categories into which the responses for studying English were divided were (in order of frequency): global language (167; 75.9 percent), education/reading (71; 32.27 percent), jobs/professional development (63; 28.6 percent), technology and development (61; 27.7 percent) and status symbol (30; 13.6 percent). The two categories for the importance of Urdu were: mother tongue/national identity/culture (195; 98.9 percent) and link language (39; 19.8 percent). The differences in the reasons given for learning Urdu and English were distinct. While all the five categories of reasons for the usefulness of English were essentially international and economic, the reasons for studying Urdu were national and emotional.

Some typical responses given by informants in response to questions that discussed the importance of English as a global language were, 'Because when we study English then we communicate with world' (1), 'English is the global language of communication and if we don't learn it we will be left behind' (239), 'To communicate with foreign countries to gain the knowledge' (35). The educational importance of English was realised as 'Without English we can not read the newest books that are written in English' (147), 'If you want to study higher, you must know English' (39), 'In higher study we can understand and seek the language' (35). The remarks written by informants who said that English was essential for professional development were amongst the most provocative. One informant simply wrote 'No English, No Future!' (95). This statement demonstrates the intensity with which students believe that English is a key to their future careers and prosperity.

Keeping abreast of modern technology was another motivation for studying English: one informant (198) stated, 'If we want to keep in touch with the technology development in the world, we should study English'. The last category of reasons for learning English was to gain social status. The informants showed awareness of linguistic discrimination. One informant (133) stated, 'If you apply for a job and don't know English, you will not get it. If you know English everyone respects you and give you special treatment, especially if you got a good pronunciation.' This reflects the respondents' frustrations about the government's dual policies of giving the elite and the moneyed class the privileges of enjoying an English language education, while the children of parents with lower income levels have no choice but to send their children to government schools where the medium of instruction is either Urdu or another regional language.

The responses to the question about the importance of Urdu were divided into two categories. However, these two categories are really sub-categories of a single main reason, i.e., national/domestic use, whether it concerns national identity or internal communication. Even informants who supported Urdu in schools stated in their responses that it is restricted in its repertoire of functions. One informant (6) stated that 'Urdu is our national language and we should know it, but in today's world if a person really want to achieve something he must know English', while another (146) said that 'Urdu should be learnt only because it is spoken all over the country', and yet another informant (151) said that 'The one and only reason [for studying Urdu] is that its our language'. These statements show that even those informants who stated that Urdu is an important language mostly said it because it was a national

language and for no other reason. This reflects the low status assigned to Urdu in comparison to English. English is the language of economic progress and vitality, while Urdu is a domestic language.

An important implication of the lower prestige for Urdu is that the informants did not feel it important enough to spend time studying it. One of the informants (146), after stating that the only purpose of learning Urdu is to have a national language of communication said, 'But we do not need to study it much because we can learn it at home/ This attitude has led to a sharp decline in the quality of Urdu language education. Hoodbhoy (personal communication) supports this finding. This poor performance in Urdu is a result of a lack of motivation to learn it. The informants in this study reflect the common belief that Urdu can be learnt at home and in the playgrounds, and is not a serious topic of study. This belief is rooted in the lack of economical incentives and prospects for people with Urdu medium education. On the other hand, the level of English proficiency in schools is also very low (Hoodbhoy, 1998). The reasons given for this are poor content knowledge of teachers and ineffective teaching materials and techniques. As a result, the students graduating from non-elite schools today can be labelled as semi-literate, i.e., although they are literate in at least two languages, their level of competency is minimal and they are not able to perform demanding tasks (e.g., writing a research report) in either of the languages.

Discussion: A Direction for Language Policy Planning in Pakistan

Languages in Pakistan are used for one or more of the following four purposes:
National economic progress,

International communication and access to modern sciences and technologies,

National identity formation and intranational communication, and Local/in-group/
regional communication.

These four areas represent aspects that language policy planners should take into consideration while framing a policy.

National economic development is the most crucial among these and is dependent on access to modern technology. Development in either of these areas needs people who are proficient in the English language. English is also the language of global communication and modern sciences. Thus, English serves the first two functions listed above and should be used in schools for all subjects related to technology and sciences at all levels of education and in all schools. A similar decision, which was popularly accepted, was made in Cameroon in 1958. The Cameroonian government chose to make English the sole medium of instruction in all primary schools (Todd, 1983). This was done to modernise the country as well as to avoid a politically controversial policy of selecting one or a few indigenous languages out of the almost 200 spoken in Cameroon as official/national language(s). Although there are some groups that fear that this policy will kill indigenous languages and cultures, most people accept it as the only viable road to the much-needed economic development.

Urdu, which serves the third purpose listed above, is viewed as the language for communication within the country and seen as a national symbol. Thus, based on the findings of the study and keeping in mind other historical factors, Urdu should be taught as a compulsory subject at all levels in all schools. However, it should not be the medium of education.

Other regional and ethnic languages only serve the fourth purpose. They are used for local/regional communication and are perceived as group markers. This role of language as an identity marker should not be downplayed because it plays a significant role in boosting self-image and self-confidence. These languages should be offered as optional subjects to students who want to learn it in communities where it is spoken as a majority language. This recognition of regional and ethnic languages and first language

literacy development will also improve the self-image of the people speaking minority languages. Cummins (1983), among other researchers who work on literacy development, has shown that literacy in first language helps literacy development in other languages. Thus, the development and use of native languages other than Urdu, and not just one provincial language, would not only be a politically astute decision, in that it will satisfy the need for official recognition of various linguistic/ethnic groups, but will also help in literacy development. In order to keep the costs of corpus development low, teachers should be actively encouraged to develop materials needed for teaching these languages. Incentives and recognition should be given to teachers who develop teaching materials in their indigenous languages.

In the above discussion, I am promoting a language in education policy that uses English as the medium of education in all schools and recognises the need to study Urdu and other vernaculars as well. Such a policy will maintain the three-language policy that is already in place and put it within a framework of linguistic pluralism (Cobarrubias, 1983). Minority languages will be given recognition and people speaking those languages will be supported in their efforts to develop their languages.

The major change that a policy based on the above observations will bring about is that it will reassign the roles different languages play in education at present in relation to their function, their value in the economic and social progress, and the importance that the people speaking those languages give to them. Literacy will be developed in an international language, a national language, and a local language. It is hard to disagree that unless the literacy rate increases, rapid economic development is unlikely. The development of literacy in a local language will boost the image of the people who speak it natively and will lower ethnic, linguistic, and regional tensions. The development of literacy in the national language will “boost intranational communication and will provide the people with a national lingua franca. And the development of literacy in the world language will open up Pakistan as an attractive destination for global investment. In addition, since English is a second language to all ethnic groups in Pakistan, no one group will have the benefit of being the ‘native speaker’.

However, the implementation of such a policy must be very carefully monitored and teachers should be trained in their content areas. Without sufficient teacher training and improvement of teaching materials, the inequalities among the private and government schools will not necessarily decrease. Thus, it is the implementation and the constant evaluation of this implementation that will achieve results. A passive policy decision without implementation cannot bring about any changes (Kennedy, 1983).

Conclusions

In this paper I have attempted to give a brief sketch of the historical overview of the English language policies in British India and in Pakistan. I have shown that the various Pakistani governments have maintained the British policies of providing education in both English and vernaculars. Such policies create two classes of people: one that is trained to rule the country and takes the highest paying jobs, and one that is expected to fill in the lower and middle level jobs that do not offer the same benefits. I have shown that the informants in my study are well aware of these issues and that they believe that the only way to achieve success in education and in life is to study (in) English.

However, Rubin (1983) does not seem to agree with this. She refers to two studies (Paulston, 1974 and Engle, 1975) and states, 'the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn...is that language is not the major causal variable in successful school achievement' (p. 12). An analysis of the number of students from various backgrounds (media of instruction) shows that, contrary to Rubin, language does play a vital role in the success of the students.

Romaine (1994:191) supports the position taken in this paper. She states that, 'Children who do not come to school with the kind of cultural and linguistic background supported in the schools are likely to experience conflict.' She further states that individuals who speak a low prestige language or speak in a non-standard variety have more difficulties in finding suitable employment than those speaking a standard variety. Romaine argues that the reason for this discrimination is linguistic because language proficiency is used as a measure of success.

Thus, in order to give equal opportunities to all, it is imperative that the language in education policy is so framed that all students have equal access to English. If a language policy has to be successful in providing equal opportunities to all, it should consider the attitudes of the people towards various languages in its formative stages. According to Rubin (1983:11):

If language policies are to serve both individual and national needs, the policies should try to address the following issues which Herbert Kelman (1971), social psychologist described: (a) how to establish and facilitate patterns of communication (both internally and internationally) that would enable its socio-economic institutions to function most effectively and equitably in meeting the needs and interests of the population; and (b) how to assure that different groups within the society, varying in their linguistic repertoires (for either ethnic or social class reasons), have equal access to the system and opportunities to participate in it.

And once a policy has been developed, its implementation and evaluation should be done responsibly and conscientiously using appropriate resources. Without proper implementation a policy remains, at best, impotent.

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Education in Pakistan: A Survey

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About the Author

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Abbreviations and Glossary

BE	Bachelor of Engineering
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GNP	Gross National Product
GOP	Government Of Pakistan
HDSA	Human Development South Asia
<i>Jihadi</i>	Islamic Militant
<i>Madrassa</i>	Religious Seminary (plural: <i>Madaris/ Madrassas</i>)
<i>Maktab</i>	Persian School (plural: <i>Makatib</i>)
MBA	Master of Business Administration
MBBS	Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery
MCS	Master of Computer Science
MIT	Master of Information Technology
<i>Mullah</i>	Islamic-Pakistani equivalent of clergymen
<i>Munshi</i>	Clerk
<i>Muallim</i>	Teacher
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
<i>Radd-Xaxis</i>	Sectarian polemic texts refuting other sects' beliefs (coined by the author)
<i>Shari'ah</i>	Islamic law
SPARC	Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child
UGC	University Grants Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN: A SURVEY

Introduction

Every year the Government of Pakistan (GOP) publishes some report or the other about education. If it does not publish a specific report about education, at least the *Economic Survey of Pakistan* carries a chapter on education. These reports confess that the literacy rate is low, the rate of participation in education at all levels is low, and the country is spending too little in this area. Then there are brave promises about the future, such as the achievement of hundred-percent literacy, increase in spending on education (which has been hovering around 2 percent of the gross national product [GNP] since 1995) to at least 4 percent, and so on.

Not much is done, although increases in the numbers of schools, universities and religious seminaries (*madaris*; singular: *madrassa*) are recorded. The private school sector mints millions of rupees and thousands of graduates through the market, unable to get the jobs they aspired to. The held of education is a graveyard of these aspirations. The following indicators point grimly to where Pakistan stands in South Asia.

	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Nepal</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>	<i>Sri Lanka</i>
Children not reaching Grade 5 (1995-1999 percentages)	30	48	56	50	3
Combined enrolment as a percentage of total	36	54	61	43	66

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1991-2000) in Human Development South Asia (HDSA) (2002: 51)

The Historical Legacy

South Asia is heir to very ancient traditions of both formal and informal learning. These traditions varied from region to region and, more importantly, between different socioeconomic classes. The very poorest people generally received no education at all, while those in the upper echelons of the social hierarchy learnt languages, literature, theology and a few other subjects.

According to G.W. Leitner, the well-known functionary of the British Empire who said that the British colonial venture had mined indigenous education in the Punjab, there were 300,000 pupils in indigenous schools before the conquest of that province in 1849, whereas in 1860-61 these numbers had come down to 60,168 pupils (However, Leitner also has a higher figure of 120,000 pupils) (Leitner, 1882:16). Leitner's report does not establish the higher figures but it is useful in that it tells us what kind of schools existed and the names some of the texts taught at them.

South Asian Muslims—who are in a majority in Pakistan (96.16 percent), the focus of this survey—were educated at the *makatib* (Persian schools; singular: *maktab*) and *madaris* (Arabic schools). As there were more Persian than Arabic schools (Edn. NWP [1850], which gives 903 Persian and 150 Arabic schools), it seems that the aim of education was primarily pragmatic, i.e., to equip people for the business of this world rather than the next: since Persian was the language of the highest domains of power—the government, bureaucracy, judiciary, education, etc.—it was necessary to learn it in order to function as a *munshi* (clerk), a *muallim* (teacher), and generally as any state functionary.

The British substituted English for Persian (Rahman, 1996: 22-38) and introduced Urdu, which was the informal lingua franca of North India but had not hitherto been taught formally in schools by Muslim rulers, in the education system (Rahman, 2002: 210-218). This was a revolution as it created a new basis

for socioeconomic stratification. The very poorest people, especially those living in the peripheries, continued to remain illiterate as there were no schools —at least, not affordable ones —where they lived. However, some of them did study in the *madaris*, which, being charitable organisations, did not charge tuition fees and even provided free food and lodging. Working class, lower middle class, and middle class children attended the vernacular schools established by the British authorities. Children of the upper classes and of the higher Indian officers of the British bureaucracy and military attended English medium institutions. In short, the medium of instruction roughly corresponded to one's position in the hierarchy of wealth and power in the state.

In the areas now comprising Pakistan, Urdu was the most commonly used medium of instruction in government schools. In the province of Sindh, however, Sindhi was also used. There were convent schools and armed forces schools for the rich and the powerful, which used English as the medium of instruction. All higher education in colleges and universities was also in English. The *madaris* used Urdu as well as the indigenous languages as media of instruction. Except for the *madaris* and the private English schools, the government controlled, or at least influenced, all other educational institutions. These also remained obvious symbols of the educational caste system, with the upper classes using English almost like a first language and being completely alienated from both their vernacular-school compatriots and the *madrassa*-educated '*mullay*' (equivalent of clergymen; singular: *mullah*).

Education in Pakistan

Beginning with the National Education Conference of 1947, there have been at least 22 major reports on education issued by the government from time to time. Among the most salient ones are *Report of the Commission on National Education* (GOP, 1959); *The New Education Policy* (GOP, 1970); *The Education Policy (1972-1980)* (GOP, 1972); *National Education Policy* (GOP, 1992) and the *National Education Policy. 1998-2010* (GOP, 1998). The present military government has issued several reports, including the controversial and much criticised *Report of the Task Force on Higher Education* (GOP 2002b).

These educational reports touch upon all kinds of educational institutions but they focus more on modern education provided in the government schools, colleges and universities. For the *madaris*, the government commissioned separate reports, of which the best known are *The Report of the National Committee on the Religious Seminaries* (GOP, 1979b) and a comprehensive report on the *Madaris* (GOP, 1988). After discounting all the rhetoric about development, several salient features of the state's real educational policy become clear. They are as follows:

1. To allow the status quo to prevail as far as possible —i.e., a class-based system of education functioning in different languages: the vernaculars for the common people and English for the elite;
2. To use Islam and Pakistani nationalism to prevent ethnic groups from breaking away from the centre and to build a modern, cohesive nation out of different linguistic and ethnic groups; and
3. To enhance literacy, impart skills and create an educated workforce capable of running a developing society.

These features were mutually contradictory at times. The first feature, of which the decision-makers may not have been conscious, was actually the result of unequal distribution of educational funds and the educational bureaucracy's inertia. Thus, while government schools in the rural areas do not even have chairs for the pupils, the great so-called 'public' schools ('public' in the sense of the public schools of Britain, such as Eton and Harrow) offer not only facilities but also luxuries for their pupils.

The second aim, that of nation-building through Islam and Pakistani nationalism, was a conscious objective but it was not always pursued in the same manner or with equal vigour. Enuring General Zia-ul-Haq's regime (1977-1988), the Islamisation of education and textbooks was more thorough than at any other time.

The third aim, that of improving literacy and other educational skills through conscious efforts, suffered as a result of the other two. The elite's children found it much easier to enter elitist domains of power, while ordinary government school pupils found it much more difficult; the students of *madaris* were, in reality, barred from them. Thus, the workforce was almost as class differentiated as a result of the education process as society otherwise was.

The Present Educational Scene

The present educational scene is full of contradictions. On the one hand, there are dynamic, fast-moving educational institutions charging exorbitant fees, while on the other there are almost free or very affordable government schools as well as religious seminaries, which are entirely free. The students of these institutions live in different worlds and operate in different languages. They are not, however, educated in their mother tongues. These are spoken by the percentages of the population given below, the total population being 132,352,000:

Mother Tongue	Speakers in Total Population
Punjabi	44.15%
Pashto	15.42%
Sindhi	14.10%
Siraiki	10.53%
Urdu	7.57%
Balochi	3.57%
Others	4.66%

Source: Table 2.7 in GOP, 2001:107

Such diversity, leading to extreme polarisation and divisiveness in society, can be potentially dangerous. However, to understand this danger, let us look at all major types of educational institutions: schools, *madaris* and institutions of higher education, that is, colleges and universities.

Schools

The situation of schools is given as follows in a recent government source (GOP, 2002a: 146):

Level	Number	Student Strength	Teachers
Primary	169,089	19,921,232	345,457
Middle	19,180	4,278,392	99,098
Secondary	13,108	1,795,444	66,522

After ten years of schooling, students sit examinations held by the different Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education in the country. The teaching and the examinations are both conducted in Urdu, except in parts of (mostly rural) Sindh, where Sindhi is used instead. Some schools do, however, teach in English so that students appear for the Matriculation examination in English too.

Most students from elitist English medium schools appear for the British Ordinary (O) and Advanced (A) Level school examinations, which demand much higher competence in English than the Pakistani system does. Most of the 511,077 students, being from Urdu medium schools, study the textbooks provided by the Textbook Boards of their provinces, Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) or Balochistan. These textbooks use Islam and Pakistani nationalism to promote Pakistani nationhood among the different linguistic and cultural groups that constitute Pakistan, including Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baloch and the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs, belonging to families of immigrants from India (For a discussion of ethnic politics, see Amin, 1988; Rahman, 199% and Ahmed, 1998). There is also much glorification of war and the military and many anti-Hindu and anti-India remarks interspersed throughout the books (For detailed analysis, see Aziz, 1993; Saigol, 1995 and Rahman, 2002a: 515-524. For a comparison between the history textbooks of India and Pakistan, see Kumar, 2001). Possibly because of such textual propaganda, students of these institutions are more prone to militancy than their English-school counterparts, as will be discussed later. The following matrix indicates the medium of instruction at schools in different regions of Pakistan:

Medium	Punjab	Islam abad	NWFP (FATA)	Sindh	Baloch istan	AJK	FANA	Federal Govt (Cantt.)	Total
Urdu	67,490	368	13,556	3,657	9,939	6,009	1,370	167	102,55
Sindhi	0	0	0	36,750	0	0	0	0	36,750
Pashto	0	0	10,731 (Primary)	0	0	0	0	0	10,731
Mixed (Urdu & Sindhi)				1,394				0	1,394
•English	22355	309	3995 326 (FATA)	5943	465				33,893
Total	90,345	677	28,608	47,744	10,404	6,009	1,370	167	185,324
- =No information available, AJK=Azad Jammu and Kashmir, FANA=FederalIly Administrated Northern Areas, FATA=Federaly Administrated Tribal Areas									
Sources: Government of Sindh, 1998 (for Sindh); Government of Punjab, 1998 (for Punjab); data from Cantonment and Directorate of Federal Government Institutions, Rawalpindi is incomplete; Census Private (2001), Table 1:12 (for English medium schools).									

Besides the Urdu and Sindhi medium schools, the government also runs some English medium schools, known as model schools, in urban centres. The armed forces too run such schools. In addition to these, there were 33,893 English medium schools spread all over Pakistani cities and even small towns (Census Private 2001, Table 1: 12). Almost all such schools that the author visited claimed to use English, though some did concede that they also used Urdu or Sindhi as an alternative medium of instruction. They are in much public demand because they claim to use English as a medium of instruction. Parents go to incredible lengths, sometimes depriving themselves of basic necessities, to teach their children in schools advertising themselves as 'English medium' because they feel that the most powerful and lucrative jobs within the country will be within the reach of their children if only they learn English. Thus, for the purposes of empowerment —in common with other ex-colonies (Pennycook, 2000) — English medium schools are very popular.

For a survey this author carried out in 1999-2000 to determine the opinions of young people that might be relevant for society and politics, English medium schools were divided into three categories: 1) Ordinary, 2) Elitist and 3) Cadet Colleges and Public Schools (see Rahman, 2002a, Appendix 14). The Ordinary English medium schools were classified as those charging monthly tuition fees between PRs50 and PRs1,499. These cater for ordinary, lower-middle and middle class people. Some only call

themselves ‘English medium’ while actually teaching in Urdu because neither teachers nor students are sufficiently competent in English.

Schools in the second category charged tuition fees ranging from PRs.1,500 to PRs10,000 and more per month. The teachers and students are much more exposed to English in informal settings —the home, peer group, cable television, comic books, foreign travel, etc. —than their counterparts in other schools. English is used informally by children in schools in upscale residential localities.

Schools in the third category, of cadet colleges and public schools, cater more to the powerful elite than the wealthy. Most of them are influenced by the armed forces. The tuition fees for the wards of the armed forces is generally lower than that for civilians. While English is the medium of instruction, the students tend not to use it informally with each other. Among such schools are Cadet College Pitro (Navy); Military College Sarai Alamgir, Jhelum (Army); Burn Hall College, Abbottabad (Army); Cadet College Sargodha (Air Force) and others. Public schools on the lines of Eton and Harrow, such as the Aitchison College in Lahore, are run by Boards of Governors (or Trustees). In most cases, the top brass of the army has a presence on the boards.

Stated Polity and Real Policy

The stated official policy of the government is that public money will be spent on schools that will use Urdu (and, only in parts of Sindh, Sindhi) as the medium of instruction. It is often stated that private educational institutions are run by private resources and enterprise. However, even during the British colonial period, the English medium schools, called European Schools at that time, cost more. A report of 1941 puts this as follows:

The cost of European Education is high compared with education in India generally, the cost per pupil in Anglo-Indian and European Institutions being Rs. 156 against Rs. 14 only in all types of institutions from a university to a primary school. (Edn-Ind, 1941: 113).

The report explains that the public funds are used to meet only 31 percent of the expenses of the European Schools, whereas the rest comes from fees. However, even this comes to Rs.48.36 per pupil per year, which was Rs.34 more than the average amount (Rs.14) spent on ordinary Indian students. In short, whatever the stated policy might be, the real one was to subsidise the education of the Anglicised elite. This policy continues to date.

In Pakistan the armed forces and the higher bureaucracy use English for official purposes. Thus, they were interested in obtaining young people who were competent in that language. Moreover, the elite, who aimed for jobs in the modern domains of power —the officer corps of the armed forces, higher bureaucracy, superior judiciary, commerce, media, higher education, etc. —were very desirous of teaching English to their children. They could either buy English medium education at exorbitant cost at the private elitist schools or they could establish institutions where English would be the medium of instruction but the cost would be lower —at least, for their own wards. It was for the latter purpose that General Ayub Khan, as the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army in the 1950s, established ‘a number of cadet colleges and academies’ (Khan, 1967: 43). In 1966 the students from less privileged institutions protested against these institutions. A commission on students’ welfare and problems agreed that such schools violated the constitutional assurance that ‘all citizens are equal before law (Paragraph 15 under Right No. VI)’ (GOP, 1966: 18) but defended them as follows:

Such establishments are intended to produce better type of students who would be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defense service of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive positions

in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and corporations (GOP, 1966:18).

As a result, the cadet colleges multiplied. Indeed, the armed forces through the Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen Foundation (Air Force) and the Bahria Foundation (Navy) created many more institutions from the 1970s onwards.

The cadet colleges are subsidised by the state as the following figures indicate:

Institution	Cost in 1998-99 (PRs)
Cadet College Palandri	8,181,000
Cadet College Razmak	11,887,000
Cadet College Sanghar	5,000,000
Cadet College Larkana	10,000,000

Source: *Expenditure*, 1999, Vol. 2:1,461-1,642 and Vol 1.: 1,084.

The cost of an ordinary Urdu medium school, such as the ones that are available for most ordinary children in the country, is PRs3,580,000 per year. It is because of this that, while cadet colleges have excellent boarding and lodging arrangements, spacious playgrounds, equipped libraries and laboratories and faculty with masters' degrees, the ordinary Urdu (and Sindhi) medium schools sometimes do not even have benches for pupils to sit on. In short, contrary to its stated policy of spending public funds on giving the same type of schooling to all, the state (and its institutions) actually spend more funds on privileged children for a privileged (English medium) form of schooling. This perpetuates the socioeconomic inequalities that have always existed in Pakistani society.

Socioeconomic Class and World View

In Pakistan socioeconomic class affects world view in general. Relevant for those interested in violent social change, religious militancy or war with India are questions relating to the distribution of resources, the introduction of Islamic law (*Sliari'a*) and Kashmir. The survey mentioned above posed questions given below the responses to which indicate how socioeconomic class stands in relation to these potentially explosive issues:

		Urdu Medium Schools (N=520)	Elitist English Medium Schools (N=97)	Cadet Colleges (N*86)	Ordinary English Medium Schools (NM19)
Q. What should be Pakistan's priorities?					
(a)	Conquer Kashmir?				
	Agree	95.58	62.89	88.37	88.24
	Disagree	02.12	31.96	06.98	06.72
	Don't Care	02.31	05.15	04.65	05.04
(b)	Develop nuclear uvafwus'				
	Agree	79.81	64.95	79.09	73.11
	Disagree	13.65	26.80	15.12	18.49
	Don't Care	06.54	08.25	05.81	08.40

(c)	Implement the Islamic Law?				
	Agree	95.58	52.58	79.07	86.55
	Disagree	01.73	23.71	05.81	01.68
	Don't Care	02.69	23.71	15.12	11.76
(c)	Give equal rights to religious minorities?				
	Agree	44.04	53.61	33.72	47.90
	Disagree	33.68	22.68	39.54	28.57
	Don't Care	23.71	23.71	26.74	23.53
Q.	<i>Do you want the language used for higher jobs in flip state and the private sector to continue to be English?</i>				
	Yes	27.69	72.16	70.93	45.38
	No	71.15	27.84	29.07	53.78
	No reply	01.15	0	0	0.84
Source: Rahman, 2002a, Appendix 14.7					

As we can see, children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, such as those in the Urdu medium and the ordinary English medium schools, support an aggressive foreign policy and more Islamisation leading to less tolerance for religious minorities. They are also dissatisfied with policies that make powerful jobs the monopoly of the English-using powerful elite.

Children in the cadet colleges, because they belong to middle class backgrounds and are subjected to regimentation in their institutions, support aggressive policies but are less supportive of Islamisation than students of Urdu medium and ordinary English medium schools.

Children of elitist schools, being exposed to Western sources of information and role models, are least supportive of militant policies and Islamisation. They are also the most tolerant towards religious minorities but they are alienated from the peoples' culture and aspirations and desire to preserve and perpetuate their privileged position by supporting English as the language of the domains of power in the country.

Such acute divisiveness along socioeconomic class lines, combined with religious intolerance, can lead to further political unrest in Pakistan. Such unrest will probably be expressed through the idiom of religion. However, poverty and alienation from the privileged classes will probably be the major motivating factors for the disgruntled and jobless young men who will come out of the educational institutions for the underprivileged.

Madaris

The *madaris* are associated with the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan who were students of these institutions (see Rashid, 2000). They have also been much in the news for sectarian killings and supporting militancy in Kashmir. They are considered the breeding ground of the '*jihadi*' culture—a term used for Islamic militancy in the English-language press of Pakistan.

At Independence, there were 137, or even fewer, *madaris*. In April 2002, Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, put the figure at 10,000, with 1.7 million students (ICG, 2002: 2). They belong to the major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shias. However, Pakistan being a predominantly Sunni country, the Shia *madaris* are very few. Among the Sunni *madaris*, there are three sub-sects: Deobandis, Barelvis and the Ahl-e-Hadith (*salafi*). Besides these, the revivalist Jamat-

e-Islami also has its own *madaris*. Whereas the Deobandis have a strict interpretation of Islam that disallows the veneration of saints, the Barelvis follow popular Islam, which venerates saints and allows folk interpretations of the faith. The Ahl-e-Hadith are a puritanical sect close to the Saudi Wahabi interpretation of Islam. The Saudi Arabia based organisation, Harmain Islamic Foundation, has been giving funds to the Ahl-e-Hadith, which has made them powerful. Indeed, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, an organisation that has been active in fighting in Kashmir, belongs to the Ahl-e-Hadith (Ahmed, 2002:10).

In recent years, the Deobandi influence has increased and the Taliban were trained in their seminaries. According to Khalid Ahmed, one of the most knowledgeable commentators on the religious scene in Pakistan, ‘The largest number of seminaries are Deobandi, at 64 percent, followed by Barelvi, at 25 percent. Only 6 percent are Ahle Hadith. But the increase in the number of Ahle Hadith seminaries or *madrassas* has been phenomenal at 131 percent, going up from 134 in 1988 to 310 in 2000’ (Ahmed, 2002: 10). The table below contains information from 1988. It is being reproduced here only because there is no reliable information on these lines at present.

Breakdown of Madaris by Sect

Province	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahl-e-Hadith	Shia	Others	Total of Provinces (1988)*	Total of Provinces (2002)**
Punjab	590	548	118	21	43	1,320	3,100
NWFP	631	32	5	2	8	678	1,200
Sindh	208	61	6	10	6	291	900 (+300 in FATA)
Balochistan	278	34	3	1	31	347	700
Azad Kashmir	51	20	2	-	3	76	Not given
Islamabad	51	20	-	2	3	76	100
Northern Areas	60	2	27	11	3	103	150
Girls’ Madaris	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	448
Total of Sects	1,869	717	161	47	97	2,891	6,898 (102 not accounted for)
FATA=Federally Administered Tribal Areas							
Sources: *GOP, 1988; **Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC), 2001: 53.							

If present numbers are to be calculated, Khalid Ahmed’s data given above may be used in combination with the data of 2002 given here. However, as mentioned earlier, the sect-wise numbers of *madaris* is not known to this author.

The *madrassa* students are the most intolerant of all the other student groups in Pakistan. They are also the most supportive of an aggressive foreign policy. The following responses in the author’s survey mentioned above indicates this:

Madaris (N=131)				
Q. What should be Pakistan's priorities?				
		Agree	Disagree	Pint Case
(a)	Conquer Kashmir	99.24	0	0.76
(b)	Develop nuclear weapons	96.18	1.53	2.29
(c)	Implement <i>Sharia'h</i>	97.71	0.76	1.53
(d)	Give equal rights to religious minorities	6.87	81.68	11.45
Q. Do you want the language of higher jobs in the state and the private sector to continue to be English?				
		Yes 10.69	No 89.31	No reply 0
Note: Response figures are percentages. Source: Survey 2000 in Rahman, 2002a, Appendix 14.7:592-596				

The figures are self-explanatory. What needs explanation is that the *madaris*, which were conservative institutions before the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s, are both ideologically activist and sometimes militant. According to Peter L. Bergen, author of a book on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group: 'Nowhere is bin Laden more popular than in Pakistan's *madrassas*, religious schools from which the Taliban draw many of its recruits' (Bergen, 2001: 150). Even with the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the *madaris* have plenty of zealous young people who can potentially act as crusaders against both Western interests and the moderate regimes, military as well civilian, whom they perceive as the allies of the West (for Central Asian parallels, see Rashid (2002), an excellent book on militant Islamic movements in that part of the world).

General Pervez Musharraf's military government, in an attempt to control religious extremism, made a law to control the *madaris*. *This law — Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 —* has, however, been rejected by most of the *madaris*, which want no state interference in their affairs.

The *madaris* are not 'frozen in time' as A.H. Nayyar, an academic and writer on educational matters, wrote about them (Nayyar, 1997: 215-250). The education they impart has two aspects. Most of the formal courses are, indeed, medieval. They are in Arabic and Persian, the classical languages of Islam in South Asia, which students memorise without much real understanding. This part serves as a symbol of identity and continuity. The other part comprises Urdu textbooks that are read by the final year graduating students. These are polemical texts that refute the beliefs of the other sub-sects of Islam as well as modern ideas. Among the latter are capitalism, socialism, democracy, modernism, individualism, etc. As *radd* is the Urdu word for refutation, this author calls them '*radd-texts*'. These *radd-texts* have a tremendous formative influence on the minds of the young *mullay* because they are in Urdu, which they understand very well. Moreover, their arguments are simple and already familiar to them through the sermons of other *mullay*. Thus, the clergy is engaged with the modern world but on its own terms and according to its own perceptions of it. Being so actively engaged and having such beliefs about reform, the *madaris* are not frozen in time; they aspire to take time in their own hands.

While the refutation of other sub-sects can lead to sectarian hatred, the refutation of modern ideas leads to opposition to the modern state and the process of colonisation that introduced modernity to South Asia during the British era.

The *madaris* became militant when they were used by the Pakistani state to fight in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and then in Kashmir so as to force India to leave the state. Pakistan's claim on Kashmir, as discussed by many, including Alastair Lamb (1997), has led to conflict with India and the Islamic militants (*Jihadis*) have entered the fray since 1989. The United States of America indirectly, and sometimes directly, helped in creating militancy among the *clergy*. For instance, special textbooks

in Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashto were written at the University of Nebraska-Omaha with a US AID grant in the 1980s (Stephens and Ottaway, 2002, Sec A:1). American arms and money flowed to Afghanistan through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence as several books indicate (Cooley, 1999). At that time all this was done to defeat the Soviet Union. Later, while Pakistan's military kept using the militant Islamists in Kashmir, the United States was much alarmed by them —not without reason as the events of 9/11 demonstrated later.

Apart from the *madaris* themselves, religious parties —such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin — print militant literature, which circulates among the *madaris* and other institutions. Although these parties have been banned, their members are dispersed all over Pakistani society, especially among the *madaris*. The *madaris*, especially the Deobandi *madaris* of NWFP, Balochistan and South Punjab, are potential centres of Islamic militancy in Pakistan.

Higher Educational Institutions

There are 755 colleges (UGC, 1999) and 80 universities in Pakistan (*The News*, 17 July 2002). Out of these, about 35 colleges and 35 universities are in the private sector.

While students join universities after high school in Western countries, they usually go to colleges for their bachelor's degrees in Pakistan. Public universities generally begin at the master's level, though some universities do have three-year BA (Honours) courses.

The colleges are affiliated with universities. They teach for the undergraduate degree for two years, after which students *appear* for the examinations of the relevant university. Courses are not evaluated by the lecturers, but only through the final examinations of the university. Such a system forces students to cram guides based on past examination papers and to regard all education as examination-oriented. The lecturers are promoted on the basis of seniority and not on published research. As such, they are generally stagnant and have little knowledge of academic developments in their field.

The tuition fees of public colleges are affordable for even the working classes so they used to be the meeting place of students from elitist English medium schools as well as the Urdu ones. This, however, is changing very fast because private entrepreneurs are establishing colleges with very high tuition fees. These are mostly in lucrative fields of employment, such as information technology, business, commerce, engineering, medicine and law, although some colleges (out of the 35 in the private sector) catering for the humanities have also emerged recently.

Pakistan had only two universities in the public sector in 1947. Now the number has gone up to 45 and is still increasing. Moreover, private institutions, calling themselves 'universities', are mushrooming in all cities. Some of these institutions are not recognised by the University Grants Commission (UGC) set up by the Government of Pakistan, but they are flourishing anyway.

The public universities are colonial institutions. Universities were set up by the British colonial government in 1857 to educate the subordinate bureaucracy because it was very costly to import it from Britain. Moreover, recruiting Indians was thought to strengthen British rule by giving Indians a sense of participation in running the affairs of the state (Basu, 1952: 303). These universities were dominated by the government, as their chief executive officers (called vice chancellors), were appointed by the government and the chancellors were governors or viceroys. The universities lacked funds for quality research or attracting the best minds to academia; they emphasised teaching rather than research and they were, for the most part, subordinate appendages of the bureaucracy (Shils, 1970). Pakistani universities retained these characteristics with the result that they did not attract the best minds in the country either and, therefore, lacked in quality research (Rahman, 1999:120-142).

Recently, the mushrooming of universities has affected the image of the public universities very adversely. First, most new public universities have been created in response to the political demand from local pressure groups that their city or region should have a university. The new university hires former college lecturers as faculty and some well-connected people, not necessarily academics but former bureaucrats as well as military officers, become vice chancellors, registrars and treasurers, etc. This means that what little research was needed in public universities (5 research papers to be promoted associate professor and 8 for a full professorship), is not insisted upon, further lowering the academic credibility of Pakistani academics in general.

The other problem is that funds, already woefully inadequate, have to be spread out more widely. In an article written in 1998, the author had shown that if the cost per student per year is adjusted with the 1985 prices as base, the real cost per student had decreased for all public universities. In the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, the foremost institution of higher learning in Pakistan, it had gone down in real terms from PRs37,430 to PRs13,983 per year per student (Rahman, 1999:131). This trend has continued, with the figures being as follows for some major public universities:

University	Enrolment	Departments	Unit Cost per Student per Year
University of Peshawar	17,134	35	Rs. 23,497 (\$338)
University of the Punjab	9,972	43	Rs. 59,000 (\$975)
University of Karachi	12,255	43	Rs. 27,160 (\$449)
University of Balochistan	2,000	31	Rs. 77,000 (\$1,273)

Sources: UGC, 2001 and database at UGC, Islamabad.

While the government spent US\$ 1,080 per student per year in 1987, it spent only US\$450 in 2001. This is a reduction of 62 percent. In 2002, more public universities have been added, so that the spending per student has decreased further. This translates into very little expensive laboratory equipment, almost no academic journals, very few new books and no inter-library loan system for borrowing dissertations and reports. As such, if any academics are doing research in public universities, they are doing so despite the system and not because of it.

The mushrooming of private universities teaching subjects supposedly leading to lucrative employment is undermining the concept that, among other things, a university education enlightens a person and gives him or her the knowledge to understand the human significance of policies and advances in knowledge. Moreover, the educational apartheid that starts in schools —with the rich and the powerful studying in elitist English medium private schools and cadet colleges —continues in the domain of higher education too. Elitist children, after British O and A Level school examinations, go on to study in private colleges and universities charging exorbitant tuition fees. The following figures bring out the difference between the fees of the public and the private universities.

Tuition Fees Structure at Public Universities

University	Per Annum Fees at the Postgraduate Level
Punjab University	PRs1,320
Quaid-i-Azam University	PRs1,350

US\$1 = PRs60
Source: UCC, 2001

Tuition Fees Structure at Private Universities

University	Fees (Pak rupees)	Duration	Subject and Level
Al-Khair	100,000	2 Years	MCS/MIT
Bahai	47,500	Per Semester	MBA
	2,27,000	Per Year	MBBS
Greenwich	9000	Per Course	MBA
Hamdard	8,500	Per Course	MBA
	72,000	Per Year	MBBS
Iqra	12,000	Per Course	MBA
Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)	1,74,000	Per Year	MBA
Aga Khan University	3,92,000	Per year	MBBS
GIKI (Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Science and Technology)	1,50,000	Per Year	BE
BE=Bachelor of Engineering, MBA=Master of Business Administration, MBBS=Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery, MCS=Master of Computer Science; MIT=Master of Information Technology Source; UGC, 2001			

Besides the tuition fees, examination, admission and other types of fees also exist in both kinds of universities but, of course, they are far higher in the private sector than in the public sector.

The fact that private colleges and universities are attended by rich young people, who are generally fluent in English and have tremendous self-confidence bordering on arrogance, makes them appear to be 'good' institutions. The fact, however, is that the faculty is generally part-time rather than full-time and this part-time faculty is from the public sector universities. Except in some universities, such as the Aga Khan University, LUMS and GIKI, the faculty members are not published academics. In some, they do not even have PhD or other research degrees. The classes are, generally speaking, air-conditioned and the furniture is better than in the public universities. However, taken as a whole, the private universities charge far more than the quality of education they offer.

Nevertheless, the elitist glitter of the private universities has had the effect of ghettoising the public universities, which, like the Urdu medium schools, are increasingly being seen as substandard, poor, incompetent and 'lower class' institutions. In addition, the private universities are generally not governed by academics. Thus, the autonomy and power of academics, such as it was, is being eroded even further.

Moreover, the idea of the university as a liberal institution where one is exposed to new ideas is also under threat. Most private universities, especially those run by the armed forces, are highly regimented and academics do not run them. Thus, academics, who are called 'teachers' and not 'academics', are treated at par with hired tutors who are supposed to provide a service for payment but have no part in the governance of the institution.

The recently announced policy on higher education contained in *The Report of the Task Force on Higher Education* (GOP, 2002) has announced more funds for the public universities. However, it has met with a lot of criticism from Pakistani academics because it has not increased the autonomy of the universities nor given an increased role to faculty members in running universities (Rahman, 2002b). The amount of the promised money has not yet been disclosed and, with so many universities opening up, it is feared that it will prove to be inadequate and the public universities will suffer from more ghettoisation. In short, the government's proposed reforms will increase the subordination of the public

university —this time to ‘civil society’ (which probably means powerful people from non-government organisations [NGOs], the corporate sector and other powerful institutions) in addition to government bureaucracy — without making it more competent.

Conclusions

To sum up, the state of education in Pakistan is woefully unsatisfactory. The *madaris*, the Urdu (and Sindhi) medium schools and the English medium schools cater for different socioeconomic classes and further increase the alienation that exists between these classes. The system is unjust in that it distributes the most lucrative and powerful jobs most advantageously to the elite, which is educated at English medium institutions. Meanwhile, the *madrassa*-educated people and the failures from the Urdu medium schools join the increasing army of the unemployed who use the idiom of religion to express their defused sense of being cheated of their rights. Hence, the unjust system of schooling may increase Islamic militancy in Pakistan, which will be as much an expression of resentment against the present policies of the ruling elite as commitment to Islamising the society.

The system of higher education is further splitting up the Pakistani educational institutions according to socioeconomic class, with the public colleges and universities being ghettoised and the private ones becoming coveted, elitist institutions just as the English medium schools already are. This is making everybody, except the upper socioeconomic classes, frustrated because they feel that they can no longer afford the best kind of higher education for their children.

On the whole, then, Pakistan needs to change its educational policies so as to end this apartheid that threatens to disrupt society. This is easier said than done because a society of over 160 million people needs vast resources for anything as ambitious as the provision of an adequate and standard education.

Annexure A

Educational Levels and Costs in Pakistan

Institutions	Years	Level	Average Monthly fees (in PRs)	Socioeconomic Class
Madaris	15-16	Almiya (_M.A)	0 (In some, fee is charged.)	Poor and rural children (mostly boys)
Government Schools (Urdu and Sindhi Medium)	10	Matriculation	PRs0-25	Working classes/ lower middle classes
English Medium	10	Matriculation	PRs50-1,499	Lower middle classes/ middle classes
English Medium (cadet colleges, armed forces schools, etc.)	12	Intermediate	PRs500-3,000	Middle classes (in some cases wards of officials pay less)
English Medium (Private Elitist)	11	British Ordinary Level (O Level)	PRs1,500-10,000+	Middle classes and above
English Medium (Private Elitist)	13	British Advanced Level (A Level)	PRs6,000-10,000+	Upper middle classes and above
Government Colleges	11-14	Intermediate and undergraduate	PRs50-150	Lower middle classes and above
Public Universities	15-16	Postgraduate and above	PRs100-200	Lower middle classes and above
Private Universities/ Colleges	13-16	Undergraduate and postgraduate	PRs5,000-15,000	Middle classes and above
NB: US\$1=PRs60 in July 2002 Source: Author's field research.				

Annexure B

ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT PAKISTAN'S EDUCATION

Enrolment Ratio	Overall 35.98%	Male 41.19%	Female 30.35%	Rural: 29.11% Urban: 49.71%
Education Up to School Level	Below Primary 18.30%	Primary (i.e., 5 years) 30.14%	Middle (i.e., 8 years) 20.89%	Matriculation (i.e., 10 years) 17.29%
Education Above School Level	Intermediate (i.e., 12 years) 6.56%	Undergraduate (i.e., 14 years) 4.38%	Postgraduate (i.e., 16 years) 1.58%	Others (e.g., postgraduate diplomas) 0.85%
Literacy	Overall 34.92%	Urban 63.08%	Rural 33.64%	54.81% Male: 32.02% Female: -
Source: GOP, 2001, Tables 2.15, 2.19 and 2.21				

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SPO DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

**The Goal of Workers’
Welfare and Policy Challenges**

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About the Author

Ms. Maliha Shamim is working as an Associate Programme Coordinator Research and Communication at Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO) since July 2002. She is the author of To Make a Stone a Flower, a book recently published by SPO documenting development cases from different parts of Pakistan. Ms. Shamim has been engaged in development research for the past three years and has co-authored two research papers and conducted a number of qualitative research studies on diverse issues. Born in Karachi in 1977, Maliha completed her master's degree in anthropology from the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in 2000.

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Abbreviations

EOBI	Employees Old Age Benefit Institution
ESSI	Employers Social Security Institute
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NRSP	National Rural Support Programme
SPDC	Social Policy Development Centre
TEPI	Trade, Export Promotion and Industry (programme)
WWB	Workers Welfare Board

THE GOAL OF WORKERS' WELFARE AND POLICY CHALLENGES

Introduction

The Trade, Export Promotion and Industry (TEPI) programme is part of the Structural Adjustments Programme being pursued in Pakistan for the past decades as part of the reforms suggested by Breton Woods Institutions. It aims at the privatisation of 33 public manufacturing enterprises employing almost 12,000 workers.

In the long run, the TEPI programme is expected to bring enhanced industrial efficiency and demand for exports. However, in the short run, it will have a negative impact on the poor of Pakistan. To cushion the expected deterioration in the socioeconomic conditions of the redundant workers, the programme is coupled with a number of mitigating measures. Existing social safety nets are to be mobilised for this purpose. However, the adequacy of these nets for addressing all the issues that will arise is questionable, as this paper explains.

The country is presently facing an imbalance between economic and social development. In pursuit of certain economic policies, social development is suffering. Economic adjustments are not leaving any room for people-centred policies, which can only be achieved through effective partnership between policy makers and those at the receiving end.

Recent efforts of the government to alleviate poverty from the country have culminated in an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). The paper has been criticised for the fact that, although it aims to guide government policies for the next five years, it does not mention any policies for redundant industrial labour. Although emphasis has been laid on pursuing the policy of privatisation of public units, no mitigation measures have been advised to provide relief to laid-off workers. The paper has been produced without any consultations with labourers who actually bear the brunt of increasing poverty at the micro level.

This paper is based on data collected from major industrialised cities of Pakistan, namely Peshawar, Faisalabad, Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi, for the TEPI programme. After giving a definition of welfare, the paper outlines the experience of public and private sector industry in Pakistan in the context of labour welfare and productivity. It then describes the laws, institutions and mandatory practices, and the social safety nets that are in place in the country to protect workers from exploitation and economic insecurity. The inadequacies of these provisions, and their evasion and exploitation by different stakeholders are discussed at length. Some of the negative impacts of privatisation of industries on laid-off workers and their exploitation due to suppression and lack of adequate information about their rights are revealed.

The main argument of this paper is that there is a need for prioritising workers' welfare in policies formulated for the industrial sector by making the workers partners in the process. Institutional inadequacies should be addressed according to the socioeconomic conditions of the labourers.

Welfare Defined

I will first define the concept of welfare according to some insights that I have been able to glean from interviews with different stakeholders linked with the industrial sector. The concept of welfare as defined here is much in agreement with a measure of human poverty developed by the Mahbub-ul-Haq Center for Human Development, namely, the Poverty of Opportunity Index.

Welfare is a term encompassing many facets of human life. The concept of welfare builds upon providing opportunities to all human beings for attaining health facilities, quality education, prestigious jobs with job security and a regular income, and a strong asset base. Political freedom, access to credit for income generation and being able to enter more lucrative labour markets are opportunities that need to be provided once the basic deprivations are removed. Access to opportunities, rather than access to money through money transfer programs, can pull the poor out of their state of poverty—a state that is a result as well as a cause of their deprivation.

A report of the Mahbub-ul-Haq Center for Human Development (1999), entitled *Profile of Poverty in Pakistan*, says,

Fittingly our definition of the poverty of opportunity is an essentially multidimensional one, manifesting itself in the lack of education and health, unequal access to economic assets, social exclusion, and political marginalization.

According to the Mahbub-ul-Haq Center for Human Development, there has been a strong link between economic growth and access to opportunities during the past 25 years. Economic growth was slow in the 1970s and this recession was repeated more acutely in the 1990s, contrary to an upward trend in the 1980s. Similarly, access to opportunities was 60 percent in the 1980s, as compared with only a 40-percent decline in poverty of opportunity in the 1970s and 1990s. Economic growth is thus correlated to access to opportunities because its rapidity decreases the deprivation of poor masses. However, unless policy makers prioritise it, the poor's welfare cannot be brought about by economic growth alone. It is the state with which the responsibility for making welfare a foundation stone for policy formulation lies.

Workers welfare is an essential element for efficient productivity. Factory workers form the backbone of the whole productive system and this makes their welfare a crucial part of an industrial setup. Workers' relations with their employers and their working environment are basic levels at which their well-being can be maintained. Job security can give them access to other opportunities, such as education for their children, health facilities and even a healthy nutritional pattern. Among workers, denial of opportunity of political freedom occurs when demand for a representative body in the form of labour unions is suppressed. Similarly, opportunity to climb up the socioeconomic ladder is denied if they are not offered a permanent job, which means irregularities in income and lack of fringe benefits. Various benefits that the labourers are entitled to, if provided with complete honesty by the employers and the institutions concerned, can safeguard their rights to a great extent. If all these ingredients are present in an industrial setup, the workers remain satisfied and content in their job and can also make production more efficient.

Public and Private Enterprises: A Background

A glance at the history of industry in the public and private domain can reveal how both have fared over time. Industrialised countries all over the globe have gone through periods of nationalisation and denationalisation of industry and have tested both approaches in pursuit of efficiency and high productivity.

A problem faced by public enterprises is their large size. In such large setups, administrative problems emerge even though it was believed that the state could control large industries better than the private sector. John Jewkes in his book *Public and Private Enterprise* (1965: 30) quotes an ardent advocate of nationalisation, Davies Ernest, who says:

Some of the administrative problems of the nationalized industries arise from the very size of the industries taken over. Bigness is perhaps their greatest drawback.

The size of public industries interferes in their proper administration despite the fact that they have more room for innovations and large investments. There has been much argument on whether there should be more centralisation of power in industries or more decentralisation to achieve maximum efficiency. Industry's nationalisation entails more control in the hands of the government and its increasing size could surpass the government's capacity for good administration.

According to Jewkes (1965), the more a government gets involved in the functioning of economic systems (part of which is industry), the more it is likely that the economic decisions will be influenced by political convenience. Policies are affected by change of government, with the new governments bringing new incentives and withdrawing the old.

On the other hand, in private enterprises, monopoly is the major menace that has occurred over time. Monopoly in private enterprises has not led to welfare but to the accumulation of privileges with the authorities, creating a wide gap between them and the employees. Jewkes writes (1965: 72),

Of the flaws in private enterprise the one which seems to me most serious, which is awkward to handle and which, if it did continue and worsen, would be fatal to that system as a whole is monopoly.

What is required is to control this monopoly through a limited intervention of the government so that it can be discouraged and the rights of the working *class* can be restored.

In Pakistan, at the time of Independence, there were only a handful of large manufacturing units. The industry that was in private hands was nationalised in the 1970s during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime. However, the trend of privatisation of nationalised industries emerged almost 15 years ago. A.R. Kemal and Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, in an article entitled *The Privatization of the Industrial Enterprises in Pakistan* (1991), confirm that,

Like many other developing countries, Pakistan has pursued a policy of privatization since the mid-Eighties. But of late a definite change in the mood has taken place, with a change of perception at the policy-making level. There is the widespread belief that to secure significant efficiency gains in output, the private sector should be fully associated in all sectors of the economy—especially in manufacturing, banking, energy, transport, communications, health, and education; that, indeed, it should be given the upper hand throughout the economy. This one-point agenda of economic reform, however, has met with limited success.

This trend has been continuing to date. The experience with public enterprises, as far as productivity is concerned, has not been very pleasant because their performance has been marred by political interventions, corruption and nepotism within the authorities. The role of labour unions has often exceeded their actual purpose, which is to negotiate with the establishment on the part of labourers. Benefits for workers, however, have not been overlooked; rather, they have always been provided, even at the cost of low productivity. These factors have had a negative effect on the level of production and work efficiency due to which many public industries have become a liability for the government. On the other hand, there are examples of medium public enterprises like the Pak-German Woodworks (Peshawar) that thrived in state control because they were able to cater to large orders, but which became sick after privatisation when large-scale production was no longer viable.

Flipping the coin, the performance of private enterprises can be seen as high on productivity and work efficiency but low on welfare for the workers. In pursuit of welfare evasion rather than provision, private ownership has given rise to elements of corruption. A system of forced worker compliance to exploitative terms and conditions makes the roots of this problem stronger.

Labour Laws and Institutions for Workers' Welfare and Their Mandatory Practices

A report on a Regional Workshop on Social Safety Nets, held in August 1998 by the Asia and Pacific Regional Organization (APRO) in Singapore (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions: APRO, 1998), highlights the emergence of the need for social protection in the form of social safety nets. The idea of social security provided by the state did not exist before industrialisation, when societies depended wholly on the family unit and communal relationships for social protection. Social protection includes basic measures to protect the economically vulnerable members of society from extreme poverty, such as provision of basic health care, education, housing, sanitation and adequate nutrition. With industrialisation, a vast majority of the rural population started pouring into cities in search of wage labour and their basic protection from the family diminished. They became totally dependent on their wages for acquiring the necessities of life and were vulnerable to privatisation or sickness of industries, which often caused many to lose their jobs. The concept of social security, to be provided by the state to wage earners through institutions developed especially for this task, evolved from the need to protect these workers from becoming poorer.

In Pakistan, labour laws have been devised over time by the Directorate of Labour, which is present in every industrial city. Labour laws are implemented through the Directorate of Labour in the form of ordinances that are approved by the Ministry of Industries. Instruments such as the Factory Act 1934, Shops and Commercial Establishment Ordinance 1969, and Minimum Wage Ordinance 1961 are devised to safeguard workers' rights. These rights are known as 'Guaranteed Rights' as opposed to 'Secured Rights', which are attained through negotiations of labour unions. Entitlements to benefits during employment and while laying off labourers also constitute a major part of labour laws. Compensations for death or injury, group insurance, regulation of wages, education for children and medical facilities for the whole family, gratuity and golden handshake are some of the benefits that employees can gain.

Numerous government institutions are channelling these benefits to workers today. The institutions providing social security are:

- Employees Social Security Institute (ESSI),
- Employees Old Age Benefit Institution (EOBI) and
- Workers Welfare Board.

Apart from these, institutions dealing with labour laws and their implementation are:

- Directorate of Labour,
- Ministry of Industries and
- Federal Labour Judiciary.

A review of these institutions will reveal their mandatory practices and how they can ensure workers' welfare if they function honestly. Governed by a body that includes the Secretary Finance, Secretary Health, Secretary Industries and Secretary Labour, three Collective Bargaining Agents and three representatives of the industrialists, ESSI is required to provide workers and their dependents medical facilities. To be eligible for the benefits, the workers' job status has to be permanent, the factory that employs them must be registered with the Labour Department and the number of total employees must be at least 10. Those workers are registered for social security whose salary is up to Rs3,000. Employers must contribute 7 percent of workers' income to social security for registered workers.

Under this fund, workers are entitled to free heart surgery, dialysis and treatment of tuberculosis and cancer. In addition, they get medicine from dispensaries in case of minor sickness. Although the authorities report that these facilities are available to the workers, surprisingly, not a single worker contacted during the survey mentioned them. Workers are only aware of facilities in the dispensaries

and those provided in hospitals in case of injury or maternity cases. Even these, according to them, are inadequate, as the doctors in dispensaries try to satisfy every type of ailing patient with painkillers and random low-potency syrups.

Industrialists evading social security of deserving workers in one way or another are reported by the Directorate of Labour to the Social Security Institute. Such factories are then visited by the local Social Security Officer for confirmation. In case the employer is found to be indulging in fraud, s/he is to be fined and jailed for three months. However, the workers are aware of the limited extent of the investigation that is conducted by the officers. There are many witnesses to fraudulent actions of the employers as well as the officers who come to check them. Workers seldom get to meet the officer, and even if they do, they have been instructed beforehand by the employer regarding what to report.

The Employees Old Age Benefit Institution was set up in 1976. It confers benefits such as old age pensions, survivors' pensions, invalidity pensions and old age grants. These benefits are given to ensure that the workers are financially secure when they retire or if they become invalid before retirement. Employers have to contribute 5 percent of the first PRs3000 of the salaries of workers who are paid PRs3000 or more to EOBI, which is accumulated in the institution's bank account. Workers who are 60 or 55 years of age (in case of men and women, respectively) are eligible for a monthly pension if their employer has been contributing to EOBI. Workers who are registered can collect their cheque from the Institution itself. The employer's contribution is neither dependent on profit earned by production, nor deducted from the workers' salary. Employers who evade these benefits have devised ways to keep the deserving workers unregistered.

The Workers Welfare Board is responsible for constructing schools and labour colonies, providing a dowry fund of Rs.30,000 to workers and collecting education cess from industrialists. An annual contribution of 2 percent, based on the profit that a factory earns, goes to this Board. It is thus responsible for helping workers to overcome some of the most vital milestones of their lives, such as getting their daughters married, educating their children and being able to live in a house with basic amenities.

In pursuit of implementing these laws and granting these benefits to workers, the Directorate of Labour, Ministry of Industries and Federal Labour Courts each have a role to play. The Directorate of Labour is responsible for maintaining industrial peace by negotiating between employees and employers. It deals with the affairs of trade unions, addressing the problems they have with the management. It is responsible for implementing labour laws and adjudicating cases in which the workers are not being conferred with benefits or are not being paid according to the standard wage criteria. For this purpose, labour officers visit factories and are supposed to meet directly with the workers to know their views about the establishment and the tensions existing between the two. Implementation of child labour laws in factories and undertaking welfare measures, such as building labour colonies and schools and distributing marriage grants and talent scholarships, are also part of the mandatory practices of the Directorate.

The Directorate regulates the payment of minimum wages by the employers and payment of provident fund/gratuity to workers retiring prematurely or on time at the rate of 30 days wage for every completed year of employment. It carries out numerous other procedures according to the above laws. The mandatory role of the Directorate of Labour is to safeguard the rights of labourers and their workplaces and making sure that they receive the benefits that they are entitled to. It can fine and punish any employer who is not meeting the criteria of workers' welfare in an establishment. The discrepancies and deviations from these laws that were unveiled by the empirical data collected during this study will be highlighted with in the discussion on policy challenges, which appears at a later stage in this paper.

Existing Social Safety Nets and Their Inadequate Outreach

In a general sense, 'social safety nets' include measures that a government has devised to protect all vulnerable sections of the society from poverty. Pakistan's Structural Adjustment Programme was designed to use pre-existing safety nets as shock absorbers for workers who were to be laid off due to privatisation or industrial sickness. These measures were expected to relieve the workers from acute poverty until economic growth could begin with the revival of sick and non-productive units.

The said pre-existing social safety nets in the country are diverse in nature. They include *Zakat*, *Bait-ul-Maal*, *Ushr*, a wheat subsidy, EOBI benefits, micro-credit for the rural poor and a housing finance scheme. The welfare of workers who are laid off from factories can be safeguarded through these safety nets, but only if they are operated without nepotism and corruption.

The religious statute concerning *Zakat*, a levy to be collected from Sunni Muslims, was passed as an ordinance in 1980. The needy or '*Mustahqin*' who are eligible for *Zakat* funds include the disabled, poor, widows and orphans. Deducted once a year at the rate of 2.5 percent on certain assets, *Zakat* is distributed to the deserving in the form of a monthly subsistence allowance of PRs250, additional PRs50 per child, and PRs3,000 as rehabilitation grant. These heads constitute 70 percent of the support provided from *Zakat* funds to the *Mustahqin*. The remaining 30 percent goes for dowry, educational and medical expenses. According to a research report of the Social Policy Development Centre (SPDC) (Pasha *et al*, 2000), the coverage of the *Zakat* programme is inadequate, reaching only a small percentage of poor households.

For the minorities that cannot benefit from *Zakat*, *Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal* was established in 1992. This institution provides two types of benefits: the Individual Financial Assistance Scheme and the Food Subsidy Scheme. However, the institution is constrained by lengthy procedures for granting benefits and its absolute dependence on budgetary support for finances makes it vulnerable to the unstable political scenario of the country. According to the official in-charge of the district head office of *Bait-ul-Maal* in Faisalabad, the institution does not have the capacity to give financial assistance to the large number of workers who are frequently being laid off due to privatisation or sickness of industries.

Ushr, another religious tax that was levied along with *Zakat* in the 1980 ordinance, is also extracted from Sunni Muslims on agricultural produce exceeding 948 kg at the rate of 5 percent of the value of crops from irrigated land and at 10 percent on crops from non-irrigated land. Despite the fact that it has a great potential to relieve poor people, especially in rural areas, its assessment and collection by the local *Zakat* committees has remained inadequate since 1983.

The wheat subsidy is a social safety net through which poor consumers can buy wheat at a lower price. The government provides the subsidy at the federal level by issuing wheat to the mills at a price lower than that at which it was imported. At the provincial level, the subsidy is the difference between the price at which local farmers can acquire wheat from the government and the actual price at which wheat is issued to mills, including transport and incidental costs. However, the subsidy has not proved to trickle down to the intended beneficiaries because of the involvement of corrupt officials, middlemen and mill owners who manipulate wheat availability through black-marketing.

The housing finance scheme of the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC), established in 1952, suffers, on the one hand, from biased targeting in large cities, and on the other, from limited coverage, partly because of the low rate of recovery and its financial dependence on the recovered loans. Thus, the program that was initiated to provide shelter to the needy has itself not been able to gain a strong footing after functioning for almost 50 years.

Contrary to all the above-mentioned safety nets, the micro-credit scheme of the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), initiated in 1991, has been evaluated as quite successful in bringing about development through community mobilisation and income generation. However, according to the SPDC report (Pasha *et al*, 2000), despite this high ranking, the scheme suffers from small coverage. It still has only a limited number of borrowers, contrary to its claim of nationwide outreach. Moreover, the scheme has failed to become financially self-sufficient, which is evident from its continued dependence on a credit line from Habib Bank Limited.

Clearly, the institutions set up to cushion the poor from poverty are themselves characterised by leakages and corrupt elements that prevent them from growing to serve their intended beneficiaries. Almost all of them have little coverage; none of them have grown to their full capacity, as they are limited by difficult and lengthy procedures of access and lack transparency, although they could go a long way in reducing poverty. According to the SPDC report on social safety nets (Pasha *et al*, 2000):

It appears that most of the schemes have weak institutional structures, their funding is limited and uncertain, their targeting inefficient, and their coverage very small. This at least partly explains the growing incidence of poverty in the country. Both government and NGOs need to be jointly mobilized to work towards poverty alleviation for preserving political and social stability at a time when the economy has stopped growing fast and both unemployment and poverty are rising rapidly.

Actual Practices at Workers' Welfare Institutions

The institutions established for workers' welfare have not been able to fulfil their roles, as is evident from the living and working conditions of workers, both during and after employment. A brief description of the departure of the state institutions from their mandatory practices and their misuse by industrial employers is provided below. The described situation supports a view that reducing the state's monopoly over workers' welfare institutions and promoting public-private partnership in ensuring welfare could catalyse a worker-friendly environment. However, that is a theme that is taken up in the last section of this paper.

Looking at the experiences of workers in the public and private sectors, it can be seen that the advent of nationalisation in the 1970s brought more worker-friendly laws than the pro-establishment ones that had existed earlier. However, since no checks and balances were maintained, the new environment gave way to a monopoly of trade unions with almost limitless freedom. Unions' vested interests developed and were fulfilled even at the cost of workers' welfare as more and more corrupt practices took root in the system.

Because their formation cannot be blocked in public enterprises, unions indulge freely in nepotism and recruit surplus labour in factories. Although they are meant to safeguard worker interests at public enterprises, they are often perceived as constant threats by workers. Union leaders can demand funds from workers, giving them incentives of benefits as well as threatening them that they will lose their job security if they do not contribute to strengthen union pressure. Workers end up contributing for the sake of securing their job, while nothing comes out of the funds collected.

Similarly, public enterprise management cannot escape the provision of benefits through the state institutions for workers' welfare. These benefits are often acquired by union leaders by registering only their own members and sometimes even unconcerned people with the institutions. Here, the emphasis of union activity is on acquiring benefits rather than playing a mediatory role between the management and workers. The path to taking liberties is eased by bribing officials in the institutions. Unions have even been reported to blackmail the staff of institutions providing medical care to sell off medicines for people who do not even work there.

Owing to the strong hold of unions, providing benefits through various welfare institutions is a major preference at public enterprises, which does not take into account decreasing productivity. Providing labour colonies, sending at least six workers for pilgrimage per year, dispensing welfare loans and contributions to EOBI, the WWB and ESSI do not go unchecked by union leaders as everything is on record and delay in any of the relevant provisions can lead to an uprising of labour unions against the management. Labour strikes and protests are common scenes in public industries, drastically affecting productivity. Thus, although benefits from the institutions reach workers in public enterprises to some extent, the environment is not conducive for efficiency. A culture of work shirking is generated, defeating the actual purpose for which an enterprise is running.

The scene of workers' welfare at private enterprises in the country may be considered to be on the other extreme. Corruption within the institutions for workers' welfare and the government offices concerned also becomes more evident in case of private enterprises as the management neglects its duties and misuses its authorities against common workers. A number of policy gaps can be highlighted in this perspective.

From the time they are hired until they are laid off, workers in private enterprises are constantly treading on shaky ground. Several factors weaken their position. Firstly, in some industrialised cities, such as Faisalabad, unchecked mushrooming of small industrial units has given rise to a tradition of enterprises run in houses that are not registered with the Labour Department. This allows the enterprises to escape the implementation of labour laws and hire and fire labour on a contract basis.

Secondly, since the inception of privatisation of industries, new owners of privatised units have been insisting on laying off all labour and bringing newly hired workers on their own terms. A major reason for this action is quoted by many as the exposure of old labour to benefits and the formation of labour unions when the industry was in state control. As the new owners are neither interested in providing all the benefits to workers nor bear the presence of labour unions that can create unrest, they bring new labour on their own terms.

In many private enterprises, labour is hired on a contract basis and stays only for three to four months. With the completion of the assignment, existing workers are laid off and new labour is hired for the next order. This short period of work does not allow the labourers to become eligible for any type of benefit as three months are usually taken as the probation period before a worker can be made permanent. Due to these unfair terms of hiring, social security and EOBI benefits are also evaded.

Where an enterprise hires 10 or more workers, it commonly starts portraying itself as several small enterprises with different owners, each having 8 or fewer workers. Building two-feet-high walls to make partitions within the establishment usually serves this purpose and enables the enterprise to hide its true scale.

Other systems devised to escape contribution to the welfare institutions are of changing surnames of workers in the record every three to four months to show the Labour Department that new labour has been hired. However, the same labour continues to work at the enterprise, often for five to six years. Contribution to EOBI is also avoided by simply not registering half of the employees for benefits: throughout their careers, the employers send no contribution on their behalf and once they reach the age of retirement (55-60 years), they are laid off. There have been many instances where trade unions seeking to contribute in welfare funds had records opened and found that many workers serving the enterprise had had no secure future and were not even aware of this.

Corruption within the Labour Department is evident from the fact that it turns its back to all the well-known malpractices through which private employers evade labour laws and contributions to welfare institutions. The Department officers' motivation to check such misconduct is usually removed by the employers of private enterprises through unfair means.

The Government of Pakistan recognises five categories of industrial workers, according to the period of their service. These are: 1) Permanent, 2) Probationary, 3) Substitutes, 4) Temporary, and 5) Apprentice Workers. The law of minimum wages for different categories of workers is usually not respected by private owners. In different industrialised cities, owners of small units looms demand 8-12 hours work but do not pay more than PRs120 per day. Similarly, in large and medium private enterprises, the law for overtime is not followed by the majority of owners. Here, it should be taken into consideration that they pay regular wages or half of regular wages to workers who work overtime, because it is difficult to pay double wages to a large number of workers who want to work overtime. Moreover, the production of the enterprise may not be faring well and the employers may be short on finances. It is a negligence on the part of government offices implementing labour laws that they do not devise flexible laws that can be implemented according to the situation on the ground, and often lay the burden solely on the shoulder of the employers, who then have to seek underhanded ways to lighten it.

While laying off workers, private owners who have defaulted or are bankrupt due to sick enterprises do not grant workers their gratuity, provident fund or social safety nets of any other kind. The golden handshake comes within the category of secured rights, which are obtained through negotiations of labour unions with the management. Contrary to large public industries, where labour unions have been successful in bargaining for a golden handshake, private industries do not leave the channel of bargaining open for workers by preventing labour union formation in the first place. Even when large privately owned industries are downsized, such as the Kohinoor Textile Mill in Faisalabad, some of the provident fund/gratuity is retained by owners and workers have to wait a number of years before getting their dues.

Finally, a disadvantage faced by permanent workers laid off from state-owned industries is that they are rehired by private mill owners as temporary or daily wage labourers. Again, the law has not controlled this situation so that at least the life standard of workers who have enjoyed a good job status in an industry does not have to sink into the deepest pit of poverty.

At the level of the institutions supposed to safeguard the workers, such as the Directorate of Labour, negligence has remained the main feature of all functions. Labour officers visiting different industrial units to check upon wages, working environment, child labour and records of workers registered for benefits have often been reported to indulge in corruption and dishonesty. Many return from the owners' office without talking to the workers or visiting the units. For those who insist on face-to-face interaction with workers, employers prepare a number of labourers to respond the way they want them to, even if that includes telling lies about the actual situation.

A report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions: Asian and Pacific Regional Organization (1998) has pointed out a few weaknesses in the institutions concerned with employees old-age benefit and social security. The Employees Old-Age Benefit Act of 1976 requires those enterprises to register with the Labour Department that hire at least 10 workers. The report points out that this criterion is not laid down for Employees Social Security Institution: the law allows it to register enterprises employing fewer than 10 workers. However, purely for the sake of administrative convenience, this institution also registers only those enterprises that have 10 or more workers. A second major weakness is that, unlike other countries, where employees and sometimes government itself contributes to employees' old age benefits and social security institutions to share the burden of the employers, in Pakistan, it is the employer alone who has to contribute to these institutions. This lack of support from the government compels him to find ways of escape.

Thus, the incentive for making welfare benefits available to workers is lacking both on the side of the private employers and public institutions. The situation of workers, who are being exploited at the hands of private enterprise owners and are compelled to search for jobs after being laid off every three

to four months, is deplorable. The ‘reasons’ for getting laid off are usually unnotified leave, demand for higher wages or interest in forming a labour union. This situation presents a big challenge to policy makers, departments formulating and implementing labour laws and the institutions set up to restore workers’ welfare. The evidence that the seven social safety nets mentioned above, including *Zakat* and *Bait-ul-Maal*, have failed to provide support to the needy also depicts the weakness of the mitigation measures.

Towards A Welfare-Oriented Policy Framework

In this situation, a middle path has to be found that can generate people-centred policies in the country. Looking at the experiences of public and private enterprises, monopoly and corruption are revealed as basic elements hindering the well-being of industrial workers. For a solution, monopoly must be reduced and partnership between the public and private sectors should be enhanced to check corruption in both. In this regard, institutions of civil society, such as interest groups, trade unions, already existing committees and councils at the district level and, most importantly, the media have to be brought into partnership with the government so that checks and balances can be maintained on both sides.

To strengthen the welfare of workers, existing welfare institutions need to be given more autonomy to function beneficially. However, limited intervention by the government to the extent of keeping a check against fraudulent actions is also required. The government needs private organisations, like non-government organisations (NGOs), to fill the gaps in its implementation of various welfare projects. Involving civil society groups in the public sector can prove successful if they rely more on the government than donor support. The government can provide finances, while implementation can be shared with institutions of civil society. However, if the private sector exceeds its limits to fulfil its own vested interests, as is also the case with trade unions, the state should intervene to restrict this mishandling of authority.

Public-private partnership could be engendered by giving some share in the enterprise to workers, which would create a sense of belonging and a motivation to work for higher productivity. This experiment has failed to satisfy its objective in most developing countries, but its application in Pakistan can be informed by the lessons learnt by those countries and thereby improved. In most countries where this idea was implemented, the workers given a share in the enterprises were not technically equipped for management, as they lacked education in economics and business administration. This made them powerless in front of the decisions taken by the informed owners: the workers’ limited knowledge could not assist them to compete with the elitist class of businessmen whose authority prevailed in the management committees and Board of Governors, where important decisions regarding the enterprise are usually taken. Moreover, the tripartite system of government, employers and trade unions resisted the process of sharing the running of an enterprise, as employers were unwilling to transfer any measure of management controls to workers. Learning from this failure, workers who are to be given shares in the management need to be well equipped with the required knowledge. They can be educated in management and market systems at least to the extent that they can perform as well as their employer and government partners.

Awareness among workers about their rights, due benefits and labour laws can play a significant role in reducing anti-welfare activities within the welfare institutions. It has been observed that the majority of labourers are not aware of all the labour laws and how they can benefit from them. They have to be made aware through awareness campaigns. They can be educated by establishing more departments such as the Directorate of Labour Education. Making this information so common that every worker is enlightened about his/her rights is the need of the hour. The mass media that frequently reach the working class, including radio, newspaper and television, can be effectively put to use by telling workers how they can register for benefits. The private employers who become a hindrance in this

action by portraying one enterprise as different enterprises, each having less than 10 workers, will also be defeated if special departments are set up to monitor the number of employees in every enterprise (public and private) and report to the institutions of EOBI, ESSI and WWB directly. This will help in bringing transparency in the procedure and increasing the outreach of welfare institutions. Making it compulsory to display labour laws and rights in every private and public manufacturing unit will also create awareness among workers.

Awareness can instigate a consciousness of exploitation among the workers when the employers indulge in fraudulent actions to avoid giving them their due benefits. But for them to fight against this deprivation, they will need support from the government as well as civil society. Labour courts have to be made more accessible to the workers and their proceedings have to be made more efficient for this purpose so that where labour unions are not allowed to form, there is a neutral body to provide them with security.

Workers' welfare in industries is a goal that must be achieved before more labourers and their households are struck by poverty. Making the workers partners rather than keeping them aloof from what is being planned would be a more welfare-oriented approach in policy making.

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SPO DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

**Gendering Space:
Patriarchy and Socio-Economic Stagnation in Pakistan**

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GENDERING SPACE: PATRIARCHY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

The incorporation of gender into development thinking and policy seamlessly brings to fore the salience of women's well-being, their issues and perspectives. This is hardly surprising given that female disadvantage is so glaring in most areas. However, focusing on "gender relations" can also provide deep insights into the functioning of entire economies and social systems. This paper argues that the high degree of gender segregation -- or a highly gendered demarcation of space — is associated not only with female disadvantage. Factors that sustain gender segregation are also associated with the persistence of economic and social stagnation.

Female Disadvantage and Patriarchy

Female disadvantage is a persistent feature in all walks of life almost everywhere. Pakistan lies within a geo-cultural zone stretching from North Africa, through West Asia, up to northern India, which is known for some of the most severe forms of patriarchy in the world. Survival itself is highly gendered in these societies.¹

While the average number of females to every one hundred males is 106 in the rest of the world, in the South Asian region this ratio is 94.1, and Pakistan, with 93.7 females per 100 males has the lowest female-male ratio in the region. If the female-male ratio in Pakistan were similar to the "rest of the world" there would have been nearly nine million females in the country than there actually were. In other words, there were some nine million "missing women".² The proximate causes for the low female-male ratios are not hard to ascertain. There are significant sex-wise differences in rates of mortality, morbidity, malnutrition, and in access to health care. Similarly, there are strong sex-wise differences in literacy rates, school enrolment ratios, and other indicators of education. When development is viewed as a means of enhancing chances of survival and improving lives, then it has mainly to do with the conditions of the lives of women and girls.

If patriarchy is defined as female disadvantage and male domination, then sex-wise disparities in statistical indices such as mortality and literacy highlight only some of the many aspects of the problem. Female disadvantage in law, rights, custom, social norms and conventions is a persistent feature of the institutional environment of countries like Pakistan.³ So is the exclusion or invisibility of women from key arenas of decision-making. Pakistan is a country where women's access to public spaces, their mobility, their visibility, and their participation in public life are most restricted. Socially sanctioned gender-wise segregation of space becomes immediately apparent in statistics such as those relating to female participation in education, formal labour force, and electoral politics.

Public and Private Spaces

In societies such as Pakistan, traditional norms concerning the division of space between public and private domains are gendered by definition. Norms of *zanana* or *chadar-chardiwari* are ready references for the classification of the world into the male public space and the female and familial private space. In other words, the very notion of public and private domains is gendered. The *chardiwari* marks out the territory inhabited by women and men within a familial setting and the world beyond the *chardixvari*

1 See Naila Kabeer (1997), *Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought* (London: Verso), for a very useful review of literature on geo-cultural zones.

2 Such calculations were made popular by Amartya Sen in the 1980s. The data used here are derived from *Human Development in South Asia 2000: The Gender Question*, produced by the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Islamabad. This latter report provides an excellent summary of some of the key issues in gender, and a review of statistical data on female disadvantage.

3 See, for instance, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women of the Government of Pakistan (August 1997), among others.

is inhabited mostly by men interacting across familial settings. Women can venture out into the non-familial world beyond the *chardiwari* on condition of invisibility (*chadar*), and normally in the company of or with the permission of familial males.⁴

The actual norms of gender segregation are, of course, at variance from the simple *chadar-chardiwari* model. The precise delineation of the *chardiwari* varies over time and place. In any case, the *chardiwari* is rarely the exclusive domain of a nuclear family. In a typical Sindh village (*goth*), for example, the entire enclosed area of the village, which is normally marked out by thorny bushes, is a *chardiwari* of sorts. Women enjoy unrestricted mobility within the *goth* but face restrictions in venturing beyond it. Restrictions also apply to the entry of non-familial males into the *goth*. They normally have to conduct any business with local men in a designated male “public” setting known as the *aulaq*.

Even the idealized norm of the *goth-aulaq* division of space is not completely determined, but is subject to individual differences. In other areas of the country the terminology and the precise division of space vary. Nevertheless, the gendered division of public and private spaces does remain strong. In some rural areas, such as parts of arid (*barani*) Punjab, the gendered division is less severe. It is stricter elsewhere, for instance, in parts of NWFP.⁵ In urban settings, the *mohalla* might take on some features of the *chardiwari*, and local norms of “decent dress” embody the attributes of the *chadar*. The main points worth stressing are the following: First, social divisions of space are, in general, highly gendered in Pakistan. Second, the division of space is not determined in strictly dual “public” and “private” spheres; there are gradations between these two polar positions. The gradations correspond with different levels of social - in effect familial - proximity or distance.

At one level, the relevance of the gendered demarcation of public and private spaces is patently obvious. If the public space is identified closely with non-familial male interaction, and the private space is identified closely with familial inhabitation, there are clear problems in the fulfillment of modern ideals of equality in the sphere of rights. This entails access to health facilities and schools, participation in politics, and employment in remunerative work and other forms of market access. Women’s ability to do these things is mediated by the men who control the terms of their entry into the “public” sphere, where all of these activities are generally located. There are other, subtler and perhaps more insidious issues at stake. How do these traditional norms concerning gendered spaces interact with social change and economic growth? Are there factors that provide stability to the gendered division of space in the face of externally induced impulses for change? And if so, what are the implications of current policy paradigms for gender relations as well as for social change and economic growth?

The Production of Public Goods

Many of the questions raised here are of a speculative nature. Clearly, much theoretical and empirical work is required before the propositions and linkages suggested here can be treated as viable explanations of the present or interesting indicators of future action. It is important, nevertheless, to begin sketching

4 See Kabeer (1994) for discussions of patriarchy in this light. There are few systematic studies of these issues in Pakistan, though the field holds much promise for empirical work. See, for example, Ayesha Khan’s thoughtful probing using quantitative data (Khan, 1999, ‘Mobility of Women and Access to Health and Family Planning Services in Pakistan, *Reproductive Health Matters*, vol 7 no. 14) and a larger quantitative survey on aspects of autonomy and mobility by Zeba Sathar and Shahnaz Kazi (1997), ‘Autonomy, Livelihood and Fertility: A Study of Rural Punjab’, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.

5 These observations are based on author’s fieldwork in rural Pakistan, reported variously in Haris Gazdar (2000), ‘State, Community, and Public Schooling - A Political Economy of Universal Education in Pakistan’, mimeograph, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics; Haris Gazdar, Ayesha Khan and Themrise Khan (2002), ‘Land Tenure, Rural Livelihoods, and Institutional Innovations’, mimeo, Collective for Social Science Research, Karachi, and Haris Gazdar (2002), ‘A Qualitative Survey of Poverty in Rural Pakistan: Methodology, Data, and Main Findings - A background study for World Bank Pakistan Poverty Assessment 2002’, mimeo, World Bank and Collective for Social Science Research. Fieldwork for these studies was carried out in rural areas of the following districts: Attock, Chakwal, Faisalabad, Hafizabad, Khairpur, Larkana, Mar dan, Muzaffargarh, Nawabshah, Sanghar, Swabi, and Toba Tek Singh. Although “gender” was not in itself the primary research question in any of the three studies cited here, empirical definitions of “community” were virtually impossible without reference to the gendered division of space. As such these studies extensively on gender analysis, and were able to generate data on gender relations.

at least the outlines of an argument, and supplement this outline with some empirical reference.

The notion of “public space”, which is so useful as a way of understanding the dynamics of gender relations, also has a powerful alternative interpretation in modern economic theory. Public space, or the more general concept of a “public good”, relates to something that is, by definition, non-excludable. A good or service is “non-excludable” if it is technically impossible or highly costly to exclude a person from enjoying its use. The reduction of vehicle emissions through the introduction of cleaner fuels leads to cleaner air for all residents of the city. Once an improvement in air quality has been achieved it would be impossible or highly costly to prevent an individual benefiting from it.

While some public goods such as clean air are non-excludable due to technical reasons other public goods are non-excludable by design. A public school is deliberately created in order to make free or subsidized schooling available to all children within its catchment area. A school can no longer be called a “public” school if some children within its catchment area face restrictions to it on the basis of caste, class, or family.⁶ There are important reasons for valuing public goods of different types. Many of these reasons lie firmly within the framework of economic well-being and efficiency. “Public space” is in large part like a public school - i.e. a public good by design rather than by default. An *autaq* in a Sindh *goth*, or a *dwpal* in a village in Punjab is a public space by design. Its very success depends on people having unhindered access to it. At the same time, these very spaces practice active exclusion on the basis of gender, and in some cases social status.

The second point to note is that the production of public goods is one of the most important problems of economic policy. Public goods are non-excludable, and therefore it is very costly, sometimes even impossible, to charge a price for their use. This means that competitive markets will tend to produce far fewer public goods than are socially optimal, and hence there is scope for state action. The problem has been explained by Olson who argued that voluntary “collective action” for the production of public goods was hard to conceive due to free-riding on the part of individuals.⁷ Take the example of a village facing the threat of a flood. The construction of a dam might save the village and all its inhabitants, and therefore it will be in the individual interest of each villager to contribute to the dam. But an individual might well consider that he would benefit from the dam even if he did not take part in its building. If many people think like that, the dam will never be built, even though the cost of building it would have been lower than the cost of facing the flood.⁸ Olson suggested that the “illogic” of voluntary collective action provided a sound ethical basis for involuntary collective action - for example the levying of taxes by government - for the production of socially desirable public goods.

Applying the economic approach to public goods to gendered spaces, it can be seen that the division of the world between “public” and “private” spaces can be recast as a division between “public spaces” of different types. A Sindhi *goth* for example is a “public space” as far as the male and female residents of the village itself are concerned. It excludes non-village males. The *autaq*, on the other hand, is a “public space” for male villagers and non-villagers alike, to the exclusion of female villagers and non-villagers. The *chardiwari* encloses a “public space” for the male and female members of an extended family that happen to live in one compound. Even within this *chardiwari* there will be smaller living quarters to which only individual nuclear families might have access.

We proceed, therefore, from a dichotomous division of the world (between public and private spaces) to a multiplicity of public spaces, which are identified by the type of people that have access to it. A

6 Public schools are supposed to enroll all children of the relevant age group who are resident in the pre-defined catchment area of the school. There are plenty of examples in Pakistan of an otherwise well-functioning government school excluding some groups resident in the catchment area on grounds of caste, kinship, or factional rivalry. These schools operate as “public” schools for one segment of the catchment area, while excluding another segment. See Gazdar (2000) for field-based insights on public schooling.

7 Mancur Olson (1965), *The Logic of Collective Action - Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press).

8 This example is based on an actual case study in rural south Punjab, reported in Gazdar (2002).

key axis in the definition of a “public space” appears to be familial proximity. The stronger the familial bond within the group in question, the greater will be the access of women of the group to that space and vice versa. Empirical research in rural Pakistan reveals, for example, that public schools in single-kinship group villages tend to operate more effectively as mixed gender schools. Such schools might well practice exclusion vis-a-vis other castes or kinship groups living in the neighbourhood. However, they do not practice exclusion vis-a-vis girls of the same caste or kinship group.⁹

Patriarchy as a Mode of Collective Action

What appears as the gendered division of space in Pakistan, therefore, is at least partly related to the production of “public spaces” of different types by groups with different levels of familial or kinship proximity. Spaces where familial bonds are the weakest are those where women face a high degree of exclusion. On the other hand, spaces where familial bonds are most salient are also those, which restrict access to non-familial males (but not to non-familial females). In this sense patriarchy in the Pakistani society takes a specific form that is quite close to the original literal meaning of the term, namely “the rule of the father over his family”.

The basic building block in many of the diverse social formations - factions, political alignments, vote blocks, tribes, and even entire villages - is the family ruled over by its male head. Inter-related families come together in these wider networks, and operate on a similarly patriarchal basis - there are powerful men from powerful families who lead these wider networks.

The production of a public good i.e. a particular public space is one of the consequences of these patriarchal familial networks. These networks also facilitate collective action for the production of other public goods including schools, health facilities, risk insurance, voting blocks, and even mechanisms for dispute resolution and contract enforcement.¹⁰ All of these are public goods whose production faces the classic free-rider problem enunciated by Olson. Yet, we do observe the active production of all of these public goods at the local level by networks based on “the rule of the father over his family” and its extensions over related families. While in Olson’s model the constraints to voluntary collective action led, perforce, to the ethical justification of involuntary state-organized collective action, in societies such as those of Pakistan, it is the patriarchal familial networks that effectively overcome constraints to collective action. It is hardly surprising that the term for a village or tribal leader among some communities- *raees-shares* its etymological root with the formal term for state (*riynsut*) in the local languages. The patriarch, therefore, is the psuedo-state who performs many of the functions that are normally the domain of the modern states.

Some Implications of “The Rule of the Father”

While the term patriarchy literally means “the rule of the father”, its contemporary usage encompasses a much wider range of structures of male domination. Pakistan is not unique, however, as a society where organic familial networks ruled literally by fathers persist and play a role in the production of various public goods. What are the implications of this observation for economic development and social change?

A clarification first: the fact that patriarchy or the “rule of the father” acts as a mode of collective action is not necessarily grounds for celebration -- in fact quite the reverse. Patriarchal networks do produce (mostly local) public goods, including different types of public spaces, but these public goods differ from modern notions of public goods in at least one crucial way. The domain of public goods-or the composition of the group for which the public good is produced-is usually based on universal access with qualifications relating to location, place or residence, or age. A modern public school, for example,

⁹ Gazdar (2000).

¹⁰ Gazdar (2002).

is supposed to be open to all children of certain ages, living in a particular locality. The public goods produced through patriarchal collective action, however, typically exclude those groups that are not organically part of the extended familial network. While the main formal criterion for recognizing group membership in modern public goods is citizenship, the “rule of the fathers” follows its own hierarchy of affiliation. A person is part of a patriarchal family, which is part of a group of related families, which forms part of a wider kinship network such as *biradri* or tribe, which might be a part of a yet wider solidarity group identified by ethnicity and so on. A person’s access to public goods thus produced, and their ability to influence decisions about the production of such public goods is mediated through multiple layers of a patriarchal hierarchy. It is useful, therefore, to think of the public goods produced through the “rule of the fathers” as being parochially-segmented public goods.

Secondly, the idea that patriarchal networks actually do act as modes of collective action indicates that, within certain limits, these networks and the hierarchy they embed perform useful functions for their members. In other words, there are persistent functional reasons for large numbers of people to maintain and uphold “the rule of the father” as the means of producing some crucial public goods such as local facilities, risk insurance, political voice, dispute resolution and contract enforcement, and even physical protection from other groups. The state-like functioning of the patriarch provides some stability and legitimacy to this system. It allows the system to be reproduced in the face of modern political and social institutions, and even within modern institutions.

Thirdly, there are quite often natural limits to social and economic value of parochially-segmented public goods. These public goods strengthen parochial identities, quite often at the expense of wider, more inclusive, and even universalist identities. While the patriarch acting as *raees*, for example, might provide effective means for dispute resolution and contract enforcement within his domain, it is highly likely that this system will lead to less efficient contract enforcement across the economy as a whole. A system based, ultimately, on familial affiliation is likely to face severe diseconomies of scale, despite the fact that norms of family formation enhance the demographic reach of familial networks.¹¹ While “the rule of the fathers” might enjoy local advantages as a mode of collective action, its wider implications are likely to include high degrees of social, political, and market segmentation, and therefore weaken the basis for the production of wider economy-wide public goods.

The Modern State Versus “The Rule of the Father”

The striking picture of female disadvantage and gendered spaces in societies like Pakistan, therefore, is closely associated with the stability of familial patriarchal networks as domains of collective action. The “rule of the father” reproduces itself in many different ways ranging from ideological investment to cousin marriages. A key factor that provides a degree of stability and legitimacy to the “rule of the father” is the absence or weakness of other viable mechanisms for the production of public goods. The strength of the “rule of the father”, therefore, can be seen as being associated with the weakness of the modern state. It will be unwise to speculate any further about the direction of causality, and in any case, the determination of causality serves little purpose. It is possible, however, on the basis of the above discussion — some of which is itself admittedly speculative and demands more careful theoretical and empirical attention -- to stick one’s neck out on two important points.

First, factors that maintain women in a position of perpetual disadvantage and oppression are closely linked to factors that inhibit the achievement of other social goals such as dispute resolution and economic growth. Countries like Pakistan are in what might be called a “bad equilibrium” of female disadvantage,

¹¹ A rare national survey of its type showed that a staggering two-thirds of married women in Pakistan had been married to their cousins (Demographic and Health Survey 1991, Macro International, Honolulu, and National Institute of Population Studies, Islamabad). Complementary data on Indian states (National Family Health Survey 1991, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, India) contrast with Indian states was striking. In the northern Indian states neighboring Pakistan the incidence of cousin marriages was statistically insignificant.

social backwardness and economic stagnation. While the country might witness periods of economic growth, there are structural factors, many of them related to the “rule of the father”, which inhibit the deepening of markets and the economies of scale. Under these conditions any growth episodes that do occur are unable to shift the economy to a higher long-term growth path. It is not being argued, of course, that the promotion of economic growth ought to be the reason for confronting patriarchy - concerns such as women’s physical and social survival provide sufficient reasons, if reasons are required. But it is useful, nevertheless, to note the potential synergy between two apparently disparate social goals: confronting patriarchy and promoting economic growth.

Secondly, policies that tend to weaken the already weak modern institutions of state are likely to strengthen “the rule of the father”. This applies to the programmes of neo-liberal orthodoxy that regard the state as an impediment to economic performance as well as to individual liberty, and want to create a world of unfettered market participants. The neo-liberal thinking arose in advanced capitalist countries where the state was, indeed, powerful. In countries like Pakistan, where modern institutions are already fragile, the dismantling of the state will result in further anarchy, more segmented markets, and an even more robust “rule of the father”. Organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, which have considerable political as well as ideological influence on Pakistani policy-makers push the neo-liberal agenda on (arguably spurious) grounds of economic efficiency, without taking into account the wider implications for societal development.

While neo-liberal economists wield a great deal of power they are not the only unwitting promoters of the “rule of the father” in countries like Pakistan. Many of the “post-modern” critics of the state see nothing but manifestations of male violence in the project of modern statecraft. They simply tend to overlook the positive opportunities held out by modern citizenship. Other would-be reformers who revel in the opportunities presented by decentralization also overlook the possibility that the gaps left open by retreating formal institutions are bound to be filled by the already resilient caste, kinship, and family networks that thrive upon and reproduce the “rule of the father”.

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SPO DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

The Role of Intellectuals in Development

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About the Author

Ms. Ajeeba K. Aslam completed her first master's in Anthropology from the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in 1997. Being a British Chevening Scholar, she received her second degree in Development Studies from the School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia UK in 2001. Her professional experience has been in social development with a specific focus on research and development communications. She has worked in different capacities with several international development agencies in Pakistan including the Aga Khan Development Network and IUCN-The World Conservation Union. Ms. Aslam is currently working with Save the Children US. She was born in Hunza in 1975.

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THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS IN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

This paper briefly describes major theoretical perspectives on development to highlight how they view the role of the intellectuals. The paper dwells at length on how the class- struggle perspective views the role of the intellectuals in facilitating people to overcome the state of underdevelopment.

The major argument is that countering ideological hegemony is the overarching role of intellectuals . It argues that generally projected state of underdevelopment is merely a reflection of a deeper human condition - the condition of dehumanisation. This condition of dehumanisation is generated, justified and permeated in society through ideological hegemony. Therefore, to facilitate development in society, the intellectuals are required to counter this ideological hegemony.

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate thinking and a discussion about the role of intellectuals in Pakistan. It provides a conceptual framework for the intellectuals to draw inferences from while keeping in mind the specific context of the Pakistani society.

Perspectives on Development

According to Cole's law, the difference in perspectives on development lies in their different beliefs in human nature. This difference also underlies varying definitions of *development*, *underdevelopment* and, *intellectuals* and their role in development. These development perspectives can be categorised as Modernisation, Structuralism, and Class-struggle (Cole 1999). These perspectives have been summarised below.

Modernisation

It proposes that modernisation of the mind and the society leads to development. It believes that human beings are genetically independent, rational, selfish and competing individuals. Therefore, the role of intellectuals whom it calls Positivists/ Empiricists is to describe the phenomena and help create an environment for the individuals to fulfill their genetically endowed potentials.

Structuralism

It believes that human beings are dependant on society. It proposes that development is possible through sustainable and egalitarian growth. Paradigm theorists/ experts' - the intellectuals' – role is to analyse the institutional structure for better management of society in the face of changing technical basis of co-operation.

Class-struggle

It believes that people are interdependent within society. They become aware of their individuality and potentials through social interaction (dialectics). Conscientisation and class-consciousness leads to development. It calls intellectuals Praxis theorists/activists whose role is to understand and facilitate the process of praxis and conscientisation.

Development and Underdevelopment: A class-struggle perspective

In order to understand the role of intellectuals from a class -struggle perspective, we need to know how this perspective views development and underdevelopment. It defines development as the state when equal opportunities are available for all the individuals in a society to become aware of and develop their potentials and capabilities for a desired future through social interaction. In such a state, individuals become conscious of the constraints hindering realisation and development of their

potentials. Consequently, they take organised collective action - class struggle - to challenge and remove these constraints (Cole 1999).

Contrary to this, underdevelopment is the state when individuals in a society do not find an opportunity to realise and develop their potentials. Besides, rather than struggling to remove barriers to the realisation and development of their potentials, they unconsciously internalise this state and accept it as an unalterable reality.

The Intellectuals

The class-struggle perspective on development regards all human beings as intellectuals, as Gramsci says 'all men are philosophers' (Gramsci quoted in Boggs 1976:33). The rationale for believing in all human beings as intellectuals is that 'all [human beings] have beliefs, ideas, feelings, intuitions, etc. And all people make choices as how better to organise their lives' (Cole 1999:207). In other words, all human beings have potentials, which they become aware of through social interaction. They develop themselves and their society as they realise these potentials. (Cole 1999). However, due to prevailing inequalities in society - social, economic, cultural and political - not all of them find opportunities to be aware of and to develop mental and psychological potentials of their being (p.207). Among the *fortunate* individuals, who find an opportunity to realise their potentials, those who feel a responsibility to bring a 'social transformation' to create a conducive environment for other fellow beings are regarded as intellectuals from the dialectic perspective on development (Freire 1970, Boggs 1976).

Awareness of their own condition as well as that of other people, especially of the 'dehumanised', 'submerged' and 'dispossessed' human beings living in a 'culture of silence' (Freire 1970:10) is the basic characteristic of these intellectuals. As a result of this awareness, these intellectuals take on the role of 'agents' and activists for a positive change and transformation in society with an ambition to create an environment where every individual finds an opportunity to realise and develop his or her potentials (Gramsci detailed in Boggs 1976:40).

Prevailing state of underdevelopment and the role of intellectuals in transforming it

Prevailing State of Underdevelopment

The World Bank illustrates the state of underdevelopment in the present world as follows:

The world has deep poverty amid plenty. Of the world's 6 billion people, 2.8 billion ... live on less than \$2 a day, and 1.2 billion ... live on less than \$1 a day, with 44 per cent living in South Asia ... [I]n the poorest countries as many as fifth of children under five do not [reach their fifth birthday]. [And in these poor countries] as many as 50 percent [children are malnourished]. (World Development Report 2000:3)

This explanation of poverty and underdevelopment only mirrors another severe and deeper state of underdevelopment, which prevails in our societies at a larger scale. This state is the state of 'dehumanisation' - a situation when people's humanity is stolen (Freire 1970). In other words people are prevented from being fully human by utilising their potentials in society - a state which is also termed as 'oppression' (p.27). In this state people are treated as 'objects' and 'things' (p.27). The basic tool used for dehumanisation is generation of *conformity* to existing *reality* and *truth* - conformity to 'existing logic of the system' (p.13). Oppression and dehumanisation are projected as 'truth' which become 'non-negotiable because of its role in justifying human action and social structures ... [This projected truth] is a denial of the essential individual and its subjective nature; denial of potential of

human individuals to be autonomous in thought and act; denial of the intrinsic potential of individuals to develop and grow as authors of their own being' (Murphy 1999:59).

This state of dehumanisation is justified as a reality through 'ideological hegemony.' This hegemony is sustained in a society as a belief system by building 'popular "consensus"' (Gramsci quoted Boggs 1976:26). This 'belief structure that generally rationalize[s] social life, tends to justify the social status quo' (Cole 1999:225). This ideological hegemony permeates in all aspects of life: social, cultural, economic, and political.

As a result of this ideological hegemony, the dehumanised people develop various characteristics, which tie them to the vicious cycle of dehumanisation and underdevelopment. '*Self-deception*' is one of these characteristics when the oppressed 'regard themselves as lazy, sick, and unproductive' (Freire 1970:38 emphasis added). As long as the oppressed do not know the causes of their oppression and the dehumanised state, they '*accept*' their state as reality (p.38). This state of acceptance results in another characteristic - '*inertia*' - when people internalise their oppression rather than externalising their vision. Vision is the state when people know what is not there which should be there (Murphy 1999 emphasis added). This 'perceived powerlessness, and the concurrent psychology of '*inertia*' strengthens *conformity* to and acceptance of constructed truth and hinders them from bringing a social change for development (p.14).

Ideological Hegemony in the Existing World

Neo-liberal capitalist ideological hegemony is a key feature of the existing globalised world (Gosovic 2000). This ideology regards the underdeveloped and the poor as being responsible for their own underdeveloped and dehumanised state (Cole 1999). It justifies exploitation of human beings in the name of free market and competition. Modern communication technologies have played a vital role in establishing this ideological hegemony at the global level (Gosovic 2000).

At the global level, this ideological hegemony has resulted in "intellectual dependence" of the countries of the South on a handful intellectuals of the North for their own national development (p.448). Not only this, it has also played a key role in forming agenda and outlook of all the key international development institutions (p.448) further influencing the development strategies formulated and implemented for the development of the underdeveloped.

Pakistan, like many other developing countries, has not been able to escape existing ideological hegemony. The government has been pursuing market-based economic reform policies since the decade of 80's. It has been ambitiously implementing International Monetary Fund (IMF) assisted structural adjustment program while removing barriers to foreign trade and investment. But these foreign *solutions* rather than freeing Pakistanis from the vicious cycle of poverty have resulted in a state of underdevelopment captured in following lines:

[T]he World Bank considers Pakistan a low-income country. No more than 39 per cent of adults are literate, and life expectancy is about 62 years or less..... Relatively few resources have been allocated to socio-economic development or infrastructure projects. Inadequate provision of social services has contributed to a persistence of poverty and unequal income distribution (www.state.gov <<http://www.state.gov>> 2000).

Counter Ideological Hegemony and the Role of Intellectuals

Panacea for this state of underdevelopment and vital process to achieve real development is generating a counter ideological hegemony in the society. In the current state of underdevelopment, the intellectuals

in Pakistan are not only supposed to explain the state of the underdeveloped and the poor world rather they need to be the agents and activists for change - social transformation. To quote Karl Marx, 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to *change it*' (Marx 1975:423 in Cole 1999:251). They need to struggle to counter ideological hegemony 'to break the ideological bond between the ruling class and various sectors of the general population' - the bond, which causes inertia, self-deception and ultimately dehumanisation (Boggs 1976:40).

This counter ideological hegemony can only be generated through the process of *conscientisation* and *praxis*. This is where the intellectuals have a crucial role to play - in generating a counter-ideological hegemony through conscientisation by facilitating praxis.

Conscientisation is awareness of selfhood and a critical look at the social situation in which people find themselves (Freire 1970, Boggs 1976). This awareness results in demystification of prevailing ideological hegemony, as a result of which people negate to accept limits on developing and utilising their potentials and open new ways for a better future for themselves. They become 'subjects' who act upon and transform their world, and doing so move towards more 'richer' life not only 'individually' but also 'collectively' (Shaul in Freire 1970:9-12).

To achieve development in the real sense people are required to be *liberated* from their dehumanised state. But this liberation will not occur by chance as the state of dehumanisation also does not exist by chance; it is generated through ideological hegemony. Therefore, liberation can be made possible by generating a counter- ideological hegemony, which is possible only through conscientisation. This conscientisation can be achieved by facilitating '*praxis*' among the oppressed (Freire 1970 emphasis added).


But before discussing how conscientisation can be facilitated through praxis, it is important to answer an important question whether there are any intellectuals in Pakistan who can be regarded as intellectuals from the praxis perspective, the intellectuals who have escaped ideological hegemony of capitalism? The answer would be yes. Because 'civil society is ... as an area that, for the most part, consolidates, through its dominant institutions, existing hegemonic arrangements, but which also contain sites or pockets, often within the dominant institutions themselves, wherein these arrangements are constantly negotiated and contested' (Mayo 1997:7).

Praxis is people's 'action and reflection upon their world in order to transform it' (p.52). To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognise its causes, so that through transformation they can create a new situation - a situation, which makes the pursuit of a fuller humanity possible (p.24). Praxis does not help to comprehend only present situation but also helps understand past - the 'experience' (Cole 1999) - and determine future by giving people a *vision*. Through praxis people see beyond their 'limit-situations' to 'untested fusibilities' (Murphy 1999:10). As long as people don't know the cause of oppression they accept it as a given reality. Once they know the causes they fight against it. But knowing the cause of their dehumanised and oppressed state will involve not only intellect but also action, not only activism but also reflection (Freire 1970: 41). For this purpose, praxis is a must, which combines both the intellect and action.

Praxis gives people the feeling and strength to believe in themselves and their potentials. It leads them to believe that '[t]he future is not determined by forces beyond [their] control; [they] do not have to be passive ... [they] can, potentially, purposefully intervene in social existence to guide the unfolding path of [their] experience' (Cole 1999:246).

However, conscientisation through praxis itself is a challenging process because conscientisation is 'anarchic' 'as it threatens status quo' as opposed to conformity (Freire 1970:15-16). This is its

The role of intellectuals in development



anarchic nature which frightens people to be conscientised (p.15). Also, counter ideological hegemony through conscientisation and praxis is not possible overnight; it requires a long struggle to achieve it. For these reasons, along with the intellect the intellectuals in Pakistani society require to have courage and confidence to fight against status quo (Cole 1999) and defy prevailing ideological hegemony at all fronts.

The first step towards achieving praxis is trust in potentials and capabilities of the oppressed. Secondly, the intellectuals need to generate and facilitate critical dialogue by posing people's own oppressed situation as problem for them rather than 'banking' information about the state of underdevelopment in the heads of the oppressed (Freire 1970:54). For dialogue, intellectuals require to have profound love and respect for human beings, humility, faith in human beings, mutual trust, hope and critical thinking (pp. 60-69).

During the process of conscientisation and counter ideological hegemony the intellectuals require to adopt following strategies:

- 1) build alliances
- 2) make the process of conscientisation locally based, and
- 3) make it an organic process in the society.

Murphy (1999) has stressed that the intellectuals should build alliances with other intellectuals to counter ideological hegemony effectively. One can argue that in a globalised society, where capitalist mode of thinking is operating as ideological hegemony, it is impossible to implement any agenda of counter ideological hegemony. But in reality globalisation itself makes this process of countering ideology hegemony and action much easier. Through its advanced technology and communication networks (media, information technology etc.), it facilitates building alliances at local, regional and global level (Mayo 1997: 133-134).

However, at the same time the process of conscientisation requires to be locally based. The intellectuals should think globally but act locally. With the help of communication technology in the epoch of globalisation, intellectuals and the oppressed can get the information about the state of their fellow beings in other parts of the world. But this information should be used to understand global trends or the globalised ideological hegemony and its implication for the people in the country. Strategies of conscientisation and struggle for development need to be based locally as conscientisation becomes effective and easier when people's own situation and experience is posed as the problem (Freire 1970). The process of struggle for conscientisation should have its own '*national* character' (Boggs 1976:19). Gramsci has also 'rejected the mechanical borrowing of strategic models from abroad and even more the attempt ... to impose worldwide models from a single centre' (p.19).

In addition, it is necessary that creation of counter hegemony is 'organic' and part of overall cultural transformation because 'evolutionary change can be authentic only insofar it is *total*, embracing all aspects of society...' (Gramsci in Boggs 1976:17-18).

'[H]egemony means permeation through civil society' (p. 39). It needs to operate as a 'general conception of life' for the masses' and 'as scholastic programme' or set of principles which are advanced by a sector of the intellectuals'. In this regard, encouraging participation of the oppressed and elimination of gap and distance between the intellectuals and the oppressed is a prerequisite (Mayo 1997).

Finally, the ultimate result of this conscientisation will be the class struggle when individuals sharing their interests will organise themselves to counter hegemony and struggle to liberate themselves from the state of dehumanisation and for an environment in which they can realise and capitalise upon their

potentials for development. During this class struggle intellectuals will be required to provide *guidance* at theoretical and practical level.

‘During the struggle for ideological hegemony, the revolutionary intellectuals will have to take the initiative on many fronts: raising new questions and introducing new modes of thinking about reality, attacking the accepted wisdom of established intellectual authority, and providing theoretical guidance to emerging class struggle’ (Boggs 1976:77).

Conclusion

The role of intellectuals in development from the class-struggle perspective has been discussed in this paper. In this regard, different definitions of development and intellectuals’ role in it have been presented. The main argument is that dehumanisation of human beings generated by ideological hegemony is the deeper state of underdevelopment and it is the responsibility of intellectuals in any society to facilitate development by countering prevailing ideological hegemony.

Pakistan like many other developing countries has also not been able to escape the global ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism, which has resulted in unequal opportunities. Intellectuals of the country have a vital role to play in the process of development. They are responsible for facilitating creation of an environment in which people of the country have equal opportunities for their development. Intellectuals can facilitate such an environment by generating a counter ideological hegemony by conscientising people through praxis. Specific strategies intellectuals of Pakistan require in this regard include building alliances with each other, making the process of conscientisation locally based, and ensuring an organic process of conscientisation in the society.

The process of conscientisation is challenging and time-intensive. It is its challenging nature, which deters many intellectuals from playing the desired role in the society. But to facilitate the real development of people Pakistani intellectuals need to gather courage and build confidence in their potentials and in the potentials and capabilities of the underdeveloped. They need to struggle to make people aware of their state and give them a vision for their development.

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SPO DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

**Reforms in Health Care:
An Equitable and Comprehensive System**

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About the Author

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Acronyms

BHU – Basic Health Unit

CON – Certificate of Need

CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child

DOTS – Direct Observed Treatment Short Course

EPI – Expanded Program on Immunization

FLSAW - Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women

FWCW – Fourth World Conference on Women

GAVI – Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization

GNP – Gross National Product

ICPD – International Conference on Population and Development

LHV – Lady Health Visitors

MCH – Maternal and Child Health

MOH – Ministry of Health

NDF – National Drug Formulary

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

OPV – Oral Polio virus Vaccine

PSDP – Public Sector Development Program

RBRVS – Resource Based Relative Value Service Units

RHC – Rural Health Center

THQ - *Tehsil* Headquarters Hospital

UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UNCED – United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

WHO – World Health Organization WHP – Women Health Project WMO – Women Medical Officer

WSSD – World Summit on Social Development

REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: AN EQUITABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM

Introduction

The fact, that Pakistan with an estimated population of 150 million has failed to fulfill the health needs of its citizens, is well supported by internationally established health indicators and poor economic status of the country.¹

In 1978 Pakistan endorsed 'Health for All' declaration adopted during the conference organized by World Health Organization (WHO) in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan (then USSR). Pakistan's, present government claims that it is working diligently to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens, and for this purpose has launched several new initiatives. However, every concerned citizen, sincere public health workers, committed NGOs, and honest government representatives, while putting efforts to improve the health and economic status of the nation are haunted by a single question, 'Is the government honest in its claims?'

Reforms in the health care system, which is the focus of this paper, as a rule occur in administration, payment and organization of health care on different levels of realization. The ethical conundrum that emerges from such reforms is that the laws of free market economics are not easily reconciled with the citizens' right to equitable health care. In most debates, the egalitarian ideals are considered intimate with basic human rights.²

This paper presents the classification and the functional components, their integration, and their function in the health care system. A historical perspective of the present health care system and the highlights of the present health policy of the Pakistan are also added. Additionally, status-quo of health care, expenditures, health care resources, health status in terms of neonatal, infant and children under five mortality rates, maternal mortality ratio and life expectancy at birth, percentage of the population with safe drinking water and situation of human resources are presented. Finally, recommendations are put forward to improve health reforms, which would lead towards the provision of an equitable and comprehensive health care.

Components of Health Care System³

Universally functional components of a health care system have been identified as Production of Resources, Organization of Programs, Economic Support, Management, and Provision of Services. The organizational relationship of these components is demonstrated in the following flow diagram:

1 World Health Organization, *World Health Report 2005, Basic Indicators for all WHO Member States*.

2 C Cherry, "Health Care, Human Worth and the Limits of the Particular," *Journal of Medical Ethics* 23, no. 5 (October 1997): 310-314.

3 Milton I. Roemer, "Analysis of Health Services Systems: A General Approach," in *Reorienting Health Services: Application of Systems Approach*, Charles O. Pannenberg, Warf A. Vander, G. B. Hirsch, K. Bernard (New York, 1982).




Figure 1: Organizational Flow of Health Components

Production of Resources

The resources within a health care system are workforce, facilities, commodities, and knowledge. *Workforce* component includes physicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, laboratory technicians, nutritionists, paramedics, and other human resource involved in service delivery.

Facilities include hospitals, which may be classified as acute short-stay, general, long-term facilities, mental hospitals, children's hospitals and other physical infrastructure used in delivering health services. Other facilities provide ambulatory care, which includes health centers, polyclinics, dispensaries, health posts and mobile clinics. Additionally, it might include nursing homes, freestanding laboratories and rehabilitation centers. Ownership, size, and technological development may characterize these facilities. The geographical distribution of hospital beds in relation to population is an important feature of health care system.

Commodities include a vast array of supplies and equipments. This sphere of health care has become increasingly sophisticated and voluminous. From biological compounds and drugs, through diagnostic and therapeutic machines and devices, to health care aids, it encompasses a multiplicity of systems of research, design, production, marketing, and distribution.

Finally, *knowledge* itself is considered a major health care resource. Primarily, this is derived from research in medical sciences and clinical studies to enhance understanding about disease processes and to better equip health care providers with more efficient tools to contain and fight diseases.

Organization

Organization refers to governmental and/or private sector management of health care resources and their distribution. At the level of government this usually takes the shape of a department or ministry of health. Lower down the hierarchy, other divisions or agencies may operate with varying degrees of independence. These may be social security organizations, social insurance programs, education providing institutions, environment protection agencies etc. In the private sector, many voluntary non-profit organizations and for profit entities may exist to manage, distribute, and provide health care.

Economic Support

Finance providing sources may vary from country to country and even between different regions of a country. Financing comes from four sources with varying degrees. These include health insurance programs or employer paid system, up-front financing by consumers, governmental revenues, and through charitable organizations or philanthropists' donations.

Management

Management encompasses activities such as planning, administration, regulation, and evaluation. Each of these representative activities is associated with certain key functions. For instance, administration involves all actions involved during policy formulation. Regulatory aspects of health care management involve both governmental and non-government jurisdictions. Most often, in health care services, the process of payment may be employed as leverage to apply regulatory controls. Additionally, courts of law may also provide recourse in settling disputes between health care providers and receivers.

Provision of Services

Healthcare service provision may be viewed under a bipolar classification of prevention (Preventive Services) and care (Curative Services). Both areas of health care operate at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of function.

1) Prevention

The goal of primary prevention is to improve the general health status of a population. This is usually achieved through educational guidelines that encourage a healthy lifestyle, teach stress management techniques, regulating environmental standards, and specific disease prevention strategies. Both physicians and the community participate in these activities to achieve comprehensive and wider reach of these programs. The secondary prevention is directed towards reducing the extent of disability by providing early diagnosis and treatment. Examples of secondary prevention are programs, which screen apparently normal individuals and administer prompt treatment. Health care providers, such as physicians and nurses, carry out secondary prevention. The goal of tertiary prevention is to reduce features associated with illness, such as pain, to improve personal level of functioning through surgery, and physical and vocational rehabilitation. Health care providers and health care organizations carry it out.

2) Care

Primary care is oriented towards uncomplicated routine patients' needs. It includes diagnosis and treatment, medical advice, referral and continuing care and is carried out by practitioners and health care facilities. Secondary care consists of routine hospitalization and specialized ambulatory care and often involves readily available technology and procedure, which includes diagnostic testing and uncomplicated surgery. Secondary care is carried out by hospitals and specialty care ambulatory settings. The goal of tertiary care is associated with highly complex services associated with the setting of well-developed ongoing basic and clinical research, and is equipped with complicated diagnostic and therapeutic procedures involving cutting edge technology. It is carried out in universities, medical colleges and research centers.

Classification of Health System⁴

The variation in the five areas of health care system in different countries, influenced by economic development and political ideology, gives us a simple way to classify health care systems.

Economic Development

Countries with higher economic development are industrialized; their population tends to be mainly urban with high per capita income and they are described as affluent developed country. Countries with

⁴ Milton I. Roemer, "Analysis of Health Services Systems: A General Approach," in *Reorienting Health Services: Application of Systems Approach*, Charles O. Pannenberg, Warf A. Vander, G. B. Hirsch, K. Bernard (New York, 1982).

per capita income level in the medium level are described as moderate less developed countries and those with lowest per capita income are described as poor developing countries.

Political Ideology

It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe different political ideologies, as the focus is on the health care system. However, we can identify three broad types of health policies dictating a particular health system. The policy emphasis with least socially organized delivery of health services may be classified as permissive, next which is more socially organized may be called cooperative, and the most socially organized may be termed as socialist.

Based on the aforementioned variables that is, economic level and political ideology, we can identify nine types of health care systems:

Economic Status	Political Ideology		
	Permissive	Cooperative	Socialist
Affluent (Developed Countries)	1	2	3
Moderate (Less Developed Countries)	4	5	6
Poor (Developing Countries)	7	8	9

Table 1

Health Care System of Pakistan

Based on the above mentioned classification, we may place the health care system of Pakistan in the ‘Poor Permissive’ category, and it comprises of public and private sector. The major infrastructure of the public health care system was set up in the 1960s and 1970s by the government.

‘Basic Health Units’ for villages, ‘Rural Health Centers’ (RHC) and ‘Tehsil Headquarter Hospitals’ represented higher primary/secondary health care, and district hospitals, teaching and referral units represented tertiary care units. Additionally, small dispensaries, maternity homes, specialized units for heart diseases, kidney ailments, eye centers and children hospitals were established in urban and rural areas. The government also supported non-scientific methods like Homeopathic and *Hikmat*, traditional methods

for treatment through Herbs, for provision of services to indigent populations. Along with this a significant public health campaign was also launched, keeping in view the donor agency needs and WHO guidelines to meet the target. These included an expanded program of immunization to eradicate the prevalent infectious diseases; malaria control program; tuberculosis control program; family planning program; diarrhea and pneumonia control programs. In order to ensure the effective monitoring and the implementation of the policy guidelines, the government formed the ‘National Institute of Health’.

Even though the subsequent governments improved physical infrastructure for health facilities, they failed in delivering what people really needed. A large number of basic healthcare units were in far flung places with small populations and no support structures such as, schools and residential places for doctors and other paramedical staff. However, under every government ‘Health for All’ remained official policy for state-owned health system. And despite less than optimum function, the public sector health delivery system provided relief to 85% of the poor population of Pakistan. But there were times when this sector was almost dysfunctional and ghost centers were erected to utilize available funds.

Due to the failure of public health system of the country in the last two decades, the private sector (for profit and not for profit) with the encouragement from successive governments has emerged as one of the most profitable businesses in the country. The inefficient public health care system (government and semi government system) provided the ground for the success of the private sector. This expensive, business oriented private sector is a barrier to access to health care for the 70% poor population of the country.

The failure of public sector health delivery system is clearly reflected in the resources and health related indicators of Pakistan.

Resources

According to official figures, Pakistan has 916 Hospitals, 552 Rural Health Centers, 5,301 Basic Health Units and 4,582 Dispensaries in the public sector. The health sector human resource in the country comprises of 17,200 Specialist Doctors, 113,206 General Physicians, 48,446 Nurses, 6,741 Lady Health Visitors and over 85,000 Lady Health Workers.⁵

Resources	Govt. Figures and estimates
01. Number of Doctors	One doctor/1552 person
02. Nurses	One nurse/3788 person
03. Hospital Beds (Public Sector)	One hospital bed/1518 person
04. Basic Health Units	5301
05. Govt. Dispensaries	4582
06. Rural Health Centers	552
07. Tehsil Headquarter Hospitals	877
08. District Hospitals	58
09. Teaching Hospitals	NA
10. Independent GPs (Private)	48446
11. Lady Health Visitors	6741
12. Lady Health Workers	85,000
13. Specialist doctors	17,200

Table 2: Masses' Accessibility to Health Resources

The above figures depict that the available human resource in health care industry is less than optimum, for example for every 1552 persons there is only one doctor, and only one nurse for every 3788 individuals. There is a dearth of paramedics, technical and ancillary staff.

Economic Support

The expenditure on health in the public sector compared to the private sector clearly reflects the past and the present governments' priority. For example in 1990-91 the developmental expenditure was 15% of the GNP, defense spending was 14%, debt servicing was 16%, education spending was 2.1% and health expenditure was only 0.74% of the GNP. In the year 2000-2003 with the present government claiming that the country's economy has boomed and billions of dollars are in reserve, the developmental expenditure was 17%, defense was 24%, debt servicing 48%, education 2.3% and health was only 0.7 % of the GNP.

⁵ Ministry of Health Pakistan, *Women's Health and Rights Situation in Pakistan* (July 2005).

Year	Defense	Debt Servicing	Developmental	Education	Health
1990-91 (% GNP)	14%	16%	15%	2.1%	0.74%
2000-2003	24%	48%	17%	2.3%	0.7%

Table 3

Health Status⁶

The current status of health of the nation can easily be evaluated by looking at the health indicators, which obviously put Pakistan at the bottom of the developing countries. For instance, the infant mortality rate is 75.9 per 1000; death rate among children under 5 years of age is 103 per 1000; and maternal mortality ratio is 340-400 per 100,000 births. The life expectancy at birth for males is 64 years and for females is 66 years. According to WHO figures, more than 3.7 million children under five are malnourished, 76% of deliveries take place at home While 78% are immunized against tuberculosis and 54% are immunized against measles. Hepatitis B vaccination facility is not available to the whole population. Hepatitis B and C patients are increasing exponentially. Furthermore, despite more than forty rounds of polio vaccination, Pakistan continues to report new polio cases every year.

The following figures are presented by the Ministry of Health in their official document:⁷

Health Related Indicators	
Prevalence of underweight children (under five years of age) Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (< 2350 calories per day)	37% (NNS 2001-02) 32.6%
Under five mortality rate	103/ 1000 Live Births (1997-2000) (PRHFPS 2000-01)
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births	75.9 (2003) (PDS/FBS 2003)
Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles	57% (PIHS-IV 2001-2002)
Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births	340-400 (Planning Commission, 2003)
Proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants	31% (PSLSM 2004-05)
HIV prevalence among 15 – 24 year old pregnant women	<0.1%
Contraceptive prevalence rate	36% (NIPS 2005)
Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS	Not Available
Proportion of death rates associated with malaria	8.9/100,000, estimated by Ministry of Health & WHO (confirmatory community and hospital mortality data required)

6 Pakistan Medical Association, *Suggested Reforms in the Health System of Pakistan* (2004).

7 Ministry of Health Pakistan, *Women's Health and Rights Situation in Pakistan* (July 2005).

Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures	20% (Ministry of Health)
Prevalence of death rates associated with Tuberculosis (TB)	42.9/100,000 population (Ministry of Health and WHO)
Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS (Direct Observed Treatment Short) course	30%-Case detection rate 77%- Treatment success rate
Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source (Tap in house, Tap outside house, Hand pump or Motor pump)	86% (PIHS-IV 2001-02)
Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation (Flush, Non-Flush or Communal Latrine)	57% (PIHS-IV 2001-02)
Life expectancy at birth (years)	66 for females & 64 for males (PDS/FBS 2001)
Population growth rate per annum	1.9 (NIPS)
Total fertility rate	4.0 (NIPS 2004)
Proportion of women 15-49 years who had given birth during the last 3 years, and attended at least one antenatal care consultation	50% (PSLSM 2004-05)
Population without access to health services	30% (MOH, 2003)
Lady Health Workers' coverage of target population	70% (MOH 2005)
FLCF utilization rate (number of OPD patients per day per facility)	36 (MOH 2002-03)
FLCF not experiencing stock-outs of any one of five key supplies (ORS, Cotrimoxazole, Iron/Folate Tablets, Chloroquine and Syringes)	28% (MOH 2002-03)
Proportion of children under five who suffered from diarrhea in the last 30 days and received ORT	54% (PIHS-IV 2002-02)
Proportion of fully immunized Children 12-23 months	77% (PSLSM 2004-05)
Immunization coverage of pregnant mothers with two doses of TT	51% (PSLSM 2004-05)
Number of polio cases	12 (Jan to July 2005)

HIV/AIDS knowledge among ever married women	41.7% (PRHFBS-NIPS 2000-01)
Safe blood transfusion in public sector	90% for Hepatitis B and HIV testing & 30-90% for Hepatitis C testing (MOH 2002)
Low birth weight babies	25% (MOH 2001)
Distribution of vitamin A to all children (6-59 months) in millions	23 (MOH 2003)
Universal access to iodized salt as reported by community	27% (NNS 2001-02)

Table 4

Highlights of National Health Policy 2001⁸

The Ministry of Health presented a 5-year plan in 2001 to improve the health situation and making the health system efficient. The plan emphasized on the following 10 priority areas:

- 1) Reducing widespread prevalence of transferable diseases
- 2) Addressing inadequacies in primary/secondary health care services
- 3) Removing professional/managerial deficiencies in the District Health System
- 4) Promoting greater gender equity
- 5) Bridging basic nutrition gaps in the target-population
- 6) Correcting urban bias in health sector
- 7) Introducing required regulation in private medical sector
- 8) Creating mass awareness in public health matters
- 9) Effective improvements in the drug sector
- 10) Capacity-building for health policy monitoring

Ever since the announcement of health policy in 2001 the government announces new projects every year with implementation modalities like:

- 1) Expansion of Lady Health Workers' program
- 2) Provision of emergency obstetric care through the establishment of 'women friendly hospitals' in 20 districts of Pakistan under Women Health Project (WHP)
- 3) Replication of experiences of WHP in 34 socio-economically poor districts under Reproductive Health Project
- 4) Establishment of a referral system between the village level and the health care facilities up to district hospital level will be under Women Health Project

⁸ Ministry of Health Pakistan, *Women's Health and Rights Situation in Pakistan* (July 2005).

- 5) Increase in the enrolment of midwives, Lady Health Visitors (LHV) and nurses in Nursing Schools, Midwifery Schools and Public Health Schools
- 6) Filling of all vacancies in government sector of Women Medical Officers (WMO), Nurses, Lady Health Visitors and women cadres on priority basis
- 7) Expansion of the National EPI Program through introduction of Hepatitis-B Vaccine in 2001
- 8) Routine EPI facilities in the provinces, especially cold-chain equipment will be strengthened through GAVI grant assistance over the next 5 years
- 9) Implementation of a national program for immunizing mothers against Neo-natal Tetanus in 64 selected High-Risk Districts in the country
- 10) Provision of Vitamin-A supplementation annually to all under five years children (about 30 million) along with OPV on national immunization days through EPI
- 11) Provision of iodized salt will be ensured along with introduction of fortified flour and vegetable oil by addition of micronutrients like Iron and Vitamin-A
- 12) Nutrition Project through PSDP will ensure a food fortification program in coordination with local food industry
- 13) Provision of Health Nutrition Package through 100,000 Lady Health Workers which includes Vitamin-B Complex syrup, Ferrous Fume rate and Folic Acid to deserving persons, especially pregnant women and sick family members
- 14) Implementation of mass awareness/health education program through print and electronic media
- 15) Expansion of a newborn care project for 10 selected districts
- 16) Project for creating a cadre of community midwives in collaboration with National Commission for Human Development

All the priority areas and the subsequent projects to achieve the goals sound good, but it is unimaginable how the government is expecting to achieve its goals without increasing the budget for the health sector.

In this context, lack of political will and poor planning are clearly the reasons for failure of the subsequent governments in providing health services to the population.

Recommendations

To attain sustainable improvement in health care facilities, Pakistan needs to drastically reform its health system. If reforms are carried out on the basis of above set priorities, Pakistan would be in a position to achieve the internationally set goals under 'Health for All', and article 38 (a & d) under the constitution of Pakistan which ensures that, 'the state shall secure the well being of the people provide basic necessities of life such as medical relief for all such citizens irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, as are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment'.

Since Pakistan is a developing country with a persistently slow moving economy, it has a high unemployment and low earning rate. Therefore, the country needs a health care system that

is capable of maximizing the utility of each penny spent on health system and optimum utility and efficiency could only be achieved by an equitable, coherent and a 'balanced health system' based on egalitarian principles.

In a balanced health care system state should be the sole guarantor of health for majority of the population and provide services through government owned facilities or regulate health services for private sector. Thus, there should be only one major buyer based on monopsonic principles of economics. Government should be able to control the cost and quality of the system. Thus all the domains of health care system that include production of resources, organization of programs, provision of services and management should be controlled either by the government or out-sourced through negotiated contracts under strict guidelines to independent, widely represented public health authorities. This way the state shall have more influence in planning and prioritizing the delivery of services.

The management should remain the responsibility of the federal and the provincial governments, as they are the ones who could engage in legislative, judicial processes to monitor and make the system efficient. Health Advisory Board should be constituted including medical associations, professional associations, public and Ministry of Health representatives to assist the government in planning, monitoring and evaluation of different health related projects. Effective monitoring of other parallel programs, initiated by different donor organizations under the broader policy framework, should be done by the federal government. Effective management of health care system lies in public private partnership, a version of which should be provided in district devolution plan under which city and district governments should have responsibility of constituting a well represented public health authority for smooth functioning of primary, higher primary and secondary care facilities and other related interventions. They should also be empowered to monitor and regulate the private sector and thus maintain the standards.

The privatization of health system is no answer to the past mismanagement; rather it is another barrier for the poor population. Official figures reflect that 32% of Pakistan's population has no access to the health care system at all. Privatization will increase their misery due to poor buying power of the masses.

To run a balanced health system the economic support should be generated by pooling resources by gradual increase in state's expenditures on health over the next five years, that is from 0.7 % to 5% of the GNP. This increase may come by decreasing expenses on defense, debt servicing, non developmental programs and through levying agricultural tax. Additionally the current share of health expenditure of 3.2% of GDP from private sector, which is mainly spent by employer and by consumers, should be monitored.

Our society is resource depleted and available resources are undermined, therefore, it is required to focus on improving resources and to optimally utilize them too.

Physicians, nurses and allied health workers are the most important resource to run a health system. To overcome human resource shortage, unemployed qualified doctors should be engaged on priority basis against all vacant sanctioned positions at public sector facilities. In addition to that, there is a need of improved career structure for health care workers. Human resource generation needs to be given a priority attention by the government. Production of human resource should be planned based on demand and supply rule in health care. In this connection, to produce quality health workers, Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and other relevant organizations should be empowered to implement quality guidelines for undergraduate and postgraduate training. These organizations should also be authorized to permit new medical schools in public and private sectors without being influenced by external forces and to play a watchdog role.

There is a dire need to establish a National Drug Formulary (NDF) in the country. This may function as a body to collect and circulate information about lifesaving, essential and commonly used drugs with generic version only. Drugs import should be limited to only those drugs that are not being produced locally. There should be state-of-the-art quality control mechanisms to ensure that the produced drugs both by national and multi-national companies are of international quality. The food and drug administration should be made efficient to implement and monitor quality assurance programs and each new drug manufactured or imported should be laboratory tested before being marketed by the administration.

Since health care is highly dependent on modern and efficient equipments and medicines, there is a tremendous advancement in biological sciences and its use in medicine. Pakistan particularly lags behind in research and development in medical sciences. The government neither introduced such policies which encourage indigenous research institutes nor allocated more resources for research and development in the medical field. Most of the efforts, in this connection, are made by the corporate sector mainly for profit making purposes, which has given a boost to the prices and made access of the poor to medicines very difficult. South Africa can be taken as an absolute case where HIV drugs are inaccessible due to high prices by multi-national companies (MNC). Therefore, the government needs to provide suitable environment for research, allocate more resources and ensure good governance in the public sector for self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the medical field. To promote such knowledge creation and accumulation, research in basic medical science and clinical medicine should be made mandatory in all medical institutions and teaching hospitals. The government should strictly monitor the pharmaceutical industry for mandatory spending in research and development and should divert minimum of 50% of that to the public institutions for research activities.⁹

To maintain a good quality and low cost of patient care and ancillary services there is an urgent need of a widely represented authority, which can develop and implement essential minimum standard guidelines for private and public sector hospitals, primary care centers, laboratories and diagnostic centers. There is also urgency for a system, which can prohibit construction of health facilities without certificate of need, so that proper urban rural distribution of hospital facilities could be ensured.

To meet patients' congestion in hospitals there is a dire need to enhance capacity of hospitals from 70 to 150 beds per hundred thousand persons to accommodate more patients. This increase should focus on RHC, THQ and district hospitals for higher primary and secondary care services. Teaching hospitals, which are located mainly in urban areas, should only focus on tertiary, higher secondary and emergency services. Furthermore, to bring sustainable long-term positive change in the health care sector and to meet the health needs of increasing population, provision of prevention oriented primary health care services is required. Such services are usually cost effective and put a long-term positive impact on the health status of the population.

Present devolved governance structures might be quite useful in future health reforms. To run the health system efficiently there is a need of partnership between professional associations of doctors and government to establish health advisory boards and authorities at all levels. Running of various programs and the health facilities should be responsibility of district governments, which should create a system through which all public and private sector health care facilities under their jurisdiction should maintain a minimum staff, bed ratio and other ancillary services. The district government should also be empowered to maintain optimum number of private hospital beds, laboratories, clinics, and nursing homes for elderly and terminally sick in the

⁹ The government under an act in 1976 made it mandatory for the pharmaceutical industry to spend 1% of its gross revenue on research and development.

areas. This could be achieved by issuing Certificate of Need (CON) on the basis of demand and supply of services. Quality control should be a responsibility of district health advisory board. With the expanded role in health care services, they should be held accountable for negligence on the part of hospitals and doctors. The implementation of several public health oriented programs like EPI, DOTS, Hepatitis and HIV screening, MCH, and supplemental food programs etc. should also be under the domain of district governments. The hiring and firing should also be done at district level, so that they can maintain an optimum human resource for the functioning of the public sector facilities.

To provide prevention oriented primary health services, a coherent network of public sector BHU, dispensaries and independent general practitioners should be developed and made functional, with the aim to have at least one such facility/practitioner per 2500 persons in urban areas, and one within 2-5 square miles in rural areas.

For indigent population, higher primary care, and secondary care services should be provided through RHC, THQ, and district hospitals in public sector. Moreover, where public facilities are not available within five mile radius or 30 minutes of transportable distance, these services should be made available through network based contracted private sector facilities. In addition to private sector hospitals, emergency departments should be regulated and mandated to provide services irrespective of the patients' ability to pay. This will help to reduce delays in accessing healthcare facilities due to inability to pay by indigent population.

Tertiary care services like transplant and chemotherapy for cancer patients have very little impact on the health status of the population. Therefore, these should be given less priority and such services should only be prioritized based on the prognosis and outcome in terms of 5-10 years survival rates and should be made available at teaching hospitals.

To maintain equal standards and uniformity in the delivery of services, fixed pay scale mechanism is required for both out of pocket and employer based payment to hospitals and ancillary services. These rates should be based on principle of resource based relative value service units (RBRVS) for private sector facilities.

Conclusion

In view of the above said, policy reforms directed towards restructuring of the health system are unavoidable. If the present government is committed to improve health status and is intending to attain Millennium Development Goals (MDG), policy reforms aimed at provision of effective healthcare and services are essential. In this connection, the above-mentioned reforms might provide a blueprint to the way forward.

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Malick Shahbaz Ahmad Tahir

About the Author

Malick Shahbaz Ahmad Tahir is an educationist and social researcher. He worked with Oxfam, Australia, as a researcher in 2004-2005. Currently, he is working as Specialist Education and Special Projects at Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO). He has a master's degree in Education Policy, Management and Change from Monash University, Australia. His first master's was in Mass Communication with a major in Development Communication from Punjab University, Pakistan. He is involved in policy development and implementation of education programmes at the district and provincial levels. He has steered the process of developing several district education plans. He also facilitated the planning and implementation of Child focused Education Management Information System (C-EMIS) in Pakistan.

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Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EFA	Education for All
ESR	Education Sector Reforms
G-8	Group of Eight
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations IPRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper MNCs Multi-national Companies
NEAS	National Education Assessment System
NEP	National Education Policy
NPA	National Plan of Action
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAP	Social Action Programme
SC	Save Children
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's & Emergency Fund (UNICEF) UPE Universal Primary Education (UPE)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Preface

Due to the growing impact of globalization, and international forces like International Non- Governmental Organizations (INGO), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, nation- states' policy-making capacity has been affected significantly. Considering the different policy denominations and definitions, this paper highlights the role of international organizations in making policies at global and international level. It also discusses the nation- states' minimizing capacities in policy-making and the pressures on the policy-making domains especially in the developing nation-states. It has been established in this paper that the policy-making at the international level is a prominent feature of globalization and internationalization, which has placed pressure on the nation-states to adopt and follow those policies. Whereas, international conferences are used as a vehicle and the financial assistance from the international organizations has been used as a tool to pressurise the nation-states.

1. Defining Policy

Policy is a coherent but complex anthology of written and verbal intentions of public or private entities. Ball (1990), for example, defines policy as an encapsulated set of principles. These principles may exist in text form, but can also be conveyed through various other mechanisms including speeches, common understandings over the complexities of those principles, shared interpretations of the problems and their solutions which are arbitrated through actions and activities (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, & Henry, 1997). Due to their prescriptive, descriptive and dialectic characteristics, policies are dynamic in nature.

With varying contexts of policies and conceptual understandings in different disciplines ranging from anthropology to sociology, policy studies is a much contested and confusing field. Drawing upon the work of Ham and Hill (1984), Kenway (1990) notices that the scholars in the field of policy do not agree on one single definition. She suggests:

While no such agreement exists, policy analysts do largely agree that policy is so difficult to define that it is more productive to think about “the policy process” than to search for a definition of a political product, the beginning and the end points of which are hard to clarify. (Kenway, 1990, p. 6)

However, policy has been defined in a number of ways in the literature by the scholars in their respective contexts. “Policy is a strategic intervention to resolve or assist in resolving a problem” (Fischer, 2003, p. 60). Majone and Wildavsky (1978) in their scholarly work notice, “Policy ideas in the abstract ... are subject to an infinite variety of contingencies, and they contain worlds of possible practical applications. What is in them depends on what is in us and vice-versa” (p.113).

Policies have multiple characters and wide ranging possibilities for action. However, rationally bounded policies which are designed with specific purposes are set to deal with the problems or opportunity in a unilateral way. According to Anderson (1984), “policy is a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with the problem or matter of concern” (p. 3). Hence, policy can be considered as a tool for the decision makers for problem solving and to regulate change. Therefore, for Rondinelli (1995) “policies are innovative ways of dealing with critical problems and opportunities” (p. 223). Following the same course, Kogan suggests that “policy is clearly a matter of the ‘authoritative allocation of values’; policies are the operational statements of values, ‘statements of prescriptive intent’” (as cited in Ball, 1990, p. 3).

In this perspective, policy is primarily the authorization or the approval of a principle or a set of principles which establishes broader parameters for action(s). Nation-states or sub-national political units while acting as authoritative entities authorise a particular set of contested values that are based on contextual reasoning including political, ideological and economic within nation-states’ domain.

Figure 1 below displays the processes of education policy formation by nation-states in recent times. Domain A depicts that the nation-states’ policy domain remains central to the policy-making processes. In this domain policy formation occurs. The development of policy is usually through interactive processes, where policies get feedback from the sub nation-state entities by involving them in different phases of policy production and implementation or what Bowe, Ball & Gold (1992, p.20) have called “context of policy production”, “context of policy practice” and “context of influence” within nation-states. However, the participation processes in policy-making may differ within different nation-states.




Figure 1: Intra-state Influences on Nation-States' Education Policy-Making Processes

Domain B represents the different contexts which play a crucial role in policy-making within nation-states. Policy-making in education is not an isolated process. It is influenced by other circumstances and the policies interact with other contemporary policies such as economic policies within nation-states. Therefore, in this domain, economic, ideological and political contexts influence education policy-making through interactive networks and achieve a place in the discourses that shape the policies. Through these discourses policy actors consider, for example, the financial burdens placed on nation-states keeping in mind the workforce requirements and need for professionals by the nation-states to match the market demands. Furthermore, nation-states take into account whether they are capable of taking financial responsibilities for meeting the educational needs of their individuals or whether individuals should bear their own expenses to fulfil their educational needs. Based on this decision they may privatise or subsidise education. As policies are very much a political phenomenon, therefore, the political and the ideological changes within nation-states impact on the policy-making and nation-states formulate them in alignment with their political and ideological doctrines. Thus, the economic, the ideological and the political contexts play significant roles in policy-making (Ball, 1990) and are vital consideration in the holistic development of policy (Kenway, 1990). However, the cultural context and the implicit and explicit social structures are significant too as the policies often coincide with social norms, cultural parameters and identities of nation-states.

In this sense, policy stands for nation-states' approved intentions in anticipation of problems or opportunities. Further, these values or intentions are those which develop around a particular issue amongst different interest groups within nation-states' entity, catch nation-states' attention, get authorization and consequently gain space in the policy lines. Policy, thus, involves contesting and competing perspectives, struggles to dominate in policy lines, playing out of agendas, interests and motivations. Policy is about whose values and intentions have been validated and whose have been disallowed. However, policy encompasses not only what is acceptable or authorised but what is unacceptable or forbidden as well, voices heard and voices ignored or unheard, and what language is privileged and has been used to convey the policy intentions.

Considering the definition put forward by Ball drawing upon Kogan (1975), we will take into consideration the analysis of changes in notions of policy processes. In recent times, the policy phenomenon has been under intense scrutiny for three reasons:

- 1) Primarily, nation-states are not the sole authorization entities any longer (Marginson, 1999; Henry, Lingard, Rizvi, & Taylor, 1999).
- 2) The arenas for contestations over the values have changed (Henry, Lingard, Rizvi, & Taylor, 2001).
- 3) The nature of actors setting the values has changed and they exist beyond nation-state entities (Waters, 2001; Henry et al., 1999; Scholte, 2000; Held & McGrew, 2002; Carnoy & Rhonten, 2002).

This paper refers to the above mentioned three policy dimensions.

2. Challenges to Nation-States in Policy-Making

Nation-states nowadays are far less independent. They survive in a world which is more interactive and dynamic in nature than before. Their actions influence other nation-states and vice-versa. Things change quite frequently and nation-states adopt those changes and align themselves with the changing scenario to keep up their progress alongside the other players of the world. This phenomenon has prompted nation-states to engage in vigorous interactions. These interactions have conclusive impacts on the nation-states' behaviour in dealing with the emerging and the existing opportunities and problems. Hence, we see nation-states' relationships not only on a one-to-one basis but various nation-states have collectively created associations where they create opportunities, plan actions, negotiate behaviours and act together in a systematic fashion. This has increased nation-states' dependencies on each other. Furthermore, the universalization of problems and opportunities has increased the factors influencing policy-making in the nation-states. For instance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has played a conclusive role in internationalisation of university education and has pushed neo-liberal reforms in its member countries (Henry et al., 2001). Therefore, any change in the education perspective at the international level has a direct impact on the nation-states' education policies.

Many studies have tied the policies to economic, political and social changes and challenges at the international level. These challenges are the consequences of inter-state relationships and other factors. Taylor et al. (1997, p.55) has described them as economic, cultural and political "supranational connection" of the nation-states with the outside world, which have changed the policy-making patterns of the nation-states. These supranational connections are created by "internationalization" and "globalization" (Taylor et al., 1997, p.55). Scholars like Wildings (1997) being sceptical of the distinction between the two, describe globalisation and internationalization as a singular phenomenon. However, others have emphasised the importance of separating both in order to describe the nation-

state's relationship with other nation-states and in the globalizing world.¹ Nonetheless, despite their practical implications, both internationalization and globalization have affected nation-states' policy-making practices.

Primarily, concepts like "dissemination", "interdependence" and "standardization" are attached to the wider debate about internationalization and the role of supranational organizations (Wilding, 1997; Henry et al., 2001; Yeats, 1999; Meyer, 1997; Yang, 2003).²

For instance, the role of OECD has been considered as a disseminating authority along with the standardization of the education policy among its member states (Taylor et al., 1997; Yang, 2003; Henry et al., 2001). Likewise, introducing standard definition of literacy and policies like Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Education For All (EFA) are the prime examples of policy standardization among the member nation-states of United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Wilding (1997), notes that "a concern for competitiveness fostered a more outward-looking approach to economic and social policy" (p. 415). Countries became more interested in what their competitors did. Scholars like Dale (1999); Marginson (1999); Henry et al. (1999) argue that growing internationalization has led to efforts by the nation-states to introduce economical means for provision of social services to the public while being competitive at the international level. Therefore, most of the Western countries have transformed their education system to ensure their "national capacity building within global competitive markets" (Kenway & Bullen, 2000, p. 268). Moreover, "a more direct and more immediately relevant consequence is the development of supranational responses to common problems for states in a globalized context" (Dale, 1999, p. 11). This sense of competitiveness and shared solution of the problems among the nation-states has provided space for these supranational organizations to work, which formulate homogeneous policies based on successful policy interventions and the good practices by the member nation-states. Consequently, organizations like OECD, IMF, World Trade Organization (WTO), the UN and its subsidiary bodies have been functioning as regulatory authorities in the international arena. According to Wilding (1997), "the development of supranational policies means loss of sovereignty" (p. 425). Therefore, national policies, including policies for provision of social services such as health, education and so on which have been heavily supported by the governments in financial terms, have been under the jurisdiction of the nation-state and are profoundly influenced by international organizations, multi-national actors, international financial and economic players through global conventions at international level, through conferences and other fora.

Education systems are now firmly inscribed within the processes and ideologies that originate beyond nation-states and many of the systematic changes are inspired by forces outside a nation-state's ambit (Kenway & Bullen, 2000). Therefore, the recent global changes have altered the traditional ways of policy-making within the nation-state and the interactive forces and networks have become dominant forces (Berkhout & Wielemans, 1999). Under the current scenario, nation-states are under pressure to adopt and incorporate rapid changes at the international level in their policies, which have effectively curtailed nation-states' independence in the policy-making processes. Nation-states are not the sole authority allocating values anymore. Hence, this phenomenon has led to the attrition of nation-state boundaries by minimizing people's choices and potentially overshadowing national policies and policy-making processes.

1 Scholars like Yang (2000), Lingard and Rizvi (1998), Taylor et al. (1997) and Knight (1997) have argued that internationalization and globalization are two different phenomena. However, this research does not aim to distinguish the two. Rather, both are being considered as influential factors on nation-states' policy-making capacity.

2 For the purpose of this research, the words "international" and "supranational" are used interchangeably.

2.1. Globalization

Like many other core concepts in social studies, the concept of globalization is also quite a contested one. Scholars and researchers have defined it in a number of different ways. Primarily, it is described as economic, cultural and political integration among nation-states. Globalization is fundamentally a process of economic integration which surpasses nation-state territorial boundaries and ultimately affects the “flow of knowledge”, “people”, “values and ideas” (Yang, 2000). While emphasising the uneven growth under the globalization process, Yang (2003) notes that this process has never led to equality but it has contributed towards increasing the gap between the rich and the poor.

Marginson (1999) presents a holistic picture of globalization by classifying it into six different aspects, “finance and trade; communications and information technologies; international movements of people; the formation of global societies; linguistic, cultural and ideological convergence; and world systems of signs and images” (p. 21). Drawing upon what Marginson has established it can be argued that there has been an increase in “international trade”, “international investments” and “international finance” in the last couple of decades (Nayyar 2002, p.6).

“Globalization is neither necessarily a good nor a bad thing – its moral character will be accomplished by the inhabitants of the planet” (Waters, 2001, p. 185). Thus, “the current trend of globalization has delivered both clear disadvantages, as well as benefits” (Yang,

2000, p. 320). Scholars like Scholte (2000), Held and McGrew (2002), Carnoy and Rhonten (2002) and many others have seen globalization as an interference in nation-states’ affairs by reducing their control over socio-political and territorial boundaries, and attacking their autonomous status. On the other hand, Giddens (1996), Dale (1999), Henry et al. (2001) and Nayyar (2002) and others, while agreeing to the fact that it has impacted nation-states’ ability in many ways, emphasise the restructuring of nation-states’ infrastructure to benefit from this process. Irrespective of its advantages and disadvantages, scholars and researchers agree that the increasing forces of globalization have brought rapid systematic changes in the world in the recent decades, which have had a conclusive impact on regional and national education policies and processes (Henry et al., 2001; Kenway & Bullen, 2000).

Liberalization of the market economy and the global technological advancements has contributed largely to the minimizing capacity of policy-making by nation-states. Marginson (1999) and Henry et al. (1999) notice that nation-states have had the capacity to control markets, promote economic growth and keep social inequality to some extent in check but that has been eroded with increasing globalization. It is further suggested that:

Whereas once governments decided how to use markets to benefit their citizens, they have become increasingly beholden to market forces. Global markets now define the limits of local and national politics. The sovereignty of nations is increasingly threatened. Globalization is redefining the role of the nation-state as an effective manager of economic and social relations. (Henry et al., 1999, p. 86)

For instance, due to the free flow of capital and unchecked powers of the large multi-national companies, countries are facing difficulties controlling the level of their currencies and the inward and outward flow of wealth (Held & McGrew, 2002). Furthermore, the free flow of information through technological advancements in communication has made it impossible to control the spread of information due to public and cultural invasion; therefore, countries are unable to control their cultural and communication policies (Carnoy & Rhonten, 2002).

Henry et al. (2001) in agreement with Giddens, see the pressure from globalisation on nation-states from both top and bottom, consequently minimizing the policy-making options for nation-states. At the top, there are struggles of international alignment, such as economic competition, political pressures from powerful states, invasion of symbols, images and ideas. And from the bottom, pressure comes from

local forces to retain cultural ideologies and identities, local social movements and political conditions (Yeats, 1999). In addition to these forces at the top, the presence of supra-national organisations, like the UN with its subsidiary bodies: the WB, the IMF and the WTO, OECD, Group of Eight (G8) and multi-national companies (MNCs), as a pressure group(s), has added another layer of pressure on nation-states. Yeats notices that:

International economic and trade institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and GATT/WTO have exerted a more tangible influence on states and national policies than has global capital. Government policies are legally bound to comply with the principles and regulations of international governmental organizations, international and supranational organizations (World Bank, IMF, UN, EU, WTO). (Yeats, 1999, p. 82)

Globalisation has thus indirectly affected public services including education (Marginson, 1999; Dale, 1999). Market forces and globalisation may compel nation-states to either cut down their social services or remove subsidies. This may also lead to the privatization of the services or getting such services out of reach of the poor (Dale, 1999).




Figure 2: Globalization and Education Policy-Making in Nation-States

In Figure 2, domain C represents inter-state influences on nation-states' policy-making practices. It further explains the inclusion of supranational organizations which are influencing nation-states' policy-making processes. Moreover, domain D represents the impact of globalization on nation-states. This impact on nation-states emanates from the powerful nations directly or through the supranational organizations indirectly.

The developed countries, considered as key forces behind global education policies, are controlling their own national policies and also those of the developing countries through international organizations (Carnoy & Rhonten, 2002). Most of the third world countries have either adopted policies made by the international entities or have seen heavy involvement in policy matters by the international players like the United Nations' agencies and multi-national organizations, which have affected their policy-making capacity.

Firstly, Henry et al. (2001) and Dale (1999) in their scholarly work on the OECD's role in education policy-making in its member countries note that the supranational organizations have had their own priorities for their member countries and they push their own agenda through the policy lines. Therefore, these supranational organizations work to make the policy outcomes meet their expectations. A nation-state's compliance with policy guidelines from global forces might be voluntary or forced. Dale notes that:

Globalization assumes that the viability test of policy is carried out at a supranational level. Rather than having to demonstrate their compatibility with existing national state structures and practices, policies have to demonstrate their compatibility with supranational expectations. (Dale, 1999, p. 10)

Secondly an important aspect of globalization is the recent process by which global institutions have become the policy formulators in a wide range of fields which have been traditionally under the jurisdiction of the nation-state, including education. Now the governments are forced to implement policies made by the international institutions or those which are aligned to the decisions, rules and regulations of these international institutions (Carnoy & Rhonten, 2002). Dale (1999, p.2) calls this phenomenon "imposition mechanism" of globalization by the supranational organizations. For instance, Taylor et al. (1997) on the educational policies of Malaysia and Papua New Guinea empirically proved that the market forces have affected the Malaysian higher education policy and that conditionalities from the organizations, like the IMF and the WB, have controlled the educational policy of Papua New Guinea against the wishes and needs of the local authorities.

These supranational organisations together with the internationally organised agreements and facilitated by media and technology have played an instrumental role in the process of globalisation (Went, 2000). Therefore, they are allies in the process and are agents of globalization. Some scholars argue that such pressures are not so intense as to leave nation-states "impotent" (Dale, 1999, p. 2), but surely they have been affected by the policy-making processes; "a state cannot in contemporary globalizing circumstances exercise ultimate, comprehensive, absolute and singular rule over a country and its foreign relations" (Scholte, 2000, p. 136).

Hence, drawing upon the above, globalization is a phenomenon which encompasses political, economic and cultural relationships of nation-states beyond their territorial boundaries through supranational networks and organizations influencing nation-states as emphasised by Taylor et al. (1997) and Henry et al. (2001).

3. Policy Analysis in the Context of Globalization

Policies are political phenomena even if their political nature is camouflaged by their objectives, tone, apparent neutrality and rationality based on legal terminology (Shore & Wright, 1997). Hence, policy analysis is a complex task that calls for a close consideration of every aspect of the policy. Researchers in the field of policy analysis have employed various models with varying degrees of simplicity and complexity. Some examples include cost-effective method (Rondinelli, 1995), cultural and anthropology model (Shore & Wright, 1997), text and discourses (Ball, 1990), power (Foucault, 1972; Gale & Densmore, 2003), impact assessment or effectiveness (Fischer, 2003), rules, facts and rights (Kenway, 1990).

For a better understanding of policy we need to consider the conditions under which a policy has emerged, what Ball (1990, p.9) calls a “careful consideration”. Ball (1990) advocates dynamic consideration of education policy in relation to the political and ideological and economic and the political, ideological and economic in education policy.

A lot depends upon how the policy analysts see things. A thorough policy analysis requires the consideration of the happenings around policies, which are named and framed by the different interest groups (Gale & Densmore, 2003), and these influence the policy-making processes, set certain parameters for policy interpretations and for what Kenway (1990) calls, “holistic account of the policy process” (p. 6).

The process of policy analysis is as complex as the process of policy formation itself. In order to explore the hidden rationalities of the recent times we need to analyse the role of international organizations in a dynamic way which answers crucial questions posed by globalization and internationalization. In this regard, this paper employs Kenway (1990) model of policy analysis.

Rondinelli et al. (1990, p.223) argue that a comprehensive consideration in which we review the decision-making channels and assess the dynamics of the policy-making processes itself provides an insightful view of “how” and “why” policies are developed in the way they exist. Kenway (1990, p.24) has employed some fundamental questions in her work in policy inquiry on gender.³ She suggests the division of policy discussion into the “what”, “why” and “how”. Here drawing upon her research, during the policy analysis, questions need to be asked on the following matters:

1. How values are being allocated?
2. Why such values are being allocated at a particular time?
3. What are the circumstances which brought a particular policy in existence?
4. What are the objectives and agendas of a particular policy?
5. How a particular policy has been designed and why in the particular fashion in which it exists?

At this point in time, I have added “who” in this form of policy inquiry. It is important to know whose interests have been served and whose not.

4. The Genesis of Education for All (EFA)

“Globalization entails an increase in the tasks of basic education” (Hallak, 2000, p. 30). The globalized world seeks societies with individuals who are capable of effective thinking and who can cope with rapid changes. Therefore, we see the universalization of the policies and the standards. EFA is one of such policies which call upon the universalization of the education standards. EFA has emerged through a consultative process among 155 nation- states and about 1500 delegates from all over the world including delegates from the UN organizations, representatives of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and bilateral organizations. The conference was convened by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank (WB) (Ministry of Education, 2002a). During the Dakar conference, the charter of the conference was approved and later on adopted by all participating nation-states. Pakistan recognized the EFA during the Jomtien conference in 1990, while it was taken up and ratified later (Ministry of Education, 2002b). The government had legislation on EFA and formally made it part of the education policy in Pakistan.

³ Drawing upon Kenway’s work on gender and education policy in 1990, Taylor et al., (1997, p.39) has gone a step ahead in policy inquiry by raising questions like “what now” and “why now”. However, this research does not focus on the work of Taylor et al. (1997).

However, it was taken up comprehensively in the policy document in 1998 when the government launched the national education policy based on the charter adopted during the Jomtien conference in 1990 (Inayatullah, 2004).

EFA has been dominated by international organizations. Comprehensively, it is a mixture of several policy initiatives introduced by different international actors. Two fundamental policy interventions are important to mention here. First, the EFA focuses on the devolution of the powers in the implementing nation-states ensuring good governance in education through equitable distribution of resources and participation of the primary stakeholders (UNESCO, 2002). In the past, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) have been involved in promoting the policy of decentralization in their member nation-states (Symth, 1994; Scholte, 2000). Secondly, the EFA emphasises the interconnectedness of education planning with poverty reduction strategies through developing a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)⁴:

There is a need to ensure that the EFA goals are the subject of an adequate and detailed planning process and that this becomes input into poverty reduction strategy planning. The assumption is that a completed PRSP process will definitely result in additional funding to the elements of poverty reduction which have been agreed in the paper. For countries having completed the PRSP process or are nearing completion, the implication is that additional funds for EFA will be forthcoming as part of the package. (UNESCO, 2002)

The idea of developing PRSP was introduced in 1999 before the EFA conference held in Dakar. Therefore, the EFA has been empowered by the several policy initiatives at the international level.

4.1. International Organizations as Stakeholders

The international framework of EFA ensures that the UN and its subsidiary bodies along with the Bretton Woods Institutions⁵ are the EFA partners and are collaborating closely with other specialized agencies including the International Labour Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (UNESCO, 2002). The OECD, on its part is responsible for thematic reviews in specific policy areas, the collection of detailed statistical information on education systems, the provision of financial assistance to build capacity and promotion of other benefits among the nation-states (UNESCO, 2002). Furthermore, INGOs like Save the Children (SC) in Pakistan's case and, bilateral organizations like United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) again in Pakistan's case are also playing a major role in EFA not only by providing financial assistance but also through their involvement in the monitoring processes within EFA (Ministry of Education, 2002a; Dawn, 2002a; The US Embassy Pakistan, 2002). Therefore, the international organizations have been deemed among major stakeholders in the EFA.

4 PRSP covers all sectors of development in which a country should invest, including education which is seen as a key component. A completed PRSP is a step in the process of guaranteed debt reduction and development financing through the WB (UNESCO, 2000).

5 The World Bank and its sister organization, the International Monetary Fund, were created at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. Together they are referred to as the Bretton Woods Institutions or BWIs.




Figure 3: The formation of EFA and the actors involved

The figure above represents the international actors involved in the formation of EFA. The arrows indicate the participation of several organizations in the EFA development process. The two arrows with nation-states highlight partial contribution of nation-states into this process of development and inversely nation-states adoption of the EFA. In the process of this adoption, the nation-states have acknowledged, attained and ratified the EFA and have adapted it into their subsequent policy lines.

4.2. Conferences: The Apparatus of Influence

During the last few decades, international conferences have become major vehicles in shaping educational perspectives across the nation-states and for the transportation of fundamental ideas into education policies around the world (Samoff, 2003). The 1990 world conference on EFA, held in Jomtien (Thailand) marked the emergence of an international consensus that education is the single most vital element in combating poverty, protecting children from hazardous exploitative labour, sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment and influencing population growth. The conference puts pressure on the participating nation-states to agree, comply and endorse the goals and the objectives set during the conference. Further, it compelled the poor nation-states to allocate more resources for the provision of education to their citizens (Samoff, 2003). However, lack of political will by the nation-states and inadequate financial support from the international agencies and richer nation-states despite their commitment resulted in failure of many nation-states to achieve the set goals and objectives (UNESCO, 2002).

The second education conference added more pressure on the nation-states in terms of achieving the goals (Samoff, 2003). The objectives and goals designed during the first education conference were reiterated in the second world education conference held at Dakar, Senegal in April 2000, with revised timelines. Unlike the first conference, this conference developed a clear mechanism to achieve the set goals, holding nation-states responsible to make rational plans and calling for accountability of nation-states through regular reporting on the progress towards EFA.

The Dakar conference laid down two fundamental principles: the political commitment of the nation-states and the development of National Plans of Action (NPA) by the nation-states to get financial assistance.⁶

The WB and other multilateral financial institutions through collaboration and partnership with the nation-states pushed their agenda and persuaded governments to reorder their priorities in favour of education (Samoff, 2003). Since the Dakar conference, Pakistan has shown its intentions to implement EFA and education has risen up in the priority agenda. The government of Pakistan has revisited its priority areas in 2000 and places education as one of the top three priorities (Burki, 2000). Furthermore, Pakistan has showed its willingness to bring in the changes in the education governance to fulfil the EFA commitments. The Minister of Education, Zobeida Jalal during her speech at the Dakar conference stated that:

We are creatively re-examining the role of the public sector in education provision within the discourse of political devolution and decentralization of services. The government of Pakistan in the last decade has experienced a shift in its role from being a provider to that of an arranger and facilitator. This has happened, perhaps not by design but by the compulsions of EFA targets and promises made to the world community at Jomtien. How do we formally recognize and institutionalize this healthy shift within our systems to reflect a truly people- centred and child-centred worldview? This is our greatest challenge. (Zobeida Jalal, 2000)

Since then there has been a consistent increase in the financial allocations for education which have increased from 1.8 % in 1999-2000 to 2.5 % in 2003-2004 of the total GDP (Ministry of Education, 2003a; Dawn, 2000a).

In Pakistan, the EFA Dakar goals have been followed rigidly and Pakistan is among the first nation-states to develop their National Plan of Action (NPA) to seek financial support from the international agencies. For instance, Pakistan got money assurance from the WB even before making financial estimates on National Education Assessment System (NEAS) (Ministry of Education, 2003b).

Irrespective of these international conferences, the regional and the national conferences have also added yet another layer of pressure on the nation-states to monitor the progress towards the EFA deadlines. “Different fora, regional conferences and seminars provide an opportunity to hold policy-makers accountable for achieving EFA goals” (UNESCO, 2002, p.13). Furthermore, national, provincial, district and local level bodies have been constituted to meet on a regular basis to ensure involvement of all the stakeholders in implementation, monitoring and revisiting the EFA targets (Ministry of Education, 2002a). Thus, all these conferences have played an important role in influencing the government of Pakistan not only in education policy-making but also in dictating implementation strategies and in the incorporation of internationally set goals, objectives and standards into the national policies.

6 National Plan of Action (NPA) is a strategy paper prepared by the government agencies to meet the goals and targets set in the EFA. For each education sector, separate NPAs have been prepared and then integrated into a larger National Plan of Action. NPA can be accessed at <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/education-ministry/highlights/national-plan-action.jsp>

5. Adoption of EFA through Contemporary Policies in Pakistan

In the previous section, it was explained that the conferences are venues of influences and have played an important role in shaping education policies. The policy texts that have been produced during these conferences have been well adapted and reproduced quite often into the other contemporary policies in Pakistan.

Irrespective of the revised timelines, the goals and targets of the education conference held in Dakar in 2000 are a replica of the first education conference held in Jomiten, 1990 (UNESCO, 2002). As Pakistan Education Policy was formulated in 1998, it had encapsulated all the goals, targets and objectives set out in the Jomiten conference in 1990, therefore, Pakistan did not produce objectives for the National EFA programme separately. Moreover, all the subsequent policies in education have carried forward the same objectives and targets of the EFA programme. The two policies described below have a fundamental role in education and poverty reduction in the country and reflect EFA objectives quite explicitly.

5.1. National Education Policy 1998-2010 (NEP)⁷

The National Education Policy (NEP) was drafted in 1997 and is to be implemented during 1998 to 2010 in Pakistan. Primarily, the NEP has been sketched on the basis of fundamental principles laid down in the Constitution of Pakistan which ensure free access to education for all children (for further details see Constitution of Pakistan)⁸ while the objectives, goals and targets are in accordance with the first education conference held in Jomtien Thailand, in 1990 (Ministry of Education, 2002a).

Scholars like Prunty (1984), Ham and Hill (1984), Offe (1985) and Anderson (1984) have attempted to characterize the different nature of policies. They argue that policies can be classified on the basis of how they are defined; what sort of interventions they are going to make; what kind of resources they are committing and how these policies originated. Occasionally, it is hard to compartmentalize policies as defined by the above-mentioned scholars. Policies may have a multiple character and address more than one subject simultaneously in many different ways (Anderson, 1984). Drawing upon the work of Anderson and other scholars, NEP is a symbolic and overarching policy providing a broader framework for action covering primary to higher education. Being a major component of NEP, the EFA and all the subsequent policies are incremental in nature. Though EFA leads towards strengthening some fundamental elements, it neither allocates resources nor suggests any structural arrangements for the implementation. It is a typical top-down regulatory policy.

The policy claims to have been laid down in view of “historical developments”, dynamic and latest trends in the education sector, training and emerging needs of society in relation to “national integrity” and “socio-economic development” in the country (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. V). The policy emphasises strong involvement of the private sector, introduction of innovative teaching and learning methods, and intense monitoring and evaluation of the initiatives by the government to achieve the set goals and objectives (Ministry of Education, 1998).

Nevertheless, there have been some additions in the contemporary education policies in Pakistan and the EFA. NEP covers some initiatives in addition to the EFA goals and objectives. For instance, the

⁷ NEP can be accessed at <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/education-ministry/highlights/highlight-three1.jsp>

⁸ The Constitution of Pakistan pledges free access to education to children in section 3. The Constitution can be accessed at http://www.nrb.gov.pk/constitutional_and_legal/constitution/

strengthening of Madrassah⁹ education while considering that the Madaris¹⁰, which are key contributors in providing educational opportunities, have been the centre of attention of the policy makers in the last four years especially after the incident of September 11, 2001. Therefore, there are many policy diversions.

Figure 4 given below, represents current policies in Pakistan. NEP is an overarching policy, designed on the principals of EFA. Meanwhile, the ESRs, decentralization and Universal Primary Education (UPE) are the complementary EFA policies and have been designed separately to address the issues raised under the EFA. Figure 3 highlights some important features of these complementary policies as well.




Figure 4: EFA and other contemporary policies in Pakistan

9 Madrassah is an Urdu word which stands for school. Religious Madrassahs are independent institutions and are usually established by the religious organizations especially in the rural areas of the country. There are about 7000 Madrassahs in Pakistan with the total enrolment of about one million students including 75,000 females. Although, the government constituted the Madrassah Education Board in 2001 calling Madrassahs to join it, changes in the curriculum were made only in November 2001, after the incident of September 11, 2001. The government of Pakistan is providing incentives to integrate religious education with formal education by introducing a common curriculum in these institutions and by bringing these Madrassahs into the mainstream. (Ministry of Education, 2002a, p. 22-23).

10 Madaris is a plural of Madrassah.

5.2. Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP)

The idea of developing PRSPs came primarily from the IMF and the International Development Association (IDA)¹¹ in 1999 (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2004) when the WB along with other international financial institutions like IMF planned to develop PRSP for 53 developing countries including Pakistan (IMF, 2004). For Pakistan, the IMF in collaboration with the IDA developed the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP)¹² in 2001. The interim paper was replaced by the PRSP¹³ in 2003. Primarily, the policy covers development in all social sectors including education. Among other things, it sets out conditions to be fulfilled by the recipient countries in order for the latter to qualify for assistance in form of debt relief which would allow them to allocate extra resources to improve provision of social services. Therefore, there is an increase in the education budget in Pakistan as well (for further information see federal budget 2004-2005¹⁴).

EFA emphasizes an input of the education policy directly into poverty reduction policies; therefore, both are tightly integrated. The financial institutions have also tied up their assistance with the development of PRSP.

Countries having completed the PRSP process or are nearing completion, the implementation is that additional funds for EFA will be forthcoming as part of the package (UNESCO 2002, p.33). Thus, Pakistan is getting unprecedented support from the financial institutions in education and other social sectors (Iqbal, 2004).

In the case of Pakistan, PRSP addresses gender disparities in education and enhances opportunities in education and other social sectors as well (Ministry of Finance, 2003). It supports institutional reforms and reinforces social assistance measures by strengthening the legal framework and institutional structure to improve the financial standings of these institutions to fortify their performance (Ministry of Education, 2002a). The PRSP has multiple characteristics as a policy. Though it does not commit any resources, it does provide broader parameters for financial assistance from the donor agencies and ensures institutional changes and strengthening of the infrastructure for improved measures in social sector including education. Therefore, PRSP is material, symbolic and structural in nature.

The above-mentioned two policies highlight how the EFA and other policy initiatives at the international level have been incorporated into the policy lines in Pakistan. Through the above discussion it has been shown how the whole policy-making mechanism has been changed. The first (ESRs) provides broader parameters by encompassing internationally set standards and policy directions in the local (state) policy settings while the second (PRSP) describes the financial and material gains achieved by adopting and restructuring of the infrastructure changes and procedures by using financial assistance as an instrument. Though the NEP has been developed by the government, it follows international guidelines. The PRSP has been produced by the international players while the government and other stakeholders have been involved as consultative partners. Hence, the nation-state works as an implementing and complying agency in this situation.

Drawing upon the above, we argue that the government of Pakistan has limited choices in education policy-making as it is bound to follow the policy lines set by the international actors via conferences and other fora to achieve the internationally set agreed trends, values and priorities.

11 The International Development Association (IDA) is a part of the World Bank that helps the poor countries in reducing poverty through the provision of interest free loans and grants for programmes aimed at boosting economic growth, reducing poverty and improving living conditions of the people.

12 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper sets a policy line that includes education to tackle poverty in the country. The paper was interim in nature and was a draft policy, which was later on presented to the stakeholders and government agencies to seek their feedback on the different issues and policy lines covered in the policy. The paper was replaced by the PRSP later on. The paper can be accessed at [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/pak/\\$File/PkJSA.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/pak/$File/PkJSA.pdf)

13 PRSP can be accessed at http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/15020_Pakistan_PRSP.pdf

14 Federal budget can be accessed at <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/>

6. Institutionalization of the Influences and EFA

The EFA charter sets out a clear differentiation among the rich and the poor nation-states by offering the rich an influential role in affecting and directing the poor to change education dimensions. Here this relationship is seen as borrowers and lenders:

It is a worldwide undertaking in which all nations, the richest as well as the poorest, have a right and duty to participate. At the World Conference on Education for All, held in Jomtien (Thailand) in March 1990, the developing countries pledged to concentrate and accelerate their efforts to achieve this goal, while the industrialized countries undertook to lend considerably increased support to such efforts. (The UNESCO Courier, 1993, p. 47)

The flow of money from lending nation-states to borrowing nation-states also had an impact on the flow of influences and conditions (Samoff & Carrol, 2004).

The new managerial practices in education, under globalization and internationalization, have contributed to a lessening of the nation-states' control over public policy. In many countries, states are no longer in the position to take unilateral decisions, notably in education policy (Kenway & Bullen, 2000; Henry et al., 2001; Wildings, 1997; Dale, 1999). Hallak (2000) argues that nation-states are facing a redistribution of power in current settings between the national and supranational bodies, news and media agencies, intellectual associations and NGOs, regional and local entities, and last but not the least, public and private authorities. Whereas these supranational bodies have posed challenges to nation-states' policy-making authority from the outside, the other policy actors within nation-states compel changes from the inside especially in the presence of decentralization or the devolution of powers or structures enabling internal actors extended participation in policy-making practices within the nation-states (Hallak, 2000). This is what Henry et al. (2001) have called top down and bottom up influences on the nation-states in policy-making. EFA has brought both these upwards and downwards pressures to Pakistan in education policy processes. Moreover, these influences have been institutionalized through certain policy measures. However, the influences from upwards are more explicit than from downwards.

For a better understanding of such influences, it is important to see how these have been institutionalized in Pakistan.

6.1. EFA, the External Forces and the Means of Influence

The Dakar Education Conference, 2000 calls upon the broader participation of the supranational bodies in education planning and policy matters within the member nation- states. The institutions and other entities including powerful nation-states have been seen as the policy formulating bodies and the dictating actors in EFA 2000 (UNESCO, 2002). Scholars like Samoff (2003), Dale (1999), Samoff and Carrol (2004), Hallak (2000), Marginson (1999) and many others have noticed that external influences in education policy flow primarily through financial support either in the form of grants or loans from the individual nation-states, MNCs, international organizations, the UN and its subsidiary bodies and other multilateral and regional arrangements.

Broadly, there has been three funding sources for the EFA implementation in Pakistan. Firstly, Pakistan receives financial assistance through its bilateral relationships. One example is Canada's direct support for women's education and other gender equity programmes in Pakistan, under the adult education sector, through CIDA. Samoff (2003, p.63) calls such entities "national organizations" located within the foreign ministries providing technical assistance and financial support to protect their own interests. Such organizations work in their own priority areas. These organizations indirectly impact on the policy process in their own particular fashion. However, the scale of their impact is attached to the volume of their financial support.

Regional alliances and the supranational organizations are the two other sources of financial assistance highlighted in the EFA for participating nation-states. Prior to the EFA, the financial support from such organizations was focused on the areas prioritised not by the nation-state receiving financial assistance but by the donor agencies. According to a thematic study, conducted by UNESCO before the Education Forum held in Senegal, most of the programmes that were initiated through the financial assistance provided by the above- mentioned sources could not get much success because of two reasons:

1. Lack of cohesiveness among the interventions by the donors.
2. Donors' initiatives could not get much appreciation from the nation-states as "conventional delivery systems, such as projects and programmes, are seen to have failed and often not to have been adopted by the host government when funding stopped". (UNESCO, 2001, p. 9)

The same is true in the case of bilateral assistance. Therefore, the EFA has called upon the funding agencies for efforts aimed at cohesion and for the provision of financial support only in those areas that have been prioritised within the EFA (UNESCO, 2002). Furthermore, the emphasis of all the donors has shifted to the participation in the policy dialogue and collaboration to ensure that aid is used in accordance to the programmes which are aligned to the international priorities (UNESCO, 2001). In this connection, most of the education initiatives have been combined under the EFA to ensure that their goals are somehow contributing to the broader goals set in the EFA (Ministry of Education, 2002b).

An international strategy paper, to put the Dakar Framework for Action on EFA into operation, published in 2002 outlines the dimensions of both international support at national level and co-ordination between international agencies, taking into account the comparative advantage of each agency and the need for cohesion and effective co-operation in support of EFA (UNESCO, 2002).

Hence, most of the international organizations, INGOs and MNCs are now working under a consortium through which they provide financial assistance in a well-coordinated manner. This is for two major reasons. Firstly, to avoid the duplication of the programmes and secondly to ensure that these funded programmes fall under the EFA umbrella. Consequently, both the NPAs by Pakistan in 2000 and 2002 received a good amount of financial support from the donor agencies (Dawn, 2000b, 2001, 2002a, 2002c & 2004; Iqbal, 2002). Similarly, most of the programmes supported by the international organizations in Pakistan, like Social Action Programme (SAP), have been either closed or incorporated into the EFA programmes (Dawn, 2002c). A case in point is Japan which has merged its bilateral financial support in the consortium specifically for the EFA programme (Ministry of Education, 2002a; Dawn, 2000b).

Moreover, Pakistan has seen a large influx of finance in the last five years from a variety of donors, including supranational organizations, regional agencies and individual nation-states. This has been largely contributed due to the incident of September 11, to restructure and mainstream Madrassah education, to stop their alleged involvement in promoting extremism among the students (The US Embassy, 2002; Dawn, 2000b, 2001, 2002a, 2002c & 2004). Pakistan was also granted relief in debt under the EFA programme especially after September 11; therefore Pakistan could allocate more resources into education especially to the seminaries. Hence, the country stands third along with Vietnam in receiving bilateral aid on education in year 2002 (UNESCO, 2005). Many countries including Canada have swapped their loans for grants with the condition that those could only be spent in the social sector especially in education and the government of Pakistan would have to allocate matching grants on a penny for penny basis.

Most of the projects and the programmes initiated by the World Bank and the other supranational organizations call upon institutional capacity building within the nation-states. These institutional capacity building measures range from the training of the policy makers to the policy-making practices themselves. Apart from the financial support, Pakistan's policies are under the influence of outside

bodies due to the technical assistance provided by the supranational organizations, regional bodies and individual nation-states (Samoff, 2003). For instance, IMF and IDA have prepared PRSP; WB has developed a Decentralization Plan while the Ministry of Education has designed Education Sector Reforms in consultation with WB, UNESCO and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The above-mentioned external influences on policy through financial support and technical assistance have been well institutionalized in Pakistan through ESRs and it is to these that we turn.

6.2. Education Sector Reforms (ESRs) in Pakistan¹⁵

Lindblom (1968) notes that policies have effects of previous policies and sometimes the new policies are just incremental in nature, strengthening previous policies' impact or merely a continuation of the previous ones. The ESRs are indeed parallel, complementary and a continuation of the current policies on education, strengthening educational goals and the targets set in the NEP and the EFA. Moreover, these also lead towards good governance through the inclusion of the private sector, which has been a focal point of all the previous policies. Its targets and goals are in harmony with EFA, the NEP, and the PRSP. Hence, ESRs are incremental in nature.

The ESRs have multiple characteristics. They are material and distributive, committing resources on the basis of uniformity. Through different interventions, these reforms focus on shaping up the demand for education, which has never been a first priority of the people in the country (Ministry of Education, 2002b). The policy's text speaks of the "enforcement of compulsory primary education" (Ministry of Education, 2002b, p. 18) reflecting government's commitment to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE)¹⁶, therefore, ESRs are structural as well. Furthermore, ESRs are procedural and top-down as they define the roles and the responsibilities of different stakeholders in achieving the set targets.

The initial ESRs' targets have been defined for the years 2001-2004 and will be revisited continuously until the achievement of the EFA (Ministry of Education, 2002b). Due to their monetary significance, before the implementation phase of the ESRs, the government sought endorsement from international institutions and other INGOs. In agreement with the funding institutions, all the international grants and assistance from international financial institutions, and the financial allocations in the country's annual budget for the education sector have been regulated through the ESRs in the priority areas defined in EFA (Ministry of Education, 2004).

The procedural character of ESRs makes them important in evaluating the influence of the funding agencies on different policy processes. The funding agencies decide the particular area for technical or financial support and define the roles and the responsibilities of stakeholders involved. Therefore, we notice frequent changes in money spending mechanisms and shifts from one area to another.

15 The ESRs have emerged through countrywide consultations with 600 partners including federal and provincial ministries/ departments, NGOs and the private sector. Approved in April 2001, the ESRs have been designed to develop human resources and to provide financial resources with a vision to meet the learning needs of all citizens through provision of quality education. The ESRs follow a sector-wide approach covering seven key areas: Universal primary education (formal and informal), adult literacy, technical stream in secondary schools, quality assurance, Madrassah education, higher education and public-private partnerships. The ESRs strategies are based on equity based sector-wide reforms in the context of the PRSP, the District Devolution Plan, mobilization of political will, diversified resource mobilization, promotion of public-private partnership, community participation and outcome based planning. The ESRs have well-defined targets for the years 2001-2004. The three-year budget of the ESRs is 55.5 billion rupees, which will be mobilized through federal, provincial and district budgets, grants and loans from international development partners, and support from the private sector and communities (Ministry of Education, 2002b). Only the United States Agency for International Development provided US \$ 600 million as a grant to support the first phase of the reforms (Ministry of Education, 2002b).

16 UPE is a programme initiated by UNICEF in Pakistan and is one of the major goals to be achieved under the EFA. For further details see Figure 4.2.




Figure 5: Institutionalized Top Down (external) and Bottom Up (internal) influences on the policy processes in Pakistan

Figure 5 represents the pressures coming to the education policy-making domain in Pakistan from the international actors. The external (top down) pressures are coming directly to the domain while the international players have generated internal (bottom up) pressures by empowering the stakeholders at the bottom as well. However, both upward and downward pressures have been institutionalized through policy interventions like ESRs and decentralization respectively. The figure also shows the development process of these policies and the actors influencing the education policy domain in Pakistan from the top and the bottom.

6.3. EFA and the Internal Policy Influences in Pakistan

“Globalization has encouraged the growth of additional loci of governance besides the state, the spread of additional forms of community besides the nation, and the development of additional types of knowledge besides modern rationality” (Scholte, 2000, p. 8). While international actors have overshadowed policy-making practices in Pakistan externally, the forces within have exerted pressure internally (Hallak, 2000; Scholte, 2000). Through the provision of financial and technical assistance directly to such internal forces, the international players have cultivated, encouraged and empowered several pressure groups including NGOs, civil society organizations, local bodies, community groups, private sector, provincial and district level EFA groups in Pakistan. Such pressures from internal forces are of both an implicit and explicit nature. In this regard, the important dimensions are: who and how these players have been empowered or strengthened, what and whose voices these pressure groups are bringing into play and, last but not the least, how these actors are putting pressure on the policy-making practices.

These internal players are the products of several policy interventions by international actors. For instance, the EFA stresses building the local level groups including EFA, community level groups, EFA district and provincial chapters and further EFA national fora. Moreover, decentralization in the country has provoked and strengthened the growth of these local actors. Consequently, these groups have created pressures on the nation-state in policy-making practices and eventually “loss of monopoly in policy-making” (Hallak, 2000, p. 36). They advocate policies with the support of the international organizations and act as pressure groups to persuade government to fulfil their international commitments. Generally, these small scale internal organizations especially NGOs get funds from the external forces directly and bring forward their agenda (Samoff, 2003; Korten, 1991). However, in Pakistan, apart from the outside direct funding, NGOs along with other internal organizations have got a significant position in the EFA and other contemporary policies. The ESRs either allocate money directly to such organizations or assert that most of the money utilized by the government would be in collaboration with these organizations. Further, these organizations have been given an important role in monitoring and assessing the measures by the country (Ministry of Education, 2002a). Thus, these organizations are working as pressure groups and watchdogs as well. Furthermore, these internal actors are responsible for bringing global influences at the local level. Thus, these internal organizations have been placed well within the policy processes including, implementation and evaluation, through the policies like decentralization by the international actors.

The phenomenon of devolution has been well practiced around the world in the last two decades. In the western world, the concept was introduced in the late 1980s and the early 1990s primarily by OECD (Smyth, 1994; Scholte, 2000). Despite all the optimism about the devolution in education, there have been arguments in support of and against devolution especially regarding its efficacy in improving the education system and its effects on educational achievements by the students. Capper (1993) notes that there has not been any solid evidence that the devolved school based management has brought system effectiveness and efficiency (as cited in Smyth, 1994, p.7). According to Alan Wanger of the OECD Education Directorate, “with some countries five years or more into devolved school systems the doubts are surfacing. We believe the time is ripe for a review from the ground up” (as cited in Smyth, 1994, p. 7). However, as Scholte (2000) has observed globalization through decentralization has brought wider participation of the people in managing their own lives through shared decision-making and power sharing.

“Devolution involves strengthening sub-national units of government – such as states, provinces or municipalities – to handle a wide range of public functions, including education” (Rondinelli et al., 1990, p. 127). Administratively, Pakistan has been a centralized country where policy formulation and decision-making have been done bureaucratically at the Federal level. Therefore, it has been a

long standing argument that the decision makers and the policy formulators have been ignorant of the on-the-ground realities, causing failures of the policies and poor quality of social services including education. Rizvi (1994) argues that devolution is not merely managerial delegation and organizational decentralization but that it should lead to cooperation, decentralized decision making and sharing of power. Therefore, through decentralization¹⁷ in Pakistan, the government's capacity to formulate policy independently has been affected by sharing in decision making and growing influences of these internal forces.

The outcomes of decentralization¹⁸ in Pakistan have yet to be assessed. It is a recent phenomenon and the fact is that it has not yet been grounded well and is facing difficulties in implementation and power struggle is getting intense at district, state and federal levels (Abbasi, 2003). Nevertheless, due to the international pressures, the government's commitment and priorities in this connection have been quite clear (The News, 2003). The EFA along with the decentralization policy has created, empowered and provided legal standings to the internal organizations to ensure their participation in the policy-making processes while the ESRs have provided funds directly and indirectly to such internal bodies by guaranteeing their presence within the policy processes.

Conclusion

This paper explores the mechanisms through which international organizations influence nation-states' education policy-making processes. It has been discussed how the international institutions, under globalization have developed universal policies and have created pressures on nation-states through financial assistance and international conferences to comply with the set standards and policy interventions agreed upon during the international conferences. EFA is a combined effort of the international actors comprising policy interventions introduced at different times by different organizations and the financial assistance has become a tool to exert pressure on nation-states including Pakistan. Different contemporary education policies have been reviewed and analysed in this paper to identify the flow of external influences on policy-making domain in Pakistan.

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17 Under decentralization, a three-tier government at the district, Tehsil, and union council level, with elected representatives, governs each district. More than 30 provincial departments including education have been devolved to the districts. It seeks to build an institutional structure that empowers the poor and hence gives them a vested interest to protect and ensure cost-effective service delivery by promoting good governance and democratic processes (National Reconstruction Bureau, 2001). Due to decentralization, the district governments enjoy a more autonomous status by having a greater voice in making decisions and designing and implementing policies (National Reconstruction Bureau, 2001). At the same time, technical support from provincial and federal governments may subside considerably, propelling the need to identify and rely increasingly on local resources and local level partners including community organizations, NGOs, intellectual bodies and private sector.

18 The Local Government design is based on five fundamentals: Devolution of power, decentralization of administrative authority, reconcentration of management functions, diffusion of power-authority nexus, and distribution of resources to the district level. It is designed to ensure that the genuine interests of the people are served and their rights safeguarded (National Reconstruction Bureau, 2001).

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**Analysis of Budgetary Allocations for Poverty Reduction,
Social Sector, Human Development and
MDGs – 2011-1012**

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Foreword

Social sector has been much neglected in resource allocation and political priorities in the country. Successive governments often compromised human development at the altar of other priorities. This has led to massive gap in vital indicators of human development in the country. As a result of that we are at the verge of failure in achieving Millennium Development Goals (MGDs).

SPO has been building capacity of civil society institutions to promote democratic governance and social justice in the society. This research document has been developed to share critical information on policy issues pertaining to human development in the country. Unless governments allocate appropriate resources for human development, the dream of achieving millennium development will always remain a distant reality.

Civil society organizations and professionals engaged in advocacy for human development, will find this document a very useful reference for their work both at policy and community level.

Dr. Tufail Muhammad
Chairperson, SPO

Introduction

Budgets in Pakistan tend to be viewed, by all and sundry, as a set of unintelligible and unwieldy documents to be surfed only by the so-called experts. This lack of interest leaves the ruling establishment free to follow its own priorities even in a democratic set up. This study is an attempt to analyze the federal and provincial budgets as if the people mattered.

The factors underlying the neglect of people-centred budgeting are political, social and economic. Chapter 1 of this study is, therefore, devoted to understanding the political economy of budgeting for the people. A democratic state bound by a social contract with its people ensures durable peace and prosperity through a judicious combination of internal and external policies. In the case of a federation, these policies are evolved with the participation of the federating units. The state of Pakistan, however, has been on a different trajectory. Instead of a state looking after the welfare of its citizens, it has become a national security state. Rather than humans, the state has become the focus of security. Its resources have been preempted by the stated and unstated requirements of self-preservation. In the pursuit of non-productive objectives, resources have been consumed at a faster rate than their development. The result is a chronic dependence on external resources. A generous inflow fuels economic growth, as it did in the sixties, eighties and in 2003-07, but its inherent un-sustainability failed to generate development. Wars on the eastern border in 1948-1971 and the search for strategic depth on the western border since 1972, have kept the country in a perpetual state of conflict. Not surprisingly, the federal budget is nothing more than a vehicle to approve demands for grants for the national security establishment and to ensure payment of salaries to its own employees. The largest share goes to debt servicing which does not even require to be voted; it is a charged expenditure of the Federal Consolidated Fund. Public and media focus is far less on Provincial budgets. Yet it is these budgets which, even before the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, spent around 60 per cent of the expenditure officially stated as pro-poor. The share would increase after the devolution of some 17 federal ministries becomes fully operational.

Low budgetary expenditure is among the important factors behind a dismal record in poverty reduction and human development. The budgetary expenditures that can be described as directly affecting the lives and livelihoods of the ordinary people can be analyzed under four categories: pro-poor or poverty-related expenditure dubbed as PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), Social Sector Expenditure, Human Development Expenditure and MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) Expenditure. Among these, the PRSP Expenditure has the largest coverage as, in addition to expenditures on social sector and human development, it includes some physical infrastructure and law and order expenditure as well. Due their overlapping and cross-cutting nature, the expenditures on MDGs cannot be aggregated in any meaningful sense. The remaining chapters of the study present analyses of these categories for the federal and provincial budgets for fiscal years 2010-11 and 2011-12.

Since the initiation of the donor-assisted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in 2001, the Government has defined expenditure on 17 sectors as pro-poor or PRSP budgetary expenditure. These include anti-poverty outlays and social safety net transfers. There is regular monitoring of these expenditures and these are available for public information on an annual and quarterly basis. There is, however, a considerable lag. Again, budgets as announced are not analyzed. Chapter 2 not only fills this gap by analyzing the budget estimates for PRSP expenditure for 2010-11, revised estimates for 2010-11 and the budget estimates of 2011-12.

Social sector expenditure, the subject matter of Chapter 3, is a subset of the pro-poor or PRSP expenditure. In terms of budgetary heads, the definition here includes education, health, social protection, housing and community services, recreation and culture, environment and population planning. Underinvestment in social sectors is compared with overinvestment in defence and increasing expenditure on internal

security. Compared with countries at comparable level of income, Pakistan spends a lot more on defence, squeezing the fiscal space for the social sector.

Human development is dealt with in Chapter 4. There are three dimensions of human development - a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of achievement in these dimensions. In 2011, Pakistan ranked 145th in a total of 187 countries in terms of HDI. Recently it has slipped further down the ladder. This chapter examines the inadequacy of budgetary allocations on health and education. The performance of third dimension of human development - Gross National Income (GNI) per capita – is assessed in relation to public investment.

Human development is a broader concept. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are an articulation of core human development priorities, with a set of indicators quantifying minimum achievement level. The trend of allocating less and less to people-centred development is most visible in the slow and unsteady performance of the MDGs. In 2006, Pakistan was ahead of targets for 7 indicators, on track on 15 indicators and lagged behind on 12 indicators. In 2010, Pakistan was ahead on 6 indicators, on track on 3 indicators, slow on 4 indicators and lagging on 19 indicators and off track on 1 indicator. At this rate of progress, targets set for 2015 are not reachable. Indeed, they are likely to be missed by wide margins. Failure to make adequate budgetary allocations, the focus of Chapter 5, is a critical factor.

1. Political Economy of Budgeting for the People

Pakistan has a chequered history of moving from a development state in its formative years to a security state in latter half of its current age. Unfortunately it failed to maintain its development gains of earlier years - mired with yawning social inequities though -after the Zia regime that skirted human development goals with callous regard. Although security needs always outshined the development allocations in our history, yet there were brief intervals of investment in human development particularly in 1970s. Pakistan's annual budget ritual is marked by three Ds i.e. Defence, Debt Servicing and Development (PSDP). The former two are considered sacrosanct and the latter is frequently scuttled to feed the other two.

'Truncated or mutilated and moth-eaten' as Jinnah-apprehensive of partition of Bengal and Punjab-termed Pakistan on 13th April 1947, the country inherited a baggage of conflicts and security appetite. The ruling military and civil oligarchy fully exploited this heavens-sent opportunity and the spook of the border enemy justified everything in the garb of securing elusive ideological and porous physical borders of the country. The sacred journey started with the very first national budget presented on 28th February 1948 that allocated more than 70% of total revenues of central government for defence. The trend dominated the subsequent years and the country spent 71 and 73 percent of the total government expenditure in 1948-49 and 1949-50 respectively on defence. The paradox of human development and security needs can be judged from a telegram of the British embassy in Washington addressed to the Foreign Office on 28th July 1952. In an astounding disclosure it revealed that while the country was reeling under grain scarcity, our representatives were purchasing arms in USA. In one hand Pakistani representative had an appeal for a grant of one million ton wheat and in the other hand they carried a shopping list of military equipment worth of 45 million dollars. This trend prevailed and was interrupted by ZA Bhutto when development allocation took strides from 1973-74 till early years of Zia regime. In his last year 1977-78, Bhutto allocated 43.5% of the budget to development comparing with 22% to defence. Zia gradually reversed the allocations and after 1982 the snowballing defence allocation closely chased the development allocation. In the fag-end of his rule, defence dwarfed the development allocation in 1986-87 and 1987-88, first time after 1958-59. In spite of bruised economy due to 1971 war and oil shocks, Bhutto diverted significant resources towards development. However all these short- living gains were tormented by despotic Zia martial law and the country degenerated from a potentially progressive development state to a retrogressive security state.

Foreign and domestic debt had been another resource guzzler. By June 2011 the country was under a huge foreign debt of approx. 62 billion US\$ and a domestic debt of more than Rs. 4.3 trillion. Public debt repayment had been the second largest resource drain after defence since very first year of the country. Debt repayment kept rivaling defence budget since then but with the culmination of Afghan war and demise of bi-polar world in early 1990s when Pakistan lost its strategic enticement and became a redundant entity for internal powers, the debt repayment obscured the defence budget. In effect, there was a net outflow of resources.

How much priority is assigned to defence and debt servicing compared to development could be judged from some recent developments. The Federal Minister for Finance informed the National Assembly on 1st October 2010 that in the current financial year Pakistan will pay a whopping sum of Rs 902.8 billion to service both domestic and external loans. The amount makes staggering 50% of the targeted revenue collection and 32.6% of the total outlay of the year. This can be compared with the size of annual public sector development allocation of Rs. 663 billion, later curtailed by 73 billion to 590 billion as reported by Dawn on 23rd September 2010. According to the same news report the initial allocation of Rs. 442.2 for defence budget inflated by Rs. 110 billion to Rs. 552 billion. This does not include Rs. 72 billion for paying pension to former personnel of the armed forces as stated by the Federal Finance Secretary before Public Accounts Committee (Dawn-22nd September 2010). The climax of the episode is that in

the very same days teachers of universities closed all varsities across the country because government expressed its inability to provide only Rs. 10 billion to meet expenses on 50% salary increase by the government itself and development needs including scholarships for those who are already studying abroad on scholarships (Dawn- 23rd September 2010). Sadly, these news reports reflect our misplaced priorities and labyrinth of political decision making. Pakistan at this critical juncture needs to redefine its priorities and embrace the emerging paradigm of security where citizens are placed at the centre and not at periphery while taking decisions and making policies.

Prosperity and peace go together. Peace is a necessary condition for development. A democratic state bound by a social contract with its people ensures durable peace through a judicious combination of internal and external policies. In the case of a federation, these policies are evolved with the participation of the federating units. The state of Pakistan, however, has been on a different trajectory. Instead of a state looking after the welfare of its citizens, it has become a national security state. Rather than humans, the state has become the focus of security. Its resources have been preempted by the stated and unstated requirements of self-preservation. In the pursuit of non-productive objectives, resources have been consumed at a faster rate than their development. The result is a chronic dependence on external resources. A generous inflow fuels economic growth, as it did in the sixties, eighties and in 2003-06, but its inherent un-sustainability failed to generate development. Wars on the eastern border in 1948-1971 and the search for strategic depth on the western border since 1972, have kept the country in a perpetual state of conflict.

Our present is conditioned by the past strategic adventures. An increasingly unwinnable war is on within our borders. Human development requires resources. Investment in human development enlarges the constituency of peace and peace is the strongest incentive for human development. After the failed attempts of the eighties in the form Five Point Programme and the so-called Social Action Programme of the nineties, the hope was pinned on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be implemented by an operational set of indicators and realizable targets. An Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Pervez Tahir as Chief Economist and consisting of representatives of concerned federal ministries, provinces and civil society was set up in the Planning Commission for regular monitoring. The results were made public in the Pakistan Millennium Development Goals Report. These reports were published for 2004, 2005 and 2006. After a gap of four years, marred by the controversies on what exactly is the level of poverty in the country, the Millennium Development Goals Report for 2010 has recently been released. The deadline to achieve these goals is only four years away.

While the 2010 report is informative in terms of the dismal progress on almost all major MDG indicators, it conceals inter-provincial and intra-provincial disparities that were presented in the last report. The period covered by the latest reports — 2006 to present — was marked by terrorist attacks, anti-terrorist operations and the displacement of several thousand people. Further, these years also saw a global recession, nose-diving foreign direct investment in the country (from \$5.13bn in 2006-07 to \$2.21bn in 2009-10), the GDP growth going into a tailspin (from seven per cent in 2006-07 to 2.1 per cent in 2008-09) and skyrocketing inflation (from 7.9 per cent in 2006-07 to 13.1 per cent in 2008-09). This was also a period of tumultuous political transition. Now, Pakistan is poised to miss almost all the MDG targets.

The primary MDG relates to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. The consumer- based economic growth model of the Musharraf era was presented as the Pakistani economy's golden period. However, it is riddled with sharply rising economic inequalities. A higher GDP growth rate during the Musharraf era created a smokescreen of wellbeing. However, there is strong evidence that economic disparities actually increased.

The Musharraf government conjured up figures to claim that poverty had declined from 34.5 per cent in 2001-02 to 22.3 per cent in 2005-06, with a too-good-to-be-true 12.3 percentage points decline in

just five years. These figures were disputed by the then chief economist. And even if this miracle is postulated, the recession in the subsequent years and the recent floods have pushed more people below the poverty line. Halving poverty from 26 per cent in 1990 to 13 per cent by 2015 appears next to impossible.

The second MDG was to achieve universal primary education. Pakistan has the lowest adult literacy rate in the region and is second only to Nigeria in out-of-school children. The current net enrolment rate is less than 60 per cent, which implies that the target of 100 per cent enrolment requires a more than 40 percentage points increase by 2015. Given that during the past 10 years Pakistan barely achieved 16 percentage points, it is unrealistic to hope for target achievement. Furthermore, nearly half the enrolled students do not complete their education and achieving survival rate of 88 per cent in the years remaining is practically impossible.

Pakistan was supposed to establish gender parity at the primary and secondary education levels by 2005. This target has already been missed. True, there has been a steady improvement; for example the proportion of 15-24 year old literate females as compared to boys has increased from 0.51 in 1990-91 to 0.78 in 2008-09. Yet achieving parity needs further serious effort. Women's representation in legislative forums has increased tremendously, but the journey from representation to real empowerment will have to traverse a rocky terrain.

The mortality rate of children under five has declined from 117 per 1,000 live births in 1990-91 to 94 per 1,000 in 2006-07, against an MDG target of 52 by 2015. The infant mortality rate declined from 102 to 75 per 1,000 live births between 1990 and 2007, against the MDG target of 65. The proportion of fully immunized children of 12 to 23 months in age also indicates a stagnant trend. It increased marginally from 75 per cent in 1990-91 to 78 per cent in 2008-09, against the target of over 90 per cent by 2015.

The number of mothers dying due to pregnancy and delivery-related complications per 100,000 live births has declined significantly from 533 in 1990-91 to 276 in 2006-07. However, the rate is still much higher than the target of 140 by 2015. Similarly, the proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants increased from 18 per cent in 1990-91 to 41 per cent in 2008-09. Yet it remains much lower than the targeted 90 per cent by 2015.

Pakistan's current total fertility rate is 3.75 and that is to be lowered to 2.1 by 2015. Meanwhile, several reports by independent sources suggest that Pakistan does not put in the desired efforts towards environmental sustainability. The forest cover increased marginally from 4.8 per cent of the land mass in 1990-91 to 5.02 per cent in 2008-09. The MDG target is six per cent. Conservation organisations consider even these figures exaggerated.

Pakistan has, however, surpassed the target of CNG-run vehicles from a targeted 920,000 to 2,220,000. Yet the population with sustainable access to safe drinking water is at 65 per cent against the targeted 93 per cent. The quality of this drinking water is also a mammoth question. Similarly, access to sanitation is enjoyed by only 63 per cent against the MDG target of 90 per cent.

Pakistan is a long way from achieving the Millennium Development Goals. More than monetary resources, what is required is the political will to prioritize human development in the country. In its current shape, Pakistan is the embodiment of a security state where human development barely attracts attention.

An analysis of the national budgets reveals how the wellbeing of the citizens has been ignored. Pakistan's first national budget of 1948 allocated more than 70 per cent of the total resources to defence; this lunacy was never reversed. Even in today's world of knowledge-based societies our allocation for education and health is shamefully the lowest in the region.

PAKISTAN has slipped 20 rungs on the ladder of human development this year. Last year, Pakistan was ranked 125th on the Human Development Index (HDI) and was in the category of ‘medium human development’.

This year Pakistan has been ranked 145 and thus falls in the category of ‘low human development’ countries. The latest annual Human Development Report of UNDP has ranked 187 countries on the HDI. Among the Saarc countries, Pakistan has performed better than Bangladesh (146), Afghanistan (172) and Nepal (157), whereas India (134), Sri Lanka (97), Bhutan (141) and the Maldives (109) have outshone Pakistan. No South Asian country is ranked in the ‘very high human development’ category though nearby Iran ranking at 88 falls in the category of ‘high human development’. Sri Lanka and the Maldives are the only two Saarc countries ranked among the countries in the ‘medium human development’ category.

The country is marked poor on other important human development indices too. For example American CIA’s World Fact Book places Pakistan on 46th number among 174 countries ranked on military expenditure but it ranks Pakistan 153rd among 186 countries measured against expenditure on education. Similarly Pakistan is ranked at 166 among 224 locations when the Fact Book measures life expectancy. World Health Organization marked Pakistan at 171 among 185 countries ranked on health expenditure and placed the country at 122 while measuring health system efficiency of 191 countries.

HDI is not just a measure of vital development signs but it also fathoms political will for human development on the part of the rulers of a country. With the end of the lunacy of cold war that eclipsed human development for several decades, world community turned its attention to the paradigm of human security. The world can only be made a secure place to live by deploying the will and resources of the world to human development.

2. Poverty: The State Failure

With the start of Human Development Reports in 1990, development policy and planning in Pakistan has emphasized poverty reduction and the delivery of basic social services. Donor assistance also shifted its emphasis toward the same objectives. Progress, however, has been lack-luster, despite periods of high growth.

The country has repeatedly been described as one of the worst cases of growth without development. In the past decades, economic growth failed to translate into better livelihoods and opportunities for the vast majority of people. Since 2007-08, growth has also collapsed. It was as low as 2.4 per cent in 2010-11, with a paltry increase in real income per capita of 0.2 per cent. Growth may not be a sufficient condition for poverty reduction, but it is a necessary condition. It influences the availability of public resources for service delivery and economic opportunities for the people. Feudal hold, a political culture of patronage, ethnic and religious divides encouraging militancy and the burden of a national security state limit the opportunities for people to grow and come out of poverty.

In the 1990s, poverty had been rising. According to official figures which raised a storm of controversy, headcount poverty fell from 34.5 per cent of the population in 2000-01 to 22.3 per cent in 2005-06. Even if it were to be believed, this was the same level achieved in 1992-93. The Planning Commission has questioned the reliability of the data for 2004-05 and 2005-06, as growth patterns have changed and food and fuel prices have risen sharply since 2005. Majority of the population is now food insecure. A Panel of Economists set up by the Planning Commission came out with a poverty number of 30 per cent for 2008-09. It is not based on any survey and is no more than an informed judgment.

Low budgetary expenditure is one of the factors behind a dismal record on poverty reduction. Since the initiation of the donor-assisted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in 2001, the Government has

defined expenditure on 17 sectors as pro-poor or PRSP budgetary expenditure. The website of Ministry of Finance claims that ‘Well-targeted anti-poverty outlays and social safety transfers are essential ingredients of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy. While anti-poverty public expenditures are essential for improving human capabilities, reducing income inequalities, and ensuring greater participation of the poor in the process of economic development, social safety transfers are necessary for creating an environment in which the most vulnerable segments of society are protected from the social and political costs of economic and structural reforms. The effectiveness of such outlays relies not only upon their levels but also their quality. Therefore, pro-poor public expenditures must be regularly monitored to improve their efficiency and impact.’

These expenditures are regularly monitored and published on an annual and quarterly basis, but with a considerable lag. At the time of writing, the latest available related to first three quarters of 2010-11. Budgets are never analyzed. The present study fills the gap by analyzing the 2010-11 budget, 2010-11 revised and 2011-12 budget. While details can be seen at Annex I for 2001-12, Table 2.1 below presents a summary picture of the recent federal and provincial budgets.

Table 2.1: PRSP Budgetary Expenditures (Rs billion)

Area	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
Federal	360.83	610.26	383.23
Punjab	268.14	242.36	291.25
Sindh	106.67	129.97	127.43
KPK	88.44	96.24	95.96
Balochistan	70.45	71.08	85.64
Pakistan	894.53	1149.92	983.50
Pakistan as % of: Total expenditure GDP	21.5 5.3	27.2 6.4	20.9 4.7

Source: Annex II


It can be seen in Table 2.1 that the Federal Government allocated in the budget Rs 360.83 billion but spent Rs 610.26 billion, thus overspending to the tune of 69.1 per cent. The allocation for the budget 2011-12 was, however, lowered drastically to Rs 383.23 billion, which is 6.2 per cent more than the previous year’s budget allocation and 37.2 per cent but less than the revised estimate of the previous year. The reduction is largely the result of a more than doubling of the subsidies and continuing macroeconomic difficulties. Devolution under the 18th amendment also played some part. In 2010-11, all provinces except Punjab utilized more than the budget allocations. For the next year, Punjab has allocated Rs 291.25 billion, which is 20.2 per cent higher than the revised expenditure of the previous year. Allocating more than can be utilized is a recurrent pattern in Punjab. Balochistan has allocated in the budget 2011-12 more than the budget and revised estimates of the previous year. Both Sindh and KPK have allocated lesser amounts in the budget for 2011-12 than the revised estimates of 2010-11.

As a whole, Pakistan utilized more than the allocated budget in 2010-11 on pro-poor expenditure. In 2011-12, the budgetary allocation is 9.9 per cent more than the budgetary allocation of 2010-11 and 14.5 per cent less than the revised allocation. This reduction is alarming in a country that already devotes an inadequate proportion of its budget on poverty reduction. As a percentage of the total budgets of the Federation and the provinces, the pro-poor expenditure has fallen from 27.2 per cent in 2010-11 (revised) to 20.9 per cent in 2011-12 (budget). The corresponding reduction as a percentage of GDP is from 6.4 per cent to 4.7 per cent. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the rising trend since 2001-02 reached

its peak of 7.6 per cent of GDP in 2009-10. Since then, it has begun to fall drastically. In fact it has almost reverted to the low level of 2002-03. This reflects the failure of the state to take care of the rapidly rising number of the poor in an economy experiencing high inflation, particularly in food, rising unemployment and deteriorating law and order.

Article (3) (c) of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 requires that the social and poverty alleviation related expenditures are not reduced below 4.5% of the estimated gross domestic product for any given year.’ This not so high threshold has been barely maintained by the Federal and Provincial budgets for 2011-12 as the expenditure/GDP ratio is 4.7 per cent. The downturn has begun and the threshold is likely to be breached in the actual operations of the budgets this year.

Figure 2.1: PRSP Expenditure as % of GDP



Source: Annex I, II

3. Social Sector: Devolved Hopes

Before the passage of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, social sector was largely in the provincial domain but with a significant federal presence, especially in education, health and social security. The Post-Amendment changes in the Fourth Schedule relate to Legislative Lists. Concurrent List, over which both the Federal and Provincial Governments exercised jurisdiction, stands abolished. This List included most of the social sector subjects. A few social sector subjects have also been deleted from the Federal Legislative List. According to Article 142 C, the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction ‘with respect to all matters pertaining to such areas in the Federation as are not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List.’ Thus Eighteenth Amendment gives the provinces full jurisdiction over education, health, population, labour, social welfare, Zakat, Auqaf, environment, tourism, print media and cinematograph films, culture and archeology.

Social sector expenditure is a subset of the pro-poor expenditure. In terms of budgetary heads, the definition here includes education, health, social protection, housing and community services, recreation and culture, environment and population planning. Pakistan spends notoriously little on social sectors. Tax structure rigidities and inefficiencies, inflexible expenditures such as debt burden and defence have limited the fiscal space for social sector. Feudal structure weakens the political will to allocate resources to social sector and poor governance leads to deficient capacity to spend whatever little is allocated. Salaries consume the large bulk of expenditure. Worse, what gets spent does not necessarily lead to the intended outcomes because of a policy framework put together essentially by a centralized bureaucracy. The unregulated resurgence of religious school has not only created a parallel system of education, but also encouraged the rise of militancy and intolerance to a level where the writ of the state has been challenged.

In line with the overall decline of the pro-poor expenditures, the social sector expenditure has also declined in the consolidated Federal and Provincial budgets of 2011-12. This can be gauged from Table 3.1 below. As a percentage of GDP, the social sector expenditure was budgeted at 2.4 per cent in 2010-11 but the achievement was 2.2 per cent. It has been budgeted at an even lower level of 2.1 per cent of the GDP for 2011-12. Similarly, the share in total budgetary expenditure for social sector was determined at 9.7 per cent in 2010-11, but the utilization was 9.3 per cent. The budget allocation in 2011-12 rises slightly over the revised estimate of the previous year but is still less than the budget estimate.

Table 3.2 gives the sectoral distribution of social sector expenditure in absolute terms. Education is the largest component of social sector expenditure, followed by health. Social protection has become the third largest sector because of Benazir Income Support Programme. The important point emerging from Table 3.2 is that, except for social protection in which there is an obvious political interest due to the Benazir Income Support Programme of cash transfers, all social sectors failed to fully utilize their respective budget allocations in 2010-11.

Table 3.1: Social Sector Expenditure (Rs. billion)

Area	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
Federal	149.04	127.90	130.34
Punjab	119.37	118.65	136.70
Sindh	47.94	57.58	60.82
KPK	48.99	51.35	59.08
Balochistan	40.21	39.08	53.38
Pakistan	405.55	394.56	440.33
Pakistan as % of: Total expenditure GDP	9.7 2.4	9.3 2.2	9.4 2.1

Source: Annex III

Mainly a provincial subject, education witnessed increasing and intrusive Federal presence. Other than standards of higher education and international student exchange, the Provinces are now responsible for the education sector. This is a radical change in that it recognizes the multicultural nature of the country.

Health is another largely provincial subject, which witnessed increasing federal role. The Eighteenth Amendment rendered Ministry of Health redundant. There is some concern that the provinces do not have the capacity to regulate drugs and manage vertical programmes. The concern is unfounded and expressed mainly by vested interests. Health and population planning go together and the present dichotomy is not in the interest of programme. With a view to ensuring effective delivery, the expert opinion for a long time has suggested the merger of the two Ministries at the Federal level, without any success. Provinces, it is hoped, will work towards integrating health and population planning.

Table 3.2: Sectoral Distribution of Social Expenditure (Rs billion)

Sector	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
Education	170.52	161.20	190.28
Health	92.75	91.35	95.69
Social Protection	59.44	72.69	63.32
Housing and Community Services	49.24	44.67	58.60
Recreational, Culture	10.44	9.19	9.72
Environment	9.51	6.55	8.96
Population Planning	13.65	8.91	13.76
Total Social Sector expenditure	405.55	394.56	440.33

Source: Annex III

Matters related to labour including social security institutions have been entrusted to the Provinces. Labour unions have expressed reservations on some key issues. An informed debate is necessary to protect the interests of the workers after this comprehensive devolution. The programmes of social transfers and assistance, Social Welfare and Zakat, have also been devolved to the provinces under the Eighteenth Amendment. Whether this augurs well for the disadvantaged sections of the society, the poor and the indigent has not seen much discussion. Before the Eighteenth Amendment, environment was on the Concurrent List. Now it is the sole responsibility of the provinces. Environment does not recognize provincial boundaries. The indivisibility of environment, devolution and the resulting issues of governance have to be properly debated. Culture and Tourism and some other subjects extend the provincial boundaries of social sector. Housing and community services, is the fourth largest spender.




Figure 3.1 gives the percent distribution of social sector expenditure. The share of education and housing and community services has increased and that of health has decreased. Social protection, dominated by the Benazir Income Support Programme, remains the third largest, despite the fact that the share has declined from 14.7 per cent of the budget in 2010-11 to 14.4 per cent. Utilization exceeded the budget in 2010-11, a pattern which is likely to be repeated in 2011-12 because of strong political backing.

The performance of the social sector has been extremely poor. Constitutional devolution has raised hopes that social sector governance, spending and outcomes will improve. This will require provinces to invest in better governance, policy thinking and making processes. Most important, devolution from federal government to provinces, without meaningful devolution from provinces to the local levels will only imply devolved hopes so far as effective service delivery is concerned. International experience is quite conclusive in this regard.

Table 3.3: Social versus Security Expenditure (Rs billion)

Categories	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
A: Total Social Expenditure	405.55	394.56	440.33
B: Total Security Expenditure (i+ii)	636.73	650.26	708.23
i).Defence	443.50	444.95	496.71
ii) Internal Security	193.26	205.31	211.53
Memo items:			
A as percentage of GDP	2.42	2.18	2.08
B as percentage of GDP	3.80	3.60	3.34
A as % of Total Budget	9.72	9.33	9.35
B as % of Total Budget	15.27	15.38	15.04
Social vs Security Ratio	0.64	0.61	0.62

Source: Annex IV

An important reason for underinvestment in social sector is the high level of expenditure on defence and internal security, second only to debt servicing. When compared with countries with the same income level, Pakistan spends a lot more on defence, squeezing the fiscal space for the social sector. Since 9/11, expenditure on internal security has also risen phenomenally. From Rs 31 billion in 2001-02, it has risen to Rs 211.53 billion in the budgets of 2011-12. In absolute terms, the budget for social sector has increased from Rs 405.55 billion in 2010-11 to Rs 440.33 billion in 2011-12, while the security budget increased sharply from Rs 636.73 billion to Rs 708.23 billion. More disturbing, the revised estimates show that the social sector budget could not be utilized fully and the security expenditure overshot the budgeted outlay. As is clear from Table 3.3, total security expenditure is a higher percentage of the GDP as well as total budget expenditure than the social sector expenditure. The security expenditure here uses the official definition of defence budget: it does not include military pensions and development expenditure of Ministries of Defence and Defence production. In the budget for 2011-12, against each rupee allocated for security, only 62 paise are allocated for social sector. It was paise 64 to a rupee in the previous budget. Such a grave disparity between expenditures on security and the social sector makes the transition from a national security state to a human security state a distant dream.

4. Human Development: The Neglect Continues

The Human Development Report 2010 defines human development as ‘the expansion of people’s freedoms to live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet. People are both the beneficiaries and the drivers of human development, as individuals and in groups.’ There are three dimensions of human development - a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. A summary indicator of human development is the Human Development Index (HDI). In terms of HDI 2010, Pakistan ranked 125th in a total of 162 countries and was placed 3rd from the bottom the in medium human development countries. In the last 30 years, the country succeeded in improving its HDI ranking by only 10 positions.

This extremely slow movement is related to low investment in human development, especially the grossly inadequate budgetary allocations. The budgets for 2011-12 continue, indeed, accelerate the trend of neglecting human development. Table 4.1 shows that the budgets allocated a measly 1.7 per cent of GDP to human development in 2010-11, which in revised estimates came down to 1.5 per cent. The budgetary outlay for 2011-12 brought the ratio to GDP further down to 1.4 per cent. Similarly, the federal and provincial budgets as a whole allocated 6.8 per cent of the total to human development in 2011-12, which is less than the budget estimates of the previous year. In Table 4.1, it will also be noticed that the budgetary outlays of the federal government for human development have declined sharply even in absolute terms. This is a consequence of the devolution under the Eighteenth Amendment. This reduction of Rs 16.46 billion by the federal government has been more than compensated by the increases made by the provinces, as the total allocation between the budgets has increased by Rs 40.54 billion. The largest increase of 32.5 per cent happened in Sindh.

Table 4.1: Budgetary Expenditure on Human Development (Rs billions)

Area	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
Federal	85.09	80.16	68.63
Punjab	98.02	90.11	113.66
Sindh	43.10	44.24	57.09
KPK	35.12	32.20	41.06
Balochistan	36.18	33.71	41.13
Pakistan	297.50	281.43	321.58
Memo items:			
Pakistan as % of: Total expenditures	7.1	6.6	6.8
GDP	1.7	1.5	1.4

Source: Annex V

The HDI measures average achievement in health, education and income. It is based on output indicators such as enrolments at various educational levels and life expectancy in the case of health. This study is concerned with budgetary inputs. It, therefore, does not account for the private sector health and education. Budgetary expenditure on education and health are well-defined heads. Health is defined here broadly to include, in addition to the traditional health sector, public health items such as water and sanitation, and population planning/welfare. Income in human development is defined as Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 2008 dollars. Gross National Investment is an obvious though not precise input to produce GNI. However, in the present budgetary exercise, public investment can be taken as a rough indicator of what the budget is doing for increasing GNI per capita.

Table 4.2: Sectoral Expenditure on Human Development (Rs billion)

Categories	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
Education	170.52	161.20	190.28
Health	92.75	91.35	95.69
Water Supply & Sanitation	20.57	19.97	21.85
Population Planning	13.65	8.91	13.76
Total Human Development Expenditure	297.50	281.43	321.58
Memo items:			
Public Investment (Rs billion)	720	605	790
Public Investment (% of GDP)	4.3	3.3	3.7

Source: Annex V

In Table 4.2, information on budgetary outlays on the human development sectors has been provided. All sectors utilized less than the budget allocation in 2010-11. This is a recurrent pattern in the human development sectors. There is no reason why it will not be repeated in 2011-12, although all sectors have been allocated more than the previous year's budget as well as revised allocation. In any case, direct allocations for education and health including public health, are too low to make any significant impact on human development. The third element in the HDI, income per capita, made negligible progress in 2010-11, as public investment was lower than the target of 4.3 per cent of GDP by a full percentage point. The target for 2011-12 at 3.7 per cent of GDP is ambitious.

Health and education allocations need to be broken down further to pinpoint the causes of the neglect of human development. In both these sectors, there is a penchant for setting ambitious and patently unrealizable targets in terms of expenditure/GDP ratios. Among other things, Article (3) (c) of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 required that 'budgetary allocation to education and health, will be doubled from the existing level in terms of percentage of gross domestic product during the next ten years.' Policy making in these sectors does not aim at outputs and outcomes. It focuses on input targets. As international league tables of expenditure/GDP ratios continue to show the country as at the bottom, the planners cannot resist the temptation to plan big, without acting big.

Table 4.3 looks at the latest budgetary allocations for health. The budget for 2010-11 envisaged that the health expenditure as a ratio of GDP would be 0.55 per cent. According to the revised estimate, it turned out to be lower at 0.51 per cent. The budget for 2011-12 fixes the ratio at an even lower level of 0.45 per cent. Now this ratio is lower than the ratio of 0.6 per cent achieved in the base year (2004-05) of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005. It had to be doubled in ten years, i.e. by 2013-14 to 1.2 per cent of the GDP. With only two years remaining, the country would be lucky if it can just maintain the ratio achieved ten years ago. Given the share of health in the total budgetary outlays at just above 2 per cent, there cannot be any mentionable progress. Table 4.3 also indicates that the emphasis is on tertiary health - General Hospitals & Clinics – which claimed 61.3 per cent of the total budget allocation for health in 2010-11, 61.2 per cent of the revised expenditure in 2010-11.

In the budget for 2011-12, the share of tertiary health rises further to 67 per cent. Devolution of health sector to the provinces seems to have pushed back the priority for primary and preventive health.

Table 4.3: Budgetary Expenditure Health (Rs billion)

Categories	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
General Hospitals & Clinics	56.87	55.89	64.16
Mother & Child Health	0.01	0.18	2.28
Health Facilities & Preventive Measures	18.65	20.14	10.34
Others	17.25	15.13	18.90
Total Health Expenditure	92.75	91.35	95.69
Total Health Expenditure as % of:			
Total expenditures GDP	2.22	2.16	2.03
	0.55	0.51	0.45

Source: Annex VI

In the education sector, the thoughtless pursuit of expenditure/GDP ratios is much more widespread than in the health sector. The Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 required doubling of the expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP within the ten year period of 2005-14. In other words, the ratio was supposed to have increased from 2.1 per cent in 2004-05 to 4.2 per cent by 2014-15. In the Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10 (MTDF), the target was raised to 5 per cent of GDP by 2009-10. A ratio of 7 per cent was mentioned in the Vision 2030 document as a target for 2015. Completely disregarding the macroeconomic realities, the recently announced education policy keeps the target of 7 per cent of GDP by 2015. Table 4.4 gives the real state of the play. The allocation in the budget for 2010-11 was a little more than 1 per cent of GDP and the revised estimate brought it down to 0.9 per cent. The budget for 2011-12 keeps its target at the revised level of the previous year. Sadly, Pakistan allocated to education a share of its total expenditure the equivalent of which in other countries is a percentage of GDP. As a percentage of the budget 2011-12, Pakistan plans to spend 4.04 per cent of its budget on education. India, South Korea and Brazil spend around 4 per cent of GDP on education. Even in the best of times, Pakistan has spent no more than 2.4 per cent of GDP on education.

Table 4.4: Budgetary Expenditure on Education (Rs billion)

Categories	2010-11 Budget	2010-11 Revised	2011-12 Budget
Primary	31.25	24.46	31.26
Secondary	36.68	35.21	46.19
Universities, Colleges, & Institutes	83.41	89.16	94.37
Others	19.85	12.38	18.46
Total Education Expenditure	170.52	161.21	190.28
Education Expenditure as % of:			
Total expenditures GDP	4.1	3.8	4.0
	1.02	0.9	0.9

Source: Annex VI

An important fact to be noted in Table 4.4 is the misplaced priorities reflected in the relative distribution of the expenditure on education. Primary education received 18.3 per cent of the budgetary outlays in 2010-11 and only 15.2 per cent in the revised budget. The allocation for primary education in the budget for 2011-12 is about the same as in the budget of previous year in absolute terms, but its share in the total education budget declined to 16.4 per cent. It was 44.3 per cent in 2003-04. Since then the pendulum has swung towards higher education. In fact, the share of tertiary education is 49.6 per cent in

the budget for 2011-12, which is larger than the 40.9 per cent share of primary and secondary education put together. The Dakar Declaration of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2010 and Education For All (EFA) by 2015 in the nineties followed by the Millennium Development Goals agreed in 2000, emphasized primary elementary education.

Figure 4.1: Education and Health: Gap between Actual and FRDL Expenditure/GDP Ratios




Figure 4.1 show the gap between the expenditure paths envisaged in the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 (FRDL) and the path trodden by actual expenditures. Broken lines indicate the expected FRDL expenditure and the unbroken lines show the actual expenditures until 2010-11, budget for 2011-12 and forecast for the remaining two years. As is obvious, it would take a miracle to bridge the yawning gap.

5. MDGs: Impossible to Achieve by 2015

Human development is a broader concept. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are an articulation of core human development priorities, with a set of indicators quantifying minimum achievement levels. Pakistan was among the 189 countries that adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration in September 2000. Progress was to be assessed in terms of eight MDGs - extreme hunger and income poverty; primary education; gender equity; child mortality; maternal health; HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases; environmental sustainability and global partnerships for development. These MDGs were further broken down in 18 targets and 48 indicators. As a follow-up of the 2005 World Summit, four new targets were added in 2007 and additional indicators were identified to track their progress.

In Pakistan, 34 indicators were chosen to track progress of MDG 1-7. No indicators have been identified for the MDG – 8, nor has there been any effort to incorporate the 4 targets added in 2007. With a view to monitor progress regularly to inform further development, it was decided to publish Pakistan Millennium Development Report (PMDGR) annually. Three reports were published since 2004. The fourth one relating 2010 has come out only recently. In 2006, Pakistan was ahead of targets for 7 indicators, on track on 15 indicators and lagged behind on 12 indicators. In 2010, Pakistan was ahead on 6 indicators, on track on 3 indicators, slow on 4 indicators lagging on 19 indicators and off track on 1 indicator. There was no information on 1 indicator.

There has been regression rather than progression since 2006. The report card on specific MDGs thus shows poor progress. Against Goal 1 to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, there is very high poverty and high hunger. Goal 2 to achieve universal primary education shows moderate enrolment. Goal 3 to promote gender equality and women empowerment shows near parity in girls' enrolment in primary schools, low share of women in paid employment and moderate representation of women in national parliaments. Goal 4 to reduce child mortality indicates high mortality. Goal 5 to improve maternal health shows very high maternal mortality and low access to reproductive health. Goal 6 to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases shows low prevalence and low mortality in regard to HIV/AIDS, but lags in anti-malaria and anti-tuberculosis targets. Goal 7 to ensure environmental sustainability shows low forest cover, low coverage of improved drinking water and sanitation. There is silence on what is happening to dwellers of *katchi abadis*.

At this rate of progress, targets set for 2015 are not reachable. Indeed, they are likely to be missed by wide margins. Failure to make adequate budgetary allocations, the focus of this study, is a critical factor. MDGs cannot be separated from the overall development strategy being pursued. A multiplicity of factors is at work here. For instance, higher growth rates and relative economic stability in 2002-07 enabled increasing fiscal space in the budget for MDGs. In the next four years, the worsening of economic situation led to reversals in crucial areas. Not only the budgetary allocations are inadequate, the utilization of the amounts budgeted leaves much to be desired. The outputs and outcomes expected of the budgetary allocations thus do not materialize.

Table 5.1: Budgetary Expenditure on MDGs (Rs billion)

		MDG1	MDG2	MDG3	MDG4,5	MDG6	MDG7
Federal	2010-11 Budget	360.8	3.2	1.8	17.3	0.4	1.0
	2010-11 Revised	610.3	3.3	7.9	17.8	0.6	1.4
	2011-12 Budget	383.2	4.4	9.4	9.7	0.5	1.5
Punjab	2010-11 Budget	268.1	5.3	26.3	4.4	0.7	13.5
	2010-11 Revised	242.4	0.8	20.6	5.2	0.1	14.4
	2011-12 Budget	291.2	1.5	29.1	3.1	0.4	14.7
Sindh	2010-11 Budget	106.7	1.0	1.7	6.1	0.3	5.4
	2010-11 Revised	130.0	0.1	0.4	4.5	0.3	3.2
	2011-12 Budget	127.4	0.1	1.2	8.3	0.3	5.0
KPK	2010-11 Budget	88.4	2.8	4.4	1.5	0.04	10.1
	2010-11 Revised	96.3	1.8	4.1	1.7	0.03	7.9
	2011-12 Budget	96.0	4.3	5.8	2.4	0.04	9.3
Balochistan	2010-11 Budget	70.5	18.2	10.9	6.6	0.03	5.1
	2010-11 Revised	71.1	18.4	10.9	6.2	0.03	5.0
	2011-12 Budget	85.6	20.1	12.1	8.1	0.04	6.9
Pakistan	2010-11 Budget	894.5	30.6	98.5	35.9	1.5	35.2
	2010-11 Revised	1149.9	24.3	93.5	33.5	1.0	31.8
	2011-12 Budget	983.5	30.5	110.9	31.5	1.5	37.2

Source: Annex VII

An attempt is made in Table 5.1 to estimate the budgetary outlays on MDGs. It should be understood that it is not possible in any meaningful manner to arrive at a total allocation for all the MDGs. This will involve a lot of double counting. Estimation of specific allocations for each MDG separately is possible but only for illustrative purposes, not as guide to budgetary policy, which is precluded by the interrelated nature of the MDGs. Take the case of MDG 1. The Government's main budgetary instrument is the pro-poor expenditure. As stated earlier, this includes as many as 17 sectors, subsuming expenditure related to nearly all sectors related to other MDGs – and more. That is why it is not a simple aggregation of the budgetary outlays on MDGs. Again, poverty reduction is not just a matter of adequate budgetary allocation. The level of poverty is intimately related to inflation, growth, distribution of income and assets.

Section 2 above discussed the pro-poor expenditure related to MDG 1 in some detail. Suffice it to say here that the aggregated budgets of the Federal and Provincial Governments in 2011-12 allocate less than the budget as well as revised estimate of 2010-11. The reduction has resulted largely from the Federal Government's actions to devolve in accordance with the 18th amendment and slashing of subsidies. In 2011-12, Punjab and Balochistan allocated more than the previous budget and revised estimates of 2010-11. Budget to budget allocations recorded the highest increase of 21.6 per cent in case of Balochistan. Sindh and KPK allocated more than the previous budget but less than the revised estimate. As gender budgeting has not yet gone beyond pilots, MDG 3 data in Table 5.1 had to be estimated. It comes out of the budgets for women development at federal and provincial levels, women's estimated share in the expenditure on primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment and programmes related to women's employment in the nonagricultural wage employment. It will be seen that the total expenditure of the country as a whole was budgeted at Rs 110.9 billion in 2011-12, which is higher than the budget and revised estimates of 2010-11. The same is true of all the provinces except Sindh, which is spending more than the revised estimates but less than the previous budget. Budget to budget increase is the highest in the case of federal government that is spending more than five-fold.

Goal 4 and 5 relate to health other than tertiary health. Federal and provincial budgets together allocated Rs 31.5 billion in the budgets of 2011-12, which is 11.3 per cent less than the revised estimate and 12.3 per cent less than the budget estimate of 2010-11. Drastic reduction by federal government after devolution is the main reason. From a budget allocation of Rs 17.3 and revised estimate of Rs 17.8 billion in 2010, the federal budget allocation for 2011-12 has reduced to Rs 9.7 billion. All provinces except Punjab provided higher budgetary outlays in 2011-12 than the previous year's budget and revised estimates. Punjab budget for 2011-12 allocated Rs 3.1 billion against the budget allocation of Rs 5.2 billion and revised estimate of Rs 4.4 billion in the previous year. Such serious under-budgeting cannot deal with the high and stagnant infant mortality rate and a maternal mortality rate that is almost 50 per cent higher than the MDG target. Goal 6 relates to HIV- AIDS. Pakistan, rated as a low prevalence country, is only slowly becoming aware of this menace. There are, however, signs that the incidence of TB and malaria is increasing. But the allocations are decreasing. The budget allocation for the country as a whole in 2011-12 was a mere Rs 1.5 billion and the same in the previous year's budget. Federal government seems to have frozen its programme and the provinces are only beginning to allocate small amounts.

Environmental sustainability is covered by the MDG7. Table 5.1 culls out from the budget documents the expenditures on environmental protection, waste water management, pollution abatement, energy efficiency, water supply and sanitation, and forests. Total federal and provincial allocations on these heads stands at Rs 37.2 billion in the budgets of 2011-12, 5.7 per cent higher than the budget estimate and 17 per cent higher than the revised estimate of 2010-11. In real terms, there is a decline as the budget to budget allocation is less than the double digit inflation. Across the provinces, Punjab has allocated the largest sum of Rs 14.7 billion, which is higher than the revised allocation of Rs 14.4 billion in 2010-11 which itself exceeded the budget allocation of Rs 13.5 billion. Balochistan has a

similar allocational pattern. Sindh and KPK have allocated less than their previous budget allocations. Despite devolution, federal budget allocation for 2011-12 was higher than the budget as well as revised estimates of the previous year.

Fiscal year 2014-15, the terminal year to achieve MDGs in the case of Pakistan, is only three years away. No amount of effort can now make it possible to achieve the MDGs in this short span of time. The budgetary analysis presented here indicates that the state of Pakistan has drifted away from these goals. An effort can be made to at least be on track on some critical indicators, but the prevailing economic paralysis, the looming elections and the time it takes a new government to get fully in the saddle do not leave any room for optimism. Figure 5.1 gives an idea of the huge gap between the resources required and the resources budgeted for 2011-12.

Figure 5.1: The Cost of MDGs and Resource Availability 2011-12




Figure 5.1 has three bars for three sectors. The highest blue bars, called PRSP, reflect the results of the MDG costing exercise carried out by the PRSP Secretariat of the Ministry of Finance in 2007. It focused on three main social sectors – education, health, water supply and sanitation - to project the cost of achieving the relevant MDG targets. Blue bars represent the projected resource requirement for 2011-12. The comparable social sector figures actually budgeted for these sectors are given in Table 4.2 of this study. These are titled SS in the figure, represented by red bars. MDGs related to education and health, are essentially about primary education, literacy, primary and preventive health, which are a subset of the education and health sectors. This information is given in Table 5.1 above and is referred to MDG2 and MDG 4,5. In Figure 5.1, green bars represent these MDGs. Water supply and sanitation has the same definition in all three cases. It has, therefore, only two bars – PRSP and SS. The comparison is not in real terms. Even then, the gap between resources budgeted and required resources is simply unbridgeable.

6. The Way Forward

This study takes a detailed look at the federal and provincial budgets for the fiscal year 2011- 12 to assess the extent of budgetary allocations made to improve the human condition in Pakistan. The analysis has been undertaken to draw conclusions from four perspectives – poverty reduction, social

sector development, human development and the MDGs. Broadly, Pakistan continues to under invest in its people. While poverty is rising, public expenditures seen to reduce poverty have been declining. Federal and Provincial budgets for 2011-12 allocated 4.7 per cent of GDP towards this end, which is almost the same as in 2002-03. The social sector expenditure has also declined. It was budgeted at 2.4 per cent in 2010-11, which has come down to 2.1 per cent of the GDP in 2011-12. Allocations for social sector have to compete with the high level of expenditure on defence and internal security. Countries with the same income level as Pakistan much less on defence, and much more on social sectors. In the budget for 2011-12, against each rupee allocated for security, only 62 paise are allocated for social sector.

Human development, captured to a considerable extent by expenditure on education and health, also depicts an extremely slow movement. The budgets for 2011-12 continue, indeed, accelerate the trend of neglecting human development, allocating a mere 1.4 per cent of GDP. All sectors of human development utilized less than the budget allocations in 2010-11, which is a recurrent pattern. Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 required doubling of expenditure on health and education by 2013-14 - 1.2 per cent of GDP for health and 4.2 per cent for education. With only two years remaining, the country would be lucky if it can just maintain the ratio achieved ten years ago. The budget for 2011-12 fixes the ratio at 0.45 per cent for health and 0.9 per cent for education. Millennium Development Goals articulate core human development priorities, with a set of indicators quantifying minimum achievement levels of human development. Fiscal year 2014-15, the terminal year to achieve MDGs, is only three years away. In case the country was making sustained progress, the achievement of MDGs in education, health, water supply and sanitation required a budget allocation of Rs 550 billion in 2011-12. The budgets provide only Rs 308 billion. MDGs related to education and health, are essentially about primary education, literacy, primary and preventive health, and public health, which are a subset of the education and health sectors. The allocation for this subset is only Rs 84 billion.

The performance of the social sector has been extremely poor. Constitutional devolution raises hope that social sector governance, spending and outcomes will improve. This will require provinces to invest in better governance, policy thinking and making processes. But devolution from federal government to provinces, without meaningful devolution from provinces to the local levels, will only imply devolved hopes so far as effective service delivery is concerned. The disparity between expenditures on security and the social sector makes the transition from a national security state to a human security state a distant dream.

In terms of HDI 2010, Pakistan ranked 125th in a total of 162 countries and was placed 3rd from the bottom in medium human development countries. In the last 30 years, the country succeeded in improving its HDI ranking by only 10 positions.

The obsession with expenditure/GDP ratios pushes in background the issues of quality, equity and efficiency. Even if there is effective utilization and desired outcomes are achieved, direct allocations for education and health including public health are too low to make any significant impact on human development. There is too much rhetoric setting overambitious targets in terms of expenditure/GDP ratios in the case of education. Thus the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 required budgetary allocations to education and health to double to 4.2 per cent of GDP by 2013-14. As international league tables of expenditure/GDP ratios continue to show the country as at the bottom, the planners cannot resist the temptation to plan big, without acting big. In the Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10, the target was raised to 5 per cent of GDP by 2009-10. A ratio of 7 per cent was mentioned in the Vision 2030 document as a target for 2015. Completely disregarding the macroeconomic realities, the recently announced education policy keeps the target of 7 per cent of GDP by 2015.

The budgetary analysis presented here indicates that the state of Pakistan has drifted away from the MDGs. An effort can be made to at least be on track on some critical indicators, but the prevailing economic paralysis, the looming elections and the time it takes a new government to get fully in the saddle do not leave any room for optimism. There is need to integrate and align the MDGs with the country's growth strategy. The new growth strategy adopted by the Planning commission makes no such effort.

It must be clear that the near term way forward lies in an end to chase elusive expenditure/GDP ratios and in focusing on consolidation. The need is that whatever money is allocated, must be spent by ensuring implementation quality. In the medium term, as the tax/GDP ratio improves, allocations should improve as well. In the long term, a consensus should be developed on regional peace so that security expenditure can be reduced to make the required budgetary space for human security.

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ANNEXES

Annex I

PRSP Expenditures 2001-2010 (Rs. Billion)

Source: Ministry of Finance, PRSP Secretariat

	01/02	02/03	03/03	04/05	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10
Roads, Highways & Bridges	6.3	13.1	22.7	35.2	53.2	60	84.8	99.6	98.5
Water Supply & Sanitation/Environment	4.6	3.4	5.8	6.5	10.3	16.6	19.8	22.2	25.4
Education	66.3	78.4	97.7	116.9	141.7	162.1	182.6	240.4	259.5
Health	19.2	22.4	27	31.4	39.2	53.2	61.1	83.7	94.4
Population Planning	1.3	3.1	4.7	4.6	10.2	7	13.3	5.3	7.0
Social Security & Welfare	3.7	1.3	4.1	2	7.6	4.5	18.9	29.1	54.6
Natural Calamities & Disasters	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.9	19.1	5	7.7	10	12.5
Agriculture	10.1	15.5	22.5	37.9	59.8	74.8	83.5	88.9	104.8
Land Reclamation	1.9	1.8	2	2.1	2.7	2.3	3.1	2.7	2.0
Rural Development	12.3	16.9	18.6	15.4	15	22.2	22.3	16.4	20.4
Subsidies	4.3	10.9	8.5	5.4	6	5.5	54.9	220.6	234.9
Food Support Programme	2	2	2.8	2.7	3.1	3.5	4.4	12.4	0
Peoples Works Programme-I	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.08	0	0.02	1.4	3.3	8.4
Peoples Works Programme-II	0	0	1.4	4.4	1	2.5	2.7	28	31.8
Low Cost Housing	0	0.01	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	1.8
Justice Administration	2	2.2	2.4	3.1	5.6	5.1	7.8	9.2	11.0
Law & Order	31	36.7	39.4	47.4	1.1	2.1	2.4	104.7	143.7
Total	166.1	209	261.3	316.2	376.1	426.7	571.3	977.2	1110.8
As % of GDP	3.8	4.3	4.6	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.6	7.5	7.6

Annex II

Pakistan: PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	170.52	161.2	190.28
Law and Order	180.93	189.38	192.14
Subsidies	154.22	416.92	203.46
Justice Administration	14.83	15.935	19.38
Roads, Highways, & Bridges	98.59	85.93	87.65
Health	92.75	91.35	95.69
Social Security & Social Welfare	54.81	39.36	55.72
Agriculture	33.37	41.5	34.43
Water Supply & Sanitation	20.57	19.97	21.85
Rural Development	15.4	16.62	24.06
Population Planning	13.65	8.91	13.76
Natural Disasters	5.01	33.88	8.04
Low Cost Housing	2.94	1.92	2.55
Land Reclamation	3.93	4.28	4.49
PWP1	5	5	5
PWP2	28	17.78	25
Total poverty related expenditure	894.53	1149.92	983.5
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	5.34%	6.37%	4.65%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	21.45%	27.20%	20.89%

PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Federal	360.83	610.26	383.23
Punjab	268.14	242.36	291.25
Sindh	106.67	129.97	127.43
KPK	88.44	96.24	95.96
Balochistan	70.45	71.08	85.64
Pakistan	894.53	1149.92	983.5
Memo items			
Total Pakistan as % of: Total expenditures GDP	21.45% 5.34%	27.20% 6.37%	20.89% 4.65%

Federal: PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	55.67	55.18	54.47
Law and Order	50.62	57.51	59.21
Subsidies	126.684	395.8	166.45
Justice Administration	2.54	2.58	3.46
Roads, Highways, & Bridges	2.99	2.99	3.37
Health	24.63	23.61	9.74
Social Security & Social Welfare	52.12	37.19	51.904
Agriculture	7.47	8.716	0
Water Supply & Sanitation	0.435	0.41	0.46
Rural Development	0.125	0.02	0
Population Planning	4.36	1.97	3.96
Natural Disasters	0.2	1.51	0.2
Low Cost Housing	0.004	0.001	0.006
Land Reclamation	0	0	0.002
PWP1	5	5	5
PWP2	28	17.78	25
Total poverty related expenditure	360.83	610.26	383.23
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	2.15%	3.38%	1.81%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	14.45%	22.79%	13.52%

Punjab: PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	49.56	41.36	56.043
Law and Order	61.98	61.09	62.93
Subsidies	21	13	30
Justice Administration	6.94	6.51	8.25
Roads, Highways, & Bridges	57.89	41.59	48.278
Health	35.42	35.36	42.69
Social Security & Social Welfare	1.03	0.570	1.22
Agriculture	11.245	8.845	14.64
Water Supply & Sanitation	11.14	12.02	12.02
Rural Development	6.2	8.25	7.34
Population Planning	1.89	1.37	2.91
Natural Disasters	1.77	11.79	3.34
Low Cost Housing	1.87	0.434	1.37
Land Reclamation	0.204	0.183	0.22
PWP1	0	0	0
PWP2	0	0	0
Total poverty related expenditure	268.14	242.36	291.25
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	1.60%	1.34%	1.38%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	33.30%	30.38%	31.88%

Sindh: PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	25.62	26.39	32.81
Law and Order	33.77	37.6	37.94
Subsidies	1.62	3.073	1.515
Justice Administration	2.5	3.61	3.89
Roads, Highways, & Bridges	13.98	10.75	12.01
Health	14.26	14.79	20.74
Social Security & Social Welfare	0.19	0.41	0.51
Agriculture	7	15.09	9.2
Water Supply & Sanitation	2.06	1.93	2.39
Rural Development	0.332	0.625	4.27
Population Planning	1.143	1.126	1.145
Natural Disasters	0.393	10.4	0.279
Low Cost Housing	0.08	0.08	0.027
Land Reclamation	3.792	4.1	0.71
PWP1	0	0	0
PWP2	0	0	0
Total poverty related expenditure	106.67	129.97	127.43
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.64%	0.72%	0.60%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	25.26%	35.39%	27.85%

KPK: PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	20.057	18.58	24.89
Law and Order	22.91	23.16	21.88
Subsidies	2.5	2.5	2.5
Justice Administration	1.89	2.09	2.24
Roads, Highways, & Bridges	14.03	17.97	14.1
Health	10.13	9.9	12.19
Social Security & Social Welfare	0.342	0.26	0.7
Water Supply & Sanitation	4.44	3.26	3.78
Agriculture	2.511	3.276	2.99
Rural Development	8.04	6.42	0
Population Planning	0.5	0.5	0.21
Natural Disasters	0.634	8.129	1.2
Low Cost Housing	0.459	0.23	0.04
Land Reclamation	0	0	9.253
PWP1	0	0	0
PWP2	0	0	0
Total poverty related expenditure	88.44	96.24	95.96
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.53%	0.53%	0.45%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	30.06%	39.32%	28.49%

Balochistan : PRSP Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	19.62	19.69	22.06
Law and Order	11.66	10.02	10.2
Subsidies	2.42	2.55	3
Justice Administration	0.96	1.15	1.54
Roads, Highways, & Bridges	9.71	12.63	9.89
Health	8.31	7.72	10.33
Social Security & Social Welfare	1.13	0.92	1.39
Water Supply & Sanitation	2.48	2.35	3.21
Agriculture	5.142	5.57	7.6
Rural Development	0.71	1.31	6.75
Population Planning	5.77	3.94	5.54
Natural Disasters	2.03	2.04	3.03
Low Cost Housing	0.53	1.18	1.11
Land Reclamation	0	0	0
PWP1	0	0	0
PWP2	0	0	0
Total poverty related expenditure	70.45	71.08	85.64
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.42%	0.39%	0.40%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	46.47%	50.84%	52.04%

Annex III

Social Sector Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Federal	149.04	127.90	130.34
Punjab	119.37	118.65	136.70
Sindh	47.94	57.58	60.82
KPK	48.99	51.35	59.08
Balochistan	40.21	39.08	53.38
Pakistan	405.55	394.562	440.33
Memo items			
Total Pakistan as % of: Total expenditures GDP	9.72% 2.42%	9.33% 2.18%	9.35% 2.08%

Pakistan: Expenditure on Social Sector (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	170.52	161.2	190.28
Health	92.75	91.35	95.69
Social Protection	59.44	72.69	63.32
Housing and Community Services	49.24	44.67	58.6
Recreational , Culture	10.44	9.192	9.718
Environment	9.51	6.55	8.96
Population Planning	13.65	8.91	13.76
Total Social Sector expenditure	405.55	394.562	440.33
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	2.42%	2.18%	2.08%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	9.72%	9.33%	9.35%

Federal: Expenditure on Social Sector (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	55.666	55.182	54.474
Health	24.63	23.61	9.74
Social Protection	52.313	38.71	52.101
Housing and Community Services	6.839	3.566	5.189
Recreational , Culture	4.793	4.421	4.301
Environment	0.45	0.45	0.58
Population planning	4.36	1.97	3.96
Total Social Sector expenditure	149.04	127.90	130.34
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.89%	0.71%	0.62%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	5.97%	4.78%	4.60%

Punjab: Expenditure on Social Sector (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	49.56	41.36	56.043
Health	35.42	35.36	42.69
Social Protection	2.8	12.361	4.56
Housing and Community Services	26.862	26.06	28.91
Recreational , Culture	2.457	1.98	1.28
Environment	0.382	0.16	0.342
Population planning	1.89	1.37	2.91
Total Social Sector expenditure	119.37	118.65	136.7
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.71%	0.66%	0.65%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	14.83%	14.87%	14.97%

Sindh: Expenditure on Social Sector (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	25.62	26.39	32.81
Health	14.26	14.79	20.74
Social Protection	0.58	10.81	0.785
Housing and Community Services	2.42	2.50	2.243
Recreational , Culture	1.68	1.49	1.694
Environment	2.23	0.47	1.4
Population planning	1.143	1.126	1.145
Total Social Sector expenditure	47.94	57.58	60.82
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.29%	0.32%	0.29%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	11.35%	15.68%	13.29%

KPK: Budget Expenditure on Social Sector (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	20.057	18.58	24.89
Health	10.13	9.9	12.19
Social Protection	0.98	8.296	1.894
Housing and Community Services	11.884	10.06	14.4
Recreational , Culture	1.114	0.81	1.744
Environment	4.334	3.254	3.761
Population planning	0.5	0.5	0.21
Total Social Sector expenditure	48.99	51.35	59.08
Memo items			
Total Expenditures	294.246	244.802	336.858
As a percentage of GDP	0.29%	0.28%	0.28%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	16.65%	20.98%	17.54%

Balochistan: Expenditure on Social Sector (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	19.62	19.69	22.06
Health	8.31	7.72	10.33
Social Protection	2.776	2.52	3.989
Housing and Community Services	1.23	2.489	7.86
Recreational , Culture	0.392	0.49	0.703
Environment	2.11	2.214	2.90
Population planning	5.77	3.94	5.54
Total Social Sector expenditure	40.21	39.08	53.38
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.24%	0.22%	0.25%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	26.53%	27.95%	32.44%

Annex IV

Pakistan : Social versus Security Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
A: Total Social Expenditure	405.55	394.562	440.33
B: Total security Expenditure (i+ii)	636.725	650.259	708.234
i).Defense	443.5	444.95	496.705
ii) Internal Security	193.26	205.31	211.528
Memo items			
A as percentage of GDP	2.42%	2.18%	2.08%
B as percentage of GDP	3.80%	3.60%	3.34%
A as % of Budget Expenditure	9.72%	9.33%	9.35%
B as % of Budget Expenditure	15.27%	15.38%	15.04%
Social VS Security Ratio	0.64	0.61	0.62

Annex V

Human Development Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Federal	85.09	81.16	68.63
Punjab	98.0165	90.11086	113.66
Sindh	43.1	44.24	57.09
KPK	35.12	32.20	41.06
Balochistan	36.18	33.71	41.13
Pakistan	297.5	281.43	321.58
Memo items			
Public sector Investment	720	605	790
Public investment as% of GDP	4.3%	3.3%	3.7%
Total Pakistan as % of: Total expenditures GDP	7.1%	6.6%	6.8%
	1.7%	1.5%	1.4%

Pakistan: Budget Expenditure on Human Development (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget Estimate 2011-12
Education	170.52	161.2	190.28
Health	92.75	91.35	95.69
Water Supply & Sanitation	20.57	19.97	21.85
Population Planning	13.65	8.91	13.76
Total H.D expenditure	297.5	281.43	321.58
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	1.78%	1.56%	1.52%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	7.13%	6.66%	6.83%

Federal: Budget Expenditure on Human Development (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	55.67	55.18	54.47
Health	24.63	23.61	9.74
Water Supply & Sanitation	0.435	0.41	0.46
Population planning	4.36	1.97	3.96
Total H.D expenditure	85.09	81.16	68.63
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.51%	0.45%	0.32%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	3.41%	3.03%	2.42%

Punjab: Budget Expenditure on Human Development (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	49.56	41.36	56.043
Health	35.42	35.36	42.69
Water Supply & Sanitation	11.14	12.02	12.02
Population planning	1.89	1.37	2.91
Total H.D expenditure	98.0165	90.11086	113.66
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.59%	0.5%	0.54%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	12.17%	11.3%	12.44%

Sindh: Budget Expenditure on Human Development (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	25.62	26.39	32.81
Health	14.26	14.79	20.74
Water Supply & Sanitation	2.06	1.93	2.39
Population planning	1.143	1.126	1.145
Total H.D expenditure	43.1	44.24	57.09
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.26%	0.24%	0.27%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	10.21%	12.04%	12.48%

KPK: Budget Expenditure on Human Development (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	20.057	18.58	24.89
Health	10.13	9.9	12.19
Water Supply & Sanitation	4.44	3.26	3.78
Population planning	0.5	0.5	0.21
Total H.D expenditure	35.12	32.20	41.06
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.21%	0.18%	0.19%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	11.94%	13.15%	12.19%

Balochistan: Budget Expenditure on Human Development (Rs. Billion)

Categories	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Education	19.62	19.69	22.06
Health	8.31	7.72	10.33
Water Supply & Sanitation	2.48	2.35	3.21
Population planning	5.77	3.94	5.54
Total H.D expenditure	36.18	33.71	41.13
Memo items			
As a percentage of GDP	0.22%	0.19%	0.19%
As a % of Budget Expenditure	23.87%	24.1%	25.0%

Annex VI

Total Education Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
Primary	31.25	24.46	31.26
Secondary	36.68	35.21	46.19
Universities, Colleges, & Institutes	83.41	89.16	94.37
Others	19.85	12.38	18.46
Total Education Expenditure	170.52	161.2	190.28
Total Pakistan as % of: Total expenditures GDP	4.1% 1.02%	3.8% 0.9%	4.04% 0.9%

Total Health Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

	Budget Estimate 2010-11	Budget Revised 2010-11	Budget estimate 2011-12
General Hospitals & Clinics	56.87	55.89	64.16
Mother & Child Health	0.009	0.18	2.28
Health Facilities & Preventive Measures	18.62	20.14	10.34
Others	17.25	15.13	18.90
Health Expenditure	92.75	91.35	95.69
Total Pakistan as % of: Total expenditures GDP	2.22% 0.55%	2.16% 0.51%	2.03% 0.45%

Annex VII

MDGs Expenditure (Rs. Billion)

		MDG 1 Poverty	MDG2 Primary Education	MDG 3 Women Empow erment	MDG 4,5 Health	6 Hiv/ Aids	7 Environ ment	8 Youth develop ment
Federal	Budget Estimate 2010-11	360.8	3.2	1.76	17.30	0.44	1.01	3.67
	Revised 2010-11	610.3	3.25	7.85	17.84	0.58	1.36	1.51
	Budget Estimate 2011-12	383.2	4.36	9.41	9.74	0.45	1.47	0
Punjab	Budget Estimate 2010-11	268.1	5.34	26.31	4.39	0.72	13.52	0
	Revised 2010-11	242.4	0.77	20.58	5.23	0.11	14.4	0
	Budget Estimate 2011-12	291.2	1.52	29.1	3.09	0.35	14.65	1
Sindh	Budget Estimate 2010-11	106.7	0.98	1.73	6.13	0.25	5.43	0.09
	Revised 2010-11	130	0.12	0.44	4.52	0.29	3.20	0.07
	Budget Estimate 2011-12	127.4	0.13	1.2	8.26	0.29	4.99	0.04
KPK	Budget Estimate 2010-11	88.44	2.83	4.36	1.47	0.04	10.09	0
	Revised 2010-11	96.25	1.79	4.14	1.72	0.03	7.89	0
	Budget Estimate 2011-12	95.96	4.34	5.75	2.39	0.04	9.26	0
Balochistan	Budget Estimate 2010-11	70.45	18.23	10.89	6.59	0.03	5.07	0.01
	Revised 2010-11	71.08	18.35	10.87	6.15	0.03	4.95	0.01

	Budget Estimate 2011-12	85.64	20.12	12.08	8.05	0.04	6.86	0.01
Pakistan	Budget Estimate 2010-11	894.53	30.58	98.49	35.88	1.48	35.16	3.76
	Revised 2010-11	1149.93	24.28	93.45	35.46	1.04	31.80	1.58
	Budget Estimate 2011-12	983.50	30.47	110.9	31.52	1.48	37.23	1.05

Note: The sources of Annex II-VII are the budget documents of federal and provincial governments for 2011-12.

Situation Analysis of Education System in Balochistan

Faheem Abbasi

About the Author

Faheem Abbasi has over 12 years' experience in the identification, design, costing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of education projects and programs in four province of Pakistan including AJK and FATA. He has direct experience of leadership, management, implementation and coordination in the Education projects. He has vast experience in designing, implementation and builds a relationship through strong coordination. From 2002- 2007, on different positions at in his native province, Sindh, Faheem played a leading role in the education sector. In April, 2008 he joined Pakistan Safe Drinking Water & Hygiene Promotion Project (PSDW-HPP) as School Activity Manager that provided him an opportunity to work in four provinces of Pakistan including FATA and AJK. As School Activity Manager to PSDW-HPP-USAID-PAKISTAN he has closely worked with provincial education departments and district governments. After successful completion of Pakistan Safe Drinking Water & Hygiene Promotion Project (PSDW-HPP), he joined as a program Manager in IRD USAID/OFDA project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab. Currently he is about to complete his thesis of PhD-Education and he works as Education Planner in iMMAP Pakistan in District School Consolidation Program-Sindh Basic Education Project (SBEP) funded by USAID-PAKISTAN.

He is currently working as Acting Chief of Party in IMMAP Pakistan. Faheem has expertise in sector approaches in general and in sector approaches in Education in particular, knowledge of Sector Budget Support modality and expertise in analyzing education budgets and multi- year budget perspectives

List of Abbreviations

BEMIS	Balochistan Education Management Information System
ECE	Early Childhood Education
EFA	Education For All
ESR	Education Sector Reform
GPI	Gender Parity Index
HRC	Human Rights Commission
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NCHD	National Commission for Human Development
NEC	National Education Census
NEMIS	National Education Management Information System
NER	Net Enrolment Ratio
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PPIU	Policy Planning Implementation Unit
PSLMS	Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization UNICEF United Nations International Children's Fund

Executive Summary

The Articles 25A, 31 and 37 (subsection a, b and c) of the Constitution of Pakistan calls for free education for all children between ages 5 to 16 years and education is considered as a fundamental right of every citizen of Pakistan. The 18th Amendment in the constitution has completely devolved education to the provinces in terms of education reforms and review of the current educational status which has increased the responsibility of provinces to achieve the MDGs and EFA. According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan (2009-10) Balochistan lags behind in terms of the literacy rate, which is 46 per cent as compared to 59 per cent in Punjab, 56 per cent Sindh and 49 per cent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) score for Balochistan is 0.35 which is lower than Punjab (0.69), Sindh (0.61) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (0.49).

Balochistan still has one of the lowest literacy rates as compared to other provinces of Pakistan. Balochistan educational system is characterized by Low primary school enrolment, lack of access to secondary education, a shortage of both middle and secondary schools and inadequate access to female education. Public education system in Balochistan is facing challenges to achieve the EFA targets and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The purpose of study was to analyze the education accomplishments of Balochistan in terms of achievements against the targets of EFA and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) based on a comprehensive and holistic situation analysis of key priority areas. The focus of this study was on review of reports, review existing data on education, policies and plans relevant to the education sector in Balochistan. For thorough understanding key representatives of education department at provincial level, district level, regional level and NGOs were interviewed. In total 10 individual interviews were conducted out of which 6 were from Education Department and 4 were NGO representatives. This study was designed to analyze the education system of Balochistan in terms of access to education, present literacy rate, gender gap, girls' education, enrolment, out of school children, dropout, retention in terms of achievements against EFA and MDGs and financial resource allocation for education and to draw practical recommendations. The scope of study was upto secondary level education.

Following key issues were highlighted from the data analysis and interviews:

(i) Access to Education

Serious challenges are faced by Balochistan in the areas of access to primary education to its population. Access to education is big challenge at all levels. The data shows highest percentage of children at primary school entry age is out of school. The major reason of slow growth in enrolments, low survival rate and low transition rates has been observed due access to education particularly for females in rural areas. The access to education in urban areas is better than of rural areas. The participation rate is very low. Overall 56 percent children of age 6-11 are not attending primary education.

(ii) Gender gap and girls' education

The second most alarming issue is Gender Parity Index (GPI) ratio at all levels of education and very higher at secondary level of education. At secondary level of education urban and rural ratio is at 0.86 and 0.48 respectively, showing much lower participation rate of girls at secondary level than that at primary level particularly in rural areas.

(iii) Dropout rate

The third major issues is the dropout rate and out of school children. About 35% students who are enrolled in Katchi class leave school before registering in Class One. High level of dropout rates and low transition rates are reported at each level of education.

(iv) Security Issue

Security problem has more aggravated the existing low visibility, negligible educational attainments and gender disparity in Balochistan. Due to security risk many teachers have been transferred from remote areas to cities. Due to security issues, in particular, female teachers in rural areas feel unsecure and girls' schools are closed due to transfer of teachers from remote areas.

(v) Achievements against EFA and MDGs

The performance of Balochistan as compared with other provinces is very low and slow. The EFA development Index (EDI) for Balochistan is 0.37 while EDI for Punjab, Sindh and KPK is 0.47, 0.43, and 0.43 respectively. In adult literacy Balochistan is able achieve 39.7% as compared to 57.2% by Punjab, 58.2% by Sindh and 46% by KPK (PSLM, 2008-9).

1. Introduction

Balochistan consists 44% of land and only 5% of the Pakistan's population. The population is highly scattered with very poor communications networks (UNESCO, 2011). Balochistan with weak development indicators, low literacy rate and huge poverty level differs from the rest of provinces. Balochistan still has one of the lowest literacy rates as compared to other provinces of Pakistan. Balochistan educational system is characterized by Low primary school enrolment, lack of access to secondary education, a shortage of both middle and secondary schools and inadequate access to female education. The adult literacy rate in Pakistani education is unlikely to achieve the adult literacy target by 2015 and progress is slow (UNESCO, 2007).

The Articles 25A, 31 and 37 (subsection a, b and c) of Constitution of Pakistan calls for free education for all children between ages 5 to 16 years and education is considered as a fundamental right of every citizen of Pakistan. The 18th Amendment in the constitution has completely devolved education to the provinces in terms of education reforms and review of the current educational status which has increased the responsibility of provinces to achieve the MDGs.

Low enrolments, survival rate, high dropouts, transition rates and high gender disparity are the major challenges for Balochistan education system. From primary level of education to middle school education the transition rate from primary to middle levels is only 23%. At secondary level the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) reduces to 14% for age groups 14 to 15 and 6% for 13 to 14 (PSLM, 2010-11). Girls' education in particular is a big challenge faced by the education system of Balochistan due to number of reasons, which are lack of access to educational institutions for girls, lack of basic facilities in primary, middle and high girls' schools, low retention rate and high dropout rate among the girls, socio-cultural restrictions and insufficient budgetary allocations. Besides above

According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan (2009-10) Balochistan lags behind in terms of the literacy rate, which is 46 per cent as compared to 59 per cent in Punjab, 56 per cent Sindh and 49 per cent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) score for Balochistan is 0.35 which is lower than Punjab (0.69), Sindh (0.61) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (0.49).

Public education system in Balochistan is facing challenges to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This phenomenon is hindering the national progress toward Education for All. For last six decades government has been struggling to promote education but Balochistan still stands behind to the other provinces. Low educational attainment has resulted into under-developed human capital.

2. Context and Purpose of Study

The purpose of study was to analyze the education accomplishments of Balochistan in terms of achievements against the targets of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) regarding Education For All by 2015 based on a comprehensive and holistic situation analysis of key priority areas. This study was designed to analyze the education system of Balochistan in terms of present literacy rate, access to education, gender gap, girls' education, enrolment, out of school children, dropout, retention, achievements against MDGs and financial resource allocation for education, highlighting the systems strength and weaknesses and to draw practical recommendations. This study has also identified the impact of security issues on education system.

3. Methodology

The study was focused on review of literature and reports. A desk review of education policies, BEMIS, PSLM, UNDP reports, UNESCO reports, UNICEF reports and literature on subject was undertaken. The secondary sources of data i.e. the BEMIS, education department reports, Bureau of Statistics reports

and other authenticated documents were analyzed for this study. For the validation of data analysis, interviews were conducted with key stakeholders working in education sector and representatives of education department at provincial level and regional level.

Key informant interviews were held at provincial level, which included officials of Ministry of Education, concerned officers of district education department, senior and mid-level officials of regional education department and non-governmental organizations. In addition, meaningful consultations with individuals and some parents were held. Analysis was simultaneously carried out.

4. Scope and Limitations

The focus of this study was to review of existing data on education, policies and plans relevant to the education sector in Balochistan. For thorough understanding key representatives of education department at provincial level, district level, regional level and NGOs were interviewed. In total 10 individual interviews were conducted out of which 6 were from education department and 4 were NGO representatives. The scope of study was upto primary, elementary, middle/ high school education.

5. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The Millennium Declaration, endorsed by 189 countries, emerged as a roadmap setting out goals to be reached by 2015. Pakistan is signatory to the Millennium declaration. These goals provide the basis for national development efforts. The eight goals are called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The primary objective of MDGs related to education is to improve percentage of literacy rate. Pakistan is committed to achieve universal primary education (Goal 2) and promote gender equality and empower women (Goal 3) including achievements in all MDGs.

Unfortunately literacy rates in Pakistan are very low as compared to other SAARC countries (PSLM, 2010-2011). Balochistan is lagging behind in all the education achievements in accordance with the commitments made in the Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Balochistan has the lowest education achievements as compared to the other provinces of the country under the EFA Development Index (EDI). It is very difficult for Balochistan to achieve all six EFA goals (UNESCO, 2011).

6. Types of Education Institutions


According to the Policy Planning and Implementation Unit (PPIU) there are about 22,000 settlements in Balochistan but availability of schools is only for 10,000 settlements. In rural areas schools are located at long distances. Out of five children one child has to travel more than 30 minutes and White Paper on Budget 2010-11 reports that one child in 10 children has to travel more than 1 hour to school. The second major problem is non-availability of the middle school level education facilities. It is reported that there is only one middle school for 11 primary schools.

School Type	No. of Govt. Schools		
	Boys	Girls	Total
Primary	7819	2849	10668
Middle	592	369	961
High	487	176	663
	8898	3394	12292

Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

The graph shows a huge gap from between primary and secondary level education and there is a clear gap between number of boys and girls schools at all levels.

Figure 6.1 Public Sector Schools in Balochistan



Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

In formal education system, there are a number of stages as described briefly below:

6.1 Pre Primary Schooling or katchi class

Pre-primary education is functional and managed in public primary schools in Balochistan. Children below five years of age, particularly in rural areas, attend primary schools informally. These children are considered in Katchi class or improved katchi class. This level of education provides pre-primary education as part of socialization process. The Katchi class has been recognized as proxy for Early childhood Education (ECE). For the formalization of ECE, Education Department, Government of Balochistan has developed Provincial Early Childhood Education (ECE) Plan 2011-2015.

6.2 Primary Schools

This schooling consists of five classes from class one to class five and children 5-9 years of age are enrolled in this stage. In total there are 10,669 primary school in Balochistan, outthese schools7819 are Boys primary schools and 2849 are Girls primary school


6.3 Middle Schools:

The middle schooling is comprised of class VI, VII and VIII and provides three years schooling. The age group 10-12 years is enrolled in this educational level. There are only 961 middle schools out which 592 middle schools for Boys and 369 for girls.

6.4 High Schools

In this level of education children stay for two years in classes IX and X. The Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education conducts the examination. There are 487 Boys high schools and 176 high schools for girls.

Figure 6.2 Level of Education in Balochistan



7. Structure of the Education System, Interventions and Situation Analysis

7.1 Access to Education and Enrolment


7.1.1 Pre Primary

Preschool organized learning and child education program is vital for the readiness of children. “About 80 % of children attending first grade were in preschool in 2010 on overall basis, slightly more females (81.9%) than males (78.9%) and marginally more urban children than those from the rural areas” (UNICEF,2011).

Gender	Un-admitted	Kachi	Pakki
Boys	27802	157187	97103
Girls	10190	109707	69012
Total:	37992	266894	166115

Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

Figure 7.1 Enrolments of Govt. Schools by Grade & Gender in Katchi and Paki class




Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

In public sector schools the Gross Enrolment Rate in pre-primary has been reported 46%, in which the portion of male is 53% and female 38%.

7.1.2. Primary

Serious challenges are faced by Balochistan in the areas of access to primary education to its population. Slow growth in enrolments, low survival rate and low transition rates from one class to another class and higher gender disparity mean a large number of children are out of school. From class I-V, in total 754,578 (Boys: 443832 & Girls: 310746) students are enrolled in 7819 Boys and 2849 Girl primary schools. According Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010 “The percentage of children of primary school entry age (age 5) entering grade 1 was found as low as 19.8 percent with boys slightly on the higher side (20.7%) than girls (18.6%) and also in urban versus rural children at 28.5 percent and 17.4 respectively” (UNICEF,2011). Overall 56 percent children of age 6-11 are not attending primary. The net attendance ratio has been reported 44 percent (Boys: 47. % & Girls: 39.6 %). The children in urban areas has higher attendance ratio at 57.4% as compared to 40.5% in rural children

Figure 7.2 Enrolments of Govt. Schools by Grade & Gender from class I-V




Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

7.1.3. Secondary (Middle /High schools)

The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010 conducted by UNICEF and Government of Balochistan reports that “only 27.8 %children age group 12-17 years are attending secondary school education, showing males are at more advantage than females in accessing education by 16 percent points on overall basis (35.2% versus 19.1%), by 10 percent points in urban areas (46.5% versus 36.1%) and by 17 percent points in rural areas (31.8% versus 13.7%)”. For both age groups of 10 to 12 and 11 to 13 for middle level there is a clear decline from the primary level NERs which reveals dropouts or low transition rates (UNESCO, 2011). At secondary level the net enrolment ratio (NER) reduces to 14% for age groups 14 to 15 and 6% for 13 to 14 (PSLM, 2010-11).


Figure 7.3 Enrolments of Govt. Schools by Grade & Gender from class VI-X



Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011


The below chart show the class wise enrolment and access trends.

Figure 7.4 Enrolments of Govt. Schools Class Kachi –X



Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

Figure 7.5 NER OF Baluchistan’s Performance in Comparison with other




Source: PSLM 2010-11

7.2. Gender Gap and Girls Education

The Gender Parity Index (GPI) for primary school adjusted Net Attendance Ratio (NAR) of girls to boys has been reported at 0.83. The GPI ratio in urban areas is at 0.91 and in rural areas it is at 0.79, which shows the lowest participation of girls from rural areas. GPI ratio in secondary schools adjusted NAR of girls to boys has been reported at 0.60. At secondary level of education urban and rural ratio is at 0.86 and 0.48 respectively, showing much lower participation rate of girls at secondary level than that at primary level particularly in rural areas (UNICEF, 2011).

Figure 7.6 GER by Grade & Gender in Primary, Middle and High Schools



Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011


7.3. Promotion , Repetition and Dropout Rate

The dropout rate at pre-primary level is 35% of students (36% is boys and 35% girls) who are enrolled in Katchi class leave school before registering in Class One (Education Department, Government of Balochistan, 2011). Policy analysis of education in Balochistan has reported that “there are approximately 1 million out of school children in Balochistan. Almost a million children are enrolled in schools with about 727, 885 in public schools, 83,000 in madrassas and about 200000 in private schools .These include those who were never admitted to a school as well as those who dropped along the way” (UNESCO,2011).

High level of dropouts and low transition rates are reported at each level of education. The maximum drop out and lowest transition rate has been observed from primary level of education to middle level education. In public schools there is 23 percent transition rate from primary level of education to middle school education. The net enrolment ratio (NER) At secondary level education reduces to 14% for age groups 14 to 15 and 6% for 13 to 14 (PSLM, 2010-11).


According to Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010 “Net primary completion rate is at 56 percent on overall basis with a higher completion rate in boys at 59.4 percent than girls at 51.3 percent, and also higher completion rate in urban students at 67.3 percent than those from rural areas at 52.7 percent.

Figure 7.7 Promotion, Repetition and Dropout Rate



Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011

Figure 7.8 Transition Rate from Elementary to Secondary



Sources: BEMIS Census, 2010-2011


7.4. Achievements against EFA and MDGs

Pakistan as a signatory to the EFA obligations is committed to articulate its commitment to the goals in various policies and plans. The main focuses of six EFA goals are on basic education, primary and pre-primary. Increased access, remove gender disparity and improvements in quality education are the main targets of EFA. Pakistan is also committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which include two education related goals.

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.


Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary school. The performance of Balochistan as compared with other provinces is very low. The EFA development Index (EDI) for Balochistan is 0.37 while EDI for Punjab, Sindh and KPK is 0.47, 0.43, and 0.43 respectively. In adult literacy Balochistan is able to achieve 39.7% as compared to 57.2% by Punjab, 58.2% by Sindh and 46% by KPK (PSLM, 2008-9).

Figure 7.9 Comparative NER, Adult Literacy and Survival Rate




Source: NEMIS and PSLM 2008-9

Figure 7.10 Comparative GEI and EDI



Source: NEMIS and PSLM 2008-9

Figure 7.11 Pre-primary GER



Source: Balochistan Provincial EFA and ECE Plans 2011

Goal 1: Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children;

Enrolment in Katchi class cannot be considered as the desired ECE. ECE’s data has not been classified separately by the BEMIS and therefore the indicator’s trend cannot be calculated. The provincial EFA plan has calculated ECE enrolment for Balochistan at 47 which has been provided as the present situation.

Goal 2: Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality;

The Primary Net Enrolment Ratio is target for this goal. “According to projections based on past trend Balochistan will reach NER of 72 overall, 85 for males and 58 for females by which year?. This falls far below the target of 100 required by EFA. At current trend Balochistan will achieve this target between 2026 and 2027” (UNESCO, 2011).

Goal 3: Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and lifeskills programs;

The projections based on FEA Mid-Decade Assessment report show that the target achieved by 2015 will be 72 overall (91.7 for males and 37.4 for females). At the current trend the target will be achieved by Balochistan.

Goal 4: Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults;

The provincial EFA Plan has set target for 10+ populations adult literacy at 64% while provincial targets have not been separately given in the NPA and it gave the target of 86%. Balochistan will fail to meet the target for both male and female. On the basis of PSLM data Balochistan would reach at 42% for the province (60% for males and 21% for females). At the current trend, the target will be achieved by 2046 (UNESCO, 2011).

Goal 5: Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality;

Balochistan appears to be completely away to achieve the target of GPI. The improvements are there but they are at a slow rate. The situation for GPI based on primary and secondary GERs is 0.57 for 2009-10 and 0.59 projected for 2015. GPI targeted for 2015 is 1 and it is projected to fall below the required level if the current trend continues. At current rate the target will be achieved by 2035.

Goal 6: Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills EFA focuses on both access and quality. EFA uses two proxy indicators for quality (i) survival rate to grade 5 and (ii) teacher pupil ratio at primary. High drop out and low survival rate is impacted quality..

The pupil student ratio in Balochistan is 1:21, with male 1:21 and female 1:26 which is considered a good range and apparently reflects good quality but ground realities are different due to lack of rationalization and variation of ratio across urban and rural areas (BEMIS, 2011). At current trend the indicator will be achieved only by 2029.

The indicators under Goal 2, goal 3 and goal 6 overlaps with the one of the three relevant education indicators of Goal 2 of the MDG while indicator under goal 5 overlaps with the one of the three relevant education indicators of Goal 3 of the MDGs.


7.5. Financial resources allocation

There is trend of continuous increase in total budget of education sector but, unfortunately, there is a decrease of the share of development expenditure in the total. Major share is allocated for recurrent cost and it goes to salaries. The time scale decision increased the potential financial problem in Balochistan.

Table 7.2 Actual Expenditures and Share of Education (PKR million)						
	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10
Share of Education in Total Expenditure	13%	15%	15%	14%	15%	17%
Share of Development Expenditure	14%	9%	8%	6%	8%	8%

Source: UNESCO; Policy Analysis Education in Balochistan, 2011

Figure 7.12 Budget analysis from 2004-05 to 2009-10



Source: UNESCO; Policy Analysis Education in Balochistan, 2011

8. Problems and Challenges

After the 18th Amendment in the Constitution, Ministry of Education has been devolved to the provinces and education has become now a provincial subject. The changes have been made in key areas of education sector. The Curriculum and Syllabus, Centres of Excellence, Standards of Education up to Grade 12, and Islamic Education has been transferred to Provinces.

The amendment has positive impact on provincial attitude. In Balochistan, there is a challenge of ownership of quality of education and to achieve the targets in accordance with the international commitments. The big challenge for Government of Balochistan is a careful understanding of the limitations and existing capacity of the provincial Education department. Balochistan has following major challenges to achieve the targets of EFA and MDGs;

- Ensure access to education at all levels for all settlements in the province, particularly in remote areas;
- Formalization of ECE in all primary schools and provision infrastructure and learning material for ECE;
- Ensure Universal Primary Education;
- Increase enrollment in middle and high schools;

- Increase transition rates from primary to middle and middle to secondary ;
- Improve survival rates at all levels of education;
- Reduce gender disparities at all level;
- Funding for implementation of provincial literacy plan;
- Awareness of community, and;
- Improve governance;

9. Recommendations

Following recommendations were given by the participants who attended Round Table Forum held at Serena Hotel Quetta:

(i) Governance

- Balochistan Government , particularly Education Department,, should improve the governance and ensure quality of service delivery;
- Government should improve the monitoring and evaluation system to improve the access and quality education;

(ii) Policy Reforms

- Education Sector Plan is being prepared by Balochistan Government in which all stakeholders may be involved in the preparation of Educator Sector Plan before finalization;
- Gender equality must be integral part of overall strategy of provincial Education Sector Plan that can be achieved by employing females in educational institutions;
- Strategy may be developed which may create de facto freedom access to education for girls and improve quality education;

(iii) Access to education

- All settlements in the province should be mapped and access to education may be provided to all population;
- Multiple approaches of service delivery i.e. community supported schools, public- private partnerships and evening classes for middle school education in existing buildings may started at those places where education facilities are not available;
- Non-Formal Education at primary level may be strengthened to target the dropout children and bringing them back into mainstream education;
- Special awareness and advocacy campaign may started within the communities to improve survival rates and improvements in quality education ;
- Model schools should be established as pilot to ensure quality education;

(iv) Gender Disparity

- Education is equal right of male and female, the provincial Education Sector Plan may assert the importance of girls education and it may be guaranteed at all levels of education;
- Gender participation should be improved by providing the opportunities for girls education and female teachers may be appointed for primary schools;

(v) Budget allocations

- Provincial budget allocation foreducation, particularly for development, may beincreased andviable strategy may be developed for sustainable support from donorsto improve access. relevance and quality education at secondary level of education;

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Early Marriages; An Invisible Sword of Patriarchy

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About the Author

Ms. Anbreen Ajaib is known women's rights activist and is working in development sector for last 13 years. Major areas of her work include women empowerment, advocacy on women's rights, project planning and implementation monitoring and evaluation, training on gender and contemporary management themes and working with men on women's rights. Ms Anbreen Ajaib has two masters' degrees, M.A in Human Rights and Social Justice from London Metropolitan University London, UK and M.Sc. in Organizational Psychology from Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad. She also has a diploma in Social Enterprise Management from Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) Lahore.

Anbreen's earlier publications in addition to different articles published in newspapers include, paper on "addressing violence against girls in and out of school" published in a book titled "Combating gender based violence at Schools" edited by professor Fiona Leach of University of Sussex and "Youth Strategy Paper" printed by ActionAid.

ACRONYMS

CEDAW	Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DISHA	Development Initiative for Healthy Adolescent
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICRW	International Centre for Research on Women
MDG's	Millennium Development Goals
MFLO	Muslim Family Laws Ordinances
NGOs	Non Government Organizations
NCRW	National Council for Research on Women
PUCL	People's Union for Civil Liberties
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNCRC	United Nations Convention on the Right's of the Child
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF	United Nations International Children Emergency Fund

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Anbreen Ajaib

ABSTRACT

This discussion paper is a critical review of Child Marriage of girls in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The factors contributing to or perpetuating child marriage in this region and their consequences on girls, families and society has been explored. Early marriages of girls is a violation of their human rights but these States are under the influence of deep rooted patriarchal norms and take human rights as Eurocentric. Therefore, implementation of international treaties takes place in a selective manner.

The Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the United Nations Convention on the Right's of the Child (UNCRC) have been discussed as major international instruments which advocate girls' and women's rights. The reasons behind their lack of effectiveness to address child marriages has been explored in the light of cultural relativism and universalism. And the domestic laws of these States have been reviewed in relation to CEDAW and UNCRC.

The author aims to prove early marriages a violation of fundamental human rights of women and girls and argues that the issue can be addressed only through a sensitized approach towards ending this tradition, improving legislation by removing discriminatory laws, and by developing awareness mechanisms at a local and national level.

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

Child marriage, as defined by UNICEF, is marriage prior to the age of 18 years¹, is a hard reality for over 60 million women worldwide². This practice has decreased at a global level over the past 20 years, however, although increasingly recognized as a human rights violation there is still a significant incidence of this practice which makes it an important issue to discuss³. Marriage of female minors remains strikingly common across South Asia, where over half of all child marriages occur⁴. The practice of child marriage is among one of the many exploitations of women and girls' rights⁵. The reports of UNICEF and that of the National Council for Research on Women (NCRW) indicate that around 30-70% of married young women in South Asian nations (i.e. Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Pakistan) are married before they reach 18 years of age. And hundreds of women from the infant age of three years become prey to customs like *Vani* and *Swara* in Pakistan.⁶

Several factors which reinforce this tradition include poverty, limited access to education, the concept of "virginity" of an unmarried girl as important to a family's honour, family structure (joint or nuclear), religious interpretation of being an adult, and low employment opportunities result in complete dependence of these girls on their male relatives. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India as part of the Indian subcontinent share similar history, culture and traditions. Religion and culture are used as a justification for not introducing or implementing laws in favour of women and girls. Although the apparent image of Bangladesh and Pakistan is that of a conservative Muslim State, and India presents itself as a secular State, all three states behave in a similar way when it comes to women and girls' rights. In these countries society supports the subordinate status of women by appreciating this dependence. Women and girls continue to compromise their rights including teenage marriage just to seek this appreciation. Religious interpretations also support teenage marriages by linking the age of a girl to adulthood with the onset of puberty, and the parents are meant to marry her as soon as possible after reaching puberty. The laws in these states also support teenage marriage by defining the age of a child differently for boys and girls.

The impact of teenage marriage on girls is appalling. The report of the NCRW indicates the adverse impact of this issue on national development, vocational opportunities, education and women's health. These girls together with their marriage agreement enter into a vicious circle of violence and exploitation of their rights as an equal human being. This starts from exploitation of their rights as a child to their rights as a woman. The extremely diverse impact of early marriages leads to a series of different types of violence against women and girls throughout their lives. Honour killing, domestic violence, denial of human rights like freedom of choice, right to education and sometimes even the right to life are strongly linked with early marriage. Early marriage is reinforced by these factors and vice versa. It results in a denial of their rights to education, health, pleasure and decision making as a child, leading to risks to life and health by becoming young mothers after marriage. A woman's self esteem is badly damaged, and she is expected to perform a role of an adult woman with her in-laws. This expectation from a teenage girl to behave like an adult woman leads to continuous exploitation and denial of her rights to make decisions leading to a life time of dependence on the male relatives for each major or minor decision. The story does not end here. This disempowered, dependent and subordinate woman when she becomes a mother, transfers the same values to her daughter and vicious cycle continues.

The continuous violations of human rights of women and girls in the region have resulted in the disappearance of women from the public sphere. To Peter and Wolper, these violations are deliberate

1 UNICEF. Progress for Children. Protecting against abuse, exploitation and violence. Child Marriage. 2007. [March 18, 2008]. http://www.unicef.org/progressforchildren/2007n6/index_41848.htm

2 Law Commission of India. Proposal to Amend the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 and Other Allied Laws 205th Report. (February 2008)

3 Saardchom N, Lemaire J. Causes of increasing age at marriage an international regression study. *Marriage & Family Rev.* 2005;37(3):73-97

4 UNFPA. State of the World Population, 2005. Child Marriage Fact Sheet. (March 18 2008), http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/presskit/factsheets/facts_child_marriage.htm.

5 Saardchom N, Lemaire J, op cit

6 *Vani* and *Swara* are traditions in which women are handed over to an enemy in order to resolve a dispute

to maintain a woman's subordinate status.⁷ Knowing that the UN calls upon maintaining civil and political rights of all individuals without any discrimination on any basis, and that these countries have ratified international human rights documents like CEDAW and UNCRC, the situation on the ground unfortunately does not reflect enough effectiveness of these documents.

The reports on implementation of UNCRC and CEDAW from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India show that the documents have been partially incorporated into domestic laws. A token coverage is observed for the 'relatively acceptable' rights including right to education, health or elimination of child labour in the laws of the countries in this study, but the denial of accepting the rights of some controversial issues like choosing religion, combating child marriages, and defining the age of a child 'especially that of girl child has been a matter of serious concern for human rights activists in these states. Rights to education and health have only been covered by ensuring access of children to school⁸ or health facilities while there is no mechanism or only a weak system to ensure children's education especially for girls.

Both the UNCRC and CEDAW aim to promote protection of women and girls, however reservations on these documents and their lack of implementation make them ineffective. Countries often sign treaties to prevent international condemnation and give citizens the bare minimum of protection, and also justify violations of abuse as a result of lack of resources, therefore limiting the effectiveness of these international instruments.

Cultural relativism and universalism are crucial when it comes to exploitation of human rights and effectiveness of human rights treaties like CEDAW and UNCRC. Conflict arises amongst professionals when human rights created with western individualistic values displace the values of collective societies. At the same time, individuals from the west find cultural practices appalling and a distinct violation of fundamental human rights leading to a continuing debate on individual versus collective rights.⁹

"Cultural relativism promotes the equality of all cultures without superiority of any culture over the other; displacing the ethnocentric view of universalism. It claims that comparing societies on the basis of systems of morality, law and politics is not ethical. Instead, it is proposed that society value other cultures and attempt to understand their activities and beliefs subjectively rather than object 'others' to assimilate to own values". Source check

This definition of cultural relativism overlooks the in-depth importance of individuals and the power division among them in a particular culture hence encouraging the powerful to suppress the powerless without being questioned by international institutions. Hence, this notion of cultural relativism weakens the effectiveness of international human rights treaties like CEDAW and UNCRC in these countries although they have signed them and are supposed to implement them effectively. This is clearly observed when it comes to rights of women and children especially girls. Universalism on the other hand gives space to individuals to raise their voice against any exploitation.

Women's rights in South Asia have been a serious concern for human rights activists. There have been some good efforts by NGOs, UN local offices and states themselves to address the issue. However, the results of these efforts have not been very successful. There is a need to build upon these efforts to bring tangible results.

The purpose of this paper is to initiate a debate on girl child marriages in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India as a form of systematic violence against women, starting from violence against the girl child. The paper highlights the intensity of early marriages, explores the factors and causes reinforcing child marriage and discusses the impact of child marriage on women and society. The other purpose is to identify the gaps in existing legislation and reasons behind these gaps. An effort is made to find out the deep rooted reasons for CEDAW and UNCRC being less effective in the light of cultural relativism and

7 Peters and Wolper, (P169), Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspective

8 Access means only physical access; distance from schools, but the factors reducing access like permission for girls to go to school, financial support or age for girls to get married has not been addressed in all the three countries.

9 Hart Publishing Babbie, E.R., (2010), The Practice of Social Research

universalism. And lastly the paper aims to reflect on work done by different actors to address this issue and to draw recommendations based on these interventions.

This paper is organised in the following sections:

Section One: Overview and Introduction to the issue of child marriage.

Section Two: focuses on the situation analysis of each country, and a brief comparison of early marriages in relation to Child Marriages and violence against women.

Section Three: highlights factors contributing to the situation in each country, and emphasises the commonalities and differences in the context of factors effecting the situation.

Section Four: presents the impact of early marriage on girls the family as a unit and on society.

Section Five: critically reviews UNCRC and CEDAW both as international instruments as well as their implementation in the states being studied. The mechanisms of reporting and implementation of these documents through domestic law are discussed and a comparison is made between the laws of all the three states related to women's rights.

Section Six: highlights the philosophical debate on cultural relativism and universalism as the main factors influencing the acceptability of international documents.

Section Seven: offers some suggestions on how the situation can be changed. The work of the United Nations, changes needed in domestic laws of the states in the discussion and programmes of NGOs in this context is discussed, and a comparison is made in order to make some recommendations on the basis of achievements and limitations.

Section Eight: a conclusion based on discussions in the previous sections.

SECTION 2:

EARLY MARRIAGES OF GIRLS; A SITUATION ANALYSIS OF INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BANGLADESH, IN RELATION TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Child marriage is a serious concern for over 60 million women worldwide¹⁰. The issue has been increasingly recognized as a serious violation of women's human rights.^{11,12} Although a decrease in the intensity has been observed worldwide, it remains persistent across South Asia, where over half of all child marriages occur. The reports of UNICEF and that of the International Council for Research on Women indicate that around 30-70% of married women in South Asian nations (i.e., Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Pakistan) are married before reaching the age of 18 years. The inclusion of infant mortality and women's empowerment in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) calls upon it as a priority to be understood¹³ and reinforces the urgent need to understand the phenomenon of child marriage and its impact on maternal and child health. The situation is more important in the context of South Asia where more than one-third of all maternal and child deaths occur.¹⁴ Little empirical research has been published in the past on this issue or the related public health consequences, despite the pervasiveness and severe consequences ascribed to this practice. This has created a critical gap hindering the work of both practitioners and policy makers¹⁵ to address the issue of child marriage and its link with maternal health.

In South Asia in 2005, 48% (nearly 10 million) young women were married before the age of 18 years¹⁶. Nearly half 45% of young women in India marry (begin cohabiting with their husband) before age 18, the legal age of marriage for women¹⁷. Government reports in the Indian State of Gujarat show that over half of the women below the age of 15 who died committed suicide. However, police reports show that in many cases of alleged suicide, the victim had actually been poisoned, beaten, drowned, burned or hanged to death. Those who were successful at committing suicide did so in order to escape their husbands or mother in laws¹⁸ (Levesque 1999). In another report, child marriage was reported by 44.5% of Indian women ages 20-24 years; 22.6% reported marriage prior to age 16 years, and 2.6% were married prior to age 13 years¹⁹.

Laws against child marriages have existed in India since 1929 and at that time the legal age of marriage was set at 12 years²⁰. The legal age for marriage was increased to 18 years for girls in 1978²¹. The population-based estimate on child marriage in India published in two different reports from 1998-1999, reveal that 50% of women 20-24 years were married as children.²²

In Bangladesh many girls are married soon after puberty, partly to release their parents from an economic burden and partly to protect the girls' sexual purity. When a girl's family is very poor or she has lost her parents, she may be married as a third or fourth wife to a much older man, to fulfil the role of a sexual and domestic servant²³. Bangladesh's demographic and health survey of 1996-1997, reveals 13.7%

10 UNICEF. Progress for Children. Protecting against abuse, exploitation and violence. Child Marriage. 2007. (March 18, 2008). http://www.unicef.org/progressforchildren/2007n6/index_41848.htm

11 UNICEF. Early Marriage: Child Spouses. Innocent Digest. No. 7, [March 18, 2008]. <http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/digest7e.pdf>

12 Saardchom N, Lemaire J, op cit

13 United Nations. UN Millennium Development Goals. [March 18, 2011]. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

14 Bhutta ZA, Gupta I, de' Silva H, Manandhar D, Awasthi S, Moazzem Hossain SM, Salam MA. Maternal and child health: Is South Asia ready for change, *BMJ*. 2004; 328:816-819

15 Raj Anita, Prevalence of Child Marriage and its Impact on the Fertility and Fertility Control Behaviors of Young Women in India, Published online (March 2009), doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60246-4

16 Early Marriage: A Harmful Traditional Practice: A Statistical Exploration, UNICEF, 2005

17 N. M. Moore et al (2009)

18 Levesque, Sexual Abuse of Children: A Human Rights Perspective 1999, P132

19 Raj Anita, Prevalence of Child Marriage and its Impact on the Fertility and Fertility Control Behaviors of Young Women in India, Published online, (March 9, 2009), doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60246-4

20 ibid

21 National Council for Research on Women. New Insights on Preventing Child Marriage: A Global Analysis of Factors and Programmes. April 2007. [March 18, 2011]. <http://www.icrw.org/docs/2007-new-insights-preventing-child-marriage.pdf>

22 UNICEF. Progress for Children. Protecting against abuse, exploitation and violence. Child Marriage. 2007. [March 18, 2011] http://www.unicef.org/progressforchildren/2007n6/index_41848.htm.

23 Innocent Digest No 7, UNICEF March 2001

of adolescents comprise girls. The survey further states that half the girls below 19 were married and 5% of 10-14 year old girls were married²⁴. Another survey of women among the age group of 25-29 years old reported that in Bangladesh 81% were married before the age of 18 years. The lowest age at marriage is found in the western and southern parts of Bangladesh – specifically those adjoining India²⁵. Caldwell quotes that marriage in Bangladesh was traditionally very early. Among Hindus, in particular, child marriage – marriage before menarche - was common²⁶. World Marriage Pattern 2000 of the UN Economic Development and Social Affairs report that in Bangladesh, 51 percent of girls are married by age 18²⁷.

A survey of adults 25-29 years old revealed that in Pakistan 37% of girls were married before the legal age, which was 16 years at the time of the survey.²⁸ In Pakistan, as in other countries of South Asia, early marriage is more common in rural areas. Also people living in rural areas observe traditions more than those who live in urban areas.

Exploring the link between violence against women and early marriages

Violence against women and girls is a serious issue in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Women and girls are stigmatized, tortured and discriminated in the name of religion and culture. Common forms of violence against women and girls in the Indian subcontinent include domestic violence, honour based violence and killing, bride price, early marriages, forced marriages, rape and trafficking. The scope of this paper is child marriages of girl, however this gender based violence is strongly linked with all the crimes mentioned above. Therefore, it is important to discuss these crimes and address the link of child marriages with them.

Most young girls especially those who are disempowered have no decision making power, and do not have the courage to oppose violence. The traditions and culture in the Indian subcontinent are patriarchal and provide enough legitimacy to violence against women and girls in certain prescribed forms and given contexts. Jahan (1988) relates this acceptance, legitimacy and tolerance for violence against women to the deeply embedded gender inequality in the social structure of Bangladesh; she argues that all Bangladesh social institutions permit and even encourage the demonstration of unequal power relations between the sexes²⁹.

Pakistan has the worst examples of violence against women and girls. Religious extremism a, strong patriarchal society and weak laws contribute to a raise in the number cases of violence against women and girls. Aurat Foundation (a women's rights organization) quotes 608 reported cases of domestic violence and a total of 7,571 reported cases of different types of violence against women including dowry violence, sexual violence, acid burning and honour killing in 2008³⁰. This report is based on news from the print media, and the actual number of cases is expected to be much higher because several cases go unreported.

The situation in India is similar. Up to 45% of married men acknowledged physical abuse to their wives, according to a 1996 survey of 6,902 men in the state of Uttar Pradesh India³¹. Although the report does not provide the age of women facing domestic violence, however, a general understanding is that young and disempowered women/girls face more domestic violence. This finding shows a strong link between violence against women and patriarchy which supports the status quo with preference to early marriages when girls are very young and are kept out of any empowerment process. These girls along with the marriage agreement enter into a vicious cycle of violence and exploitation of their rights as an equal human being. This starts from exploitation of their rights as a child to their rights as a woman.

24 The State of the World's Children, UNICEF, 2007

25 National Institute of Population Research and Training, Mitra and Associates and ORC Macro, 2005.

26 Caldwell "Age at marriage in South Asia; Session 4"

27 World Marriage Patterns 2000

28 Early Marriage, Child Spouses, UNICEF, Innocent Research Center, Florence, Italy, March 2001

29 Jahan 1988, Hidden Wounds, Visible Scars: Violence Against Women in Bangladesh

30 February 1, 2010: Aurat Foundation – Statistics of violence against women in Pakistan in 2009

31 Innocent Digest 6 (June 2000), UNICEF

Early marriage results in a denial of their rights to education, health, pleasure and decision making as a child leading to domestic violence, risks to life and health by becoming early mothers after marriage. Their self esteem is badly damaged. They are expected to perform the role of an adult woman with their in-laws. This expectation from a teenage girl to behave like an adult woman leads to continuous exploitation and denial of their rights to make decisions leading to a lifetime of dependence on male relatives for each major or minor decision. The story does not end here; when this disempowered, dependent and subordinate woman becomes a mother, she transfers the same values to her daughter and vicious circle continues.

The summary of the discussion above is that statistics of early marriages in all the three countries being discussed is extremely alarming. Girls who enter an early marriage actually enter a continuous circle of violence and discrimination. Violence against women is strongly linked with the disempowerment of women, which is reinforced through early marriages. Therefore, if the statistics of early marriages are reduced through sincere efforts by states, violence against women would be reduced, because the unmarried girls would endeavour to achieve their rights like education, economic, social and political rights and would be able to make decisions independently. In order to do this, it is important to explore the factors which reinforce the tradition of early marriages. In the next section, the factors contributing to early marriages of girls in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India is explored.

SECTION 3:

FACTORS REINFORCING GIRL CHILD MARRIAGES

The reasons or factors reinforcing teenage marriages of girls are very similar in the sub-continent. This is because they share the same history and culture. Despite the political and geographical division of the subcontinent into three countries, the communities share similar values, traditions and customs.

Customs related to marriage, including the desirable age and the spouse selection process depends on how society views the individual, role of a family, its structure and collective responsibilities of its members. The idea and function of ‘family’ varies across the world and is constantly evolving³². In Europe people marry as adults with some experience of life, it is therefore alien for them to imagine parental choice for a spouse. Since Roman times, both partners’ free consent was accepted as a right in this region.³³ This consent, and the relative independence for marriage partners, is absent from the systems of marriages where the girl is absorbed into the household of her in-laws and is expected to take on the role of the mother-in-law’s subordinate and helper. A significant difference between marriage customs in many countries of the developing world and the industrialized world is that in the former, these customs tend to support high fertility even where overall fertility levels are falling³⁴.

In all three countries in this study there is a strong preference for the joint family system. Marriage is taken as a union of two families instead of individuals and is expected to provide families essential support in uncertain situations. Caldwell quotes a widely believed view of the Bangladesh community that early marriage for girls made them more compliant towards their new family circumstances, and in particular of the authority of their husbands, and in-laws. The girls were married so early that in many cases they were virtually brought up by the husband’s family. Caldwell further argues that early marriage is perceived particularly by Hindus to be in keeping with the notion of the “joint family”, where ideally property is held jointly with the husband, his brothers and father³⁵. The argument is equally valid for India and Pakistan where joint family systems prevail and are condoned.

One reason for early marriage is to ensure that a wife is ‘protected’, or placed firmly under male control. It also ensures that she is submissive to her husband and works hard for her in-laws’ household; that the children she bears are ‘legitimate’; and that bonds of affection between couples do not undermine the family unit³⁶. The younger the girl at the age of marriage, the greater the possibility to control her. In many underdeveloped countries the adolescence of girls is an alien concept. A girl who is menstruating can bear a child therefore she is considered ‘a woman’³⁷. This concept is then supported by the religious interpretations in Hinduism and Islam. This is an obvious contradiction with the fact that the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) covers everyone up to age 18 and regards childhood as a process of development – one that does not end with a definitive physical maturity marker. In many societies, a girl is raised to show self-control and deference to men that will be expected of her throughout life³⁸. By the age of five, a girl in rural Pakistan has learnt to ‘go outside’ as little as possible and adopt ‘an attitude of care and service towards men’³⁹.

Poverty is another major factor contributing to early marriage of girls. Where poverty is acute, a young girl may be regarded as an economic burden and her marriage to a much older – sometimes even elderly – man, a practice common in the South Asian societies, is a family survival strategy, and may even be seen as in her interest⁴⁰. In Bangladesh, poverty-stricken parents are persuaded to part with their daughters through promises of marriage, or by false marriages, which are used to attract the girls into prostitution abroad⁴¹. Many families of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh settled in the United Kingdom

32 Boyden, Jo with UNESCO (1993), *Families: Celebration and Hope in a World of Change*, Gaia Books, UK

33 Rawson Beryl ed, (1991), *Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome*, Clarendon Press, Oxford

34 Innocent Digest 7, UNICEF, (March 2001) <http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest7e.pdf>

35 Caldwell (2005: 5), Factors affecting female age at marriage in South Asia

36 Caldwell, (1977), ‘Role of Marital Sexual Abstinence in Determining Fertility

37 Innocent Digest 7, UNICEF

38 ibid

39 National Commission on Status of Women Report, 1989

40 Innocent Digest 7, op cit

41 Kabir (1998), *Adolescent Girls in Bangladesh*

(UK) send their British daughters to visit ‘home’ and forcibly marry them to men in order to resettle them in the UK for economic reasons⁴². And this can be achieved conveniently with young girls instead of adult women. Ajitha Memon quotes the Union Health Ministry recording the highest teenage marriages and pregnancies in the Indian state of Bengal. The report quotes poverty and gender bias in education as the main causes of early marriages⁴³. The tradition of dowry is also reported as an important factor which reinforces early marriages⁴⁴. Many poor families arrange their daughter’s marriage as soon as they find a prospective husband. For younger girls, there is less demand of a dowry. This argument is further supported by a news release in ‘The Hindu’ quoting a report by the Women’s Studies Research Centre, which found the high rate of early marriages of girls in Bengal as an escape from the demand of a high dowry. The human traffickers approach the villagers in the guise of “grooms” without a demand for a dowry, and lure them into marrying minor girls. These girls are then sold and sent to places like Mumbai, Dubai or Kashmir⁴⁵. Caldwell et al, argue that the tradition of dowry may have delayed female marriage in India while parents save for dowry⁴⁶, but a dowry can also act to hasten marriages for older brides who may require higher dowries. An important cost of many marriages in Bangladesh is the marriage payment. Traditionally the main marriage payment for Muslims and most Hindu castes was the bride-price⁴⁷, referred to in Bangladesh as “*pawn*” and in Islamic parlance as “*mahr*”⁴⁸. In recent years, however, a new form of dowry, referred to as “*joutuk*” or by the English term ‘demand’ has spread through the population, which is a payment made with the explicit intention of attracting ‘a suitable boy’⁴⁹.

Protecting the chastity of young girls as a symbol of honour is another reason for child marriage. And the loss of virginity before marriage is perceived as an attack on the family’s honour which results in honour crimes/killings. Parents and society encourage early marriages of girls to save their family’s honour. Honour crimes are very common in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Violated family honour may result in the murder of the offending woman, in some cases, purely on the suspicion of illicit sexual relations⁵⁰. This tradition is one of the main reasons to encourage child marriages of girls. To Shaheed (1994) the bodies of women and girls are seen as a battle field for the dispute between men of different families, casts or class. She holds the government responsible as the main perpetrator of violence because it has not adapted punitive and transparent measures against perpetrators and because of drafting weak legislation. ⁵¹.

The adult age of a girl is defined by puberty in different laws of these countries and in religious interpretations of Islam and Hinduism. This link between adult age and puberty supports discrimination against girls, and encourages child marriages of girls soon after reaching puberty. In many areas (especially in poorer, more traditional states) of India the prevailing practice is that child marriages indicate prestige⁵². Girls are promised in marriage although they may start living with their husbands after puberty and the marriage is sanctified through the ceremony of “*gauna*”⁵³. The practice is closely tied to widespread norms aimed at preserving female chastity and preventing premarital sex, and young women have little say in their parents’ decision on when and whom they marry⁵⁴. Maloney et al,⁵⁵ report the belief of many of their Hindu respondents in Bangladesh that for a girl to be married at 8 years was admirable. If a girl had her first menstruation while living with her parents, it is considered a disgrace for her family. Under Muslim law guardians do not have the right to contract marriage for a pre-pubescent girl⁵⁶, but clearly the Hindu example has influenced Bangladesh’s Muslims⁵⁷.

42 Innocent Digest 7, op cit

43 Ajitha Memon (2010), Women’s Feature Service, One World South Asia

44 Ibid

45 The Hindu (2007), <http://www.hindu.com/2007/07/19/stories/2007071956291300.htm>

46 Caldwell (1988), ‘The Causes of Marriage, Change’ in The Causes of Demographic Change

47 Caldwell (2005, P14-17), Factors affecting female age at marriage in South Asia

48 Amin and Cain (1997: 291-93), ‘The rise of dowry in Bangladesh’ in The Continuing Demographic Transition

49 Ibid

50 Iqbal 1990, Crimes Against Women in Pakistan

51 Farida Shaheed, (1994, P213-219) “Experience in Pakistan” in Women & Violence

52 IIPS India (1992-93), India: National Family Health Survey

53 IIPS India (2005-06), missing

54 Das Gupta et al (2008), Lessons from Programs and policies to delay marriage for girls in India

55 Maloney et al. (1981, P86), Beliefs and Fertility in Bangladesh

56 Jhabvala (1975, P28 cited in Maloney et al. 1981: 87)

57 Caldwell (2005, P5), Factors affecting female age at marriage in South Asia

The efforts of securing the virginity of girls in the name of honour, the influence of an extended family on parents, and the appreciation for parents who marry their girls at an early age creates social pressure on a couple to marry their daughters when they are young. This is because of the prevailing norm that marriage is the responsibility of the family, and it is the parent's duty to arrange their daughter's marriage. Caldwell quotes that apart from protecting family norms the major pressure for early female marriage is the fear of the consequences of delayed marriage for the girl and her family⁵⁸. For Hindus it is critical to prevent intermarriage between different castes: for the fear of disastrous consequences for all families involved. For Muslims premarital sexual activity or even 'unchaste' behaviour challenges not only the young woman's virtue but also the *izzat* (honour) of her family members^{59,60,61}. In order to keep this honour and gain the community's approval parents prefer to marry their daughters when they are very young. This is further encouraged by the lack of a respected role for an unmarried adult woman in these communities; no matter how much their economic contribution to society. Indeed, the presence of an unmarried daughter leads to social disapproval. Kotalova⁶² comments that 'a daughter is a debt of honour and there is hardly a more shameful failure for a man than the inability to marry off his daughter/sister.'

The lack of education opportunities and a biased curriculum also plays a significant role in reinforcing early marriages in girls. Most of the girls either do not have access to education or they are not allowed to continue their studies after primary school. Girls who drop out of school are married immediately. UNICEF claims motherhood among teenagers is nine times greater among girls with no schooling than among women with 12 or more years of education⁶³. All the states put more resources into primary education in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals. As soon as girls finish primary education, many of them are taken out of the education system and get married as soon as their parents find suitable husbands for them.

Weak legislation or the absence of legislation is another important factor which underpins early marriage of girls. The legal age of marriage for girls in Pakistan⁶⁴ is 16 years and a person who marries his daughter/sister before 16 is charged a fine of Rs. 1,000 (around US\$11)⁶⁵.

"Under the Muslim Personal Law, a girl under the age of sixteen years is, in view of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, incompetent to contract a marriage. Although the law does not permit the marriage of a girl below the age of 16 years, however if any marriage of a girl below the age of 16 years is reported, the marriage itself does not become invalid, only the adult husband contracting the marriage or the persons who have arranged the marriage are punished or charged the fine of US\$11."

The other flaw is that if the girl has attained puberty and marries with an adult male of her free will, the marriage is valid under Muslim Law, and the Court acting under Section 491, CRC may permit the marriage. Thus, this ability to bypass the law has increased the practice of selling girls into 'marriage' in exchange for money, settling disputes with the exchange of girls known as *vani* or *swara* and the use of a girl as compensation for crimes⁶⁶.

In India, despite the presence of the Child Marriage Act 2006, child marriages occur because of weak implementation of law.⁶⁷ The report of Marriage India quotes a priest saying, "*We have not received any guidelines or any rules [on the Child Marriage Act], But every year we perform five to eight marriages where they are below 16 years old. Even now we'll be doing so – the dates are booked*".⁶⁸ This quote shows the weak implementation of the law on child marriages in India.

58 Caldwell, Ibid P10

59 Maloney et al. (1981), op cit

60 Kotalova (1996, P71), *Belonging to Others: Cultural Construction of Womanhood in a Village in Bangladesh*

61 White (1992, P153), *Arguing with the Crocodile: Gender and Class in Bangladesh*.

62 Kotalova (1996, P193), op cit

63 Ajitha Menon (2010), op cit

64 The Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929)

65 Child Rights Desk Pakistan (2011), <http://pakistan.childrightsdesk.com/?p=9058>

66 Rangita de Silva de Alwis, (2007, P40), *Child marriage and the practice*

67 Marriage India, *Child marriage comes to an end in India*

68 Ibid

Information from all three countries shows similar factors reinforcing early marriages of girls. It is also apparent that all the causes mentioned in this section are interlinked with each other. All the three states have formulated laws however their implementation is very weak, which shows the reluctance of the states towards eliminating this extreme act of discrimination and violence against women. The unwilling attitude of policy makers is proved by the flaws in laws of Pakistan. A fine of US\$11 is not a difficult penalty for any man to pay and perhaps this is one of the reasons such cases are not reported.

SECTION 4:

IMPACT OF EARLY MARRIAGE ON GIRLS, FAMILIES AND SOCIETY

Child marriage is both a cause and a consequence of the most severe forms of gender based violence. Child marriage is a result of the devaluing of women and the girl child, where the continuous powerlessness and vulnerability of the child bride results in further gender-based violence, often in the form of domestic violence, marital rape, trafficking, deprivation of food, lack of access to information, education, healthcare, and obstacles to mobility⁶⁹.

The impact of child marriage is not just on the individual getting married, it also brings a series of serious repercussions to the family and society. These girls are often married to men who are many years older than them. While being children themselves they have to look after their newborn babies. They have limited knowledge about sex and childbearing leading to health risks to themselves and the children they give birth to⁷⁰. This is one of the reasons that offspring born too early in their mothers' lives are at increased risk of illness and death. Teenage pregnancies, large family size and unplanned child bearing increase the risk of the health of young girls. In India as reported by Moore et al 14% of all adolescents' recent births were unplanned in 2006⁷¹. Moreover, early forced sex with the girl child as a wife has not been recognized as a form of sexual abuse except where warlords or traffickers have recruited girls as sexual slaves⁷². A large proportion of reproductive and sexual health concerns of adolescent girls and women result from early marriage and early pregnancy. In the context of reproductive health the risks faced by young girls include problems at birth when the pelvis and birth canal are still under-developed which leads to an increased risk of complications during birth including protracted labour⁷³. In addition to the complications in pregnancies and child birth, the consequences of child marriage also increase in many cases during the post-natal period. A prolapsed uterus leads to backaches, difficulties while walking, working and sitting for a long time. At times these young girls have to give birth even with a prolapsed uterus, which has a detrimental effect on their reproductive health⁷⁴

Sexual violence is another consequence which young girls face more than those who marry at an adult age. Child brides are usually not in a position to negotiate terms of sex with their husbands who are usually older and have had previous sexual partners⁷⁵. They cannot insist on fidelity or safe sex methods⁷⁶. 'Who's Right to Choose' research in Calcutta, India stated that almost half of the women patients in the hospital interviewed were married at or below the age of 15 with the youngest being married at 7 years. This age group has the second highest rates of vulnerability to sexual violence in marriage (the first highest rate is for those who did not have a dowry). The women had forced sexual intercourse before menstruation began. In these situations girls were sexually active at an earlier age, and sex was painful and many still continued to be forced into sexual activity by their husbands. Although young girls had made their husbands aware of their unwillingness to sexual activity or of pain during sex, in 80% of these cases, the rapes continued.⁷⁷ Vulnerability of these girls to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV is also high because of their husband's lack of fidelity and forced sex with them. The majority of the sexually active girls aged 15-19 in South Asia are married and these adolescent girls tend to have higher rates of HIV infection than their sexually active unmarried peers. Early sexual activity within marriage is more likely to expose young people to sexually transmitted infections rather than sex outside marriage⁷⁸. And unprotected sex is also related to a desire to get pregnant. This desire is further reinforced by the family and society, because in all the three states in this study, women and girls are expected to give birth to children soon after getting married; otherwise they face serious problems

69 Child Marriage and the Law, UNICEF (2007)

70 Early Marriage: op cit

71 Moore. M et al (2009), Adolescent Marriage and Childbearing in India

72 Maggie Black, Taking Action to End Child Marriage, Forum on marriage and the rights of women and girls, December (2005)

73 Ibid

74 Adhkari R K, (2002), Early Marriage and Childbearing: Risks and Consequences

75 Early Marriage and Adolescent Girls: Youth Lens on Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS August 2005.

76 Early Marriage: Fundamental Child Right Violation: Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, Bangladesh

77 Early marriage: op cit.

78 UNFPA (2004) The Implications of Early Marriage for HIV/AIDS Policy

adjusting to their in-laws family. Demographic and health survey data in Bangladesh reveals that on an average 80% of unprotected sex encounters among adolescent girls occurred within marriage⁷⁹.

There is another obvious connection between early marriage and low educational attainment. A young girl when married early loses the opportunities provided through education. The opportunity for girls to acquire skills diminishes when they are prevented from going to school. Educating children is believed to be an agent of change in rural areas⁸⁰. An educated girl will try to educate her daughter creating a trend for girls' education. There is a direct correlation between the number of years of schooling of girls and reduction of chances of early marriages in Bangladesh. A one year postponement of marriage increased schooling by 0.32 years and literacy by 5-10%.⁸¹ It is a common belief in all the three states that investing in girls' education is a waste of resources, because eventually they have to serve another family.⁸² So, a family prefers to keep girls at home after puberty to learn household chores which they are expected to do in their husbands' house.

Severe psychological disorders are also reported among girls who are married at an early age. Psychologists working in the area of emotion and personality argue that when a girl through early marriage loses her childhood, and all the pleasurable emotions attached to it, she has a difficult adolescence and is unable to develop a personality of concern and care. This may lead these girls to perpetuating the same values for others including their own children⁸³. Removing girls from school and getting them married leads to less exposure of girls to the external world. This results in low self-esteem, a reduced sense of identity as an independent person with an independent mind, limited socialization with peers and non-family adults, and considerably less knowledge of what early marriage entails⁸⁴.

Domestic violence is a widely tolerated aspect of violence against women in all the three states. It is perceived as a private issue and any external interference is believed to be unwanted and unethical. Domestic violence is often not recognized as a crime. It is more common for women who were married as children. Women who marry at a younger age are more likely to believe that it is normal for a husband to beat his wife occasionally, and are more likely to suffer domestic violence. Surveys in various countries show that an alarming number of teenage wives are beaten by their spouses. India has the highest level of domestic violence among women married by 18 with a rate of 67%⁸⁵. In Bangladesh domestic violence remains the biggest threat to woman's security. The murder of a wife by her husband accounted for over 70% of reported domestic violence cases involving individuals 13-18 years old in 1998⁸⁶. The incidence of domestic violence is even worse when a teenage girl is married to a teenage boy. The boy is not in a position to provide protection to his wife in such cases, exposing her to further violence. Most of these girls face sexual and physical abuse from males in their in-laws family like their father- in- law and brother- in- law. Moreover, the chances of polygamy increase when the teenage husband grows up and prefers another woman. Thus the practice of early marriage perpetuates different forms of violence against women⁸⁷.

Sexual abuse of teenage girls married to strange men also increases when the traffickers marry these girls and use them as sex workers. Many such marriages are performed under physical and emotional pressure, or when one of the parties gains financially or in kind for arranging the marriage. A research conducted in 2003, revealed that the markets for "purchased" Bangladeshi wives are well established in North India, especially in Uttar Pradesh. Young Bangladeshi girls in the age group of 14-16 are bought by much older men through brokers for as little as one thousand Indian rupees (approximately US\$ 9). In most cases, parents were not aware of the sale or the transaction of money in procuring the girl. Many

79 Ibid

80 Early Marriage: Sexual Exploitation and the Human Rights of Girls, Forum on marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls, (November 2001).

81 Consequences of Early Marriage for Women in Bangladesh, Erica Field, Harvard University.

82 UNICEF, Innocent Research Center, (March 2001)

83 UNICEF ROSA-Early marriages in South Asia

84 Maggie Black, op cit

85 UNICEF (2005), op cit

86 Rachel Kabir, (October 1999), Adolescent Girls in Bangladesh

87 Jyotsna Chatterji, Ending Child Marriage, Consultation Report, Joint Women's Programme, India, (2005-2006)

of them never return to Bangladesh and even those who are allowed to go back to visit their families can only do so without their children, thus ensuring their return to India⁸⁸.

In addition to the individual, and family the society suffers equally from this gender biased tradition. By marrying early, girls lose the opportunity for higher education and are unable to explore employment opportunities in the formal sector. Women comprise half of the population in these three countries. Cultural barriers, traditional gender roles of family nurturing early marriages and fewer opportunities for women in the formal sector limit their employment options to the informal sector alone. Around 90% of Indian working women are associated with the informal sector and not included in official statistics⁸⁹. The Labour Force Survey 1999-2000 shows 14% of women in the total labour force in Pakistan. This figure is increasing as compared to 4% in 1998-99, but is still low when compared to Bangladesh 42% and India 32%⁹⁰. The decision for women to work in the formal economic sector depends upon; nature of employment of the head of the family (mostly males), size of the family, education, age, marital status and many others factors.⁹¹ Early marriage limits the opportunities for girls to learn professional skills required to work in the formal sector, and they are often not allowed to work in the formal sector if their in-laws object. In terms of working in the informal sector even this is only permitted, if there is a family financial crises or if the women are thrown out of the family. While working in the informal sector most women do not have control over their income. The money they earn is managed by male members of the family. As there are no laws to address the rights of working women in the informal sector, therefore by entering this sector they move into another cycle of violence including sexual harassment and abuse. And a lower number of women in the formal sector contributes significantly to an increase in poverty in a society.

From the discussion above it is evident that the consequences of early marriages range from the individual level to the societal level. Girls who are married at an early age suffer from various forms of violence which could be avoided if they were married at a mature age. The women suffer from sexual abuse by their family members as well as by outsiders. They do not get opportunities to earn an income or to have control over their earnings. They go through serious physical and psychological illnesses. As a result they transfer their trauma to their daughters and the vicious cycle continues. The fact of having fewer women in the formal sector leads to more pressure on men to provide all the necessities to large families. As a result the community remains in a continuous poverty cycle which increases with each generation.

88 Blanchet, Therese. (2006), "Bangladesh Girls Sold As Wives in North India

89 John E. Dunlop and Victoria A. Velkoff, (January 1999), Women and the Economy in India

90 World Bank Report 2002, How do Women Decide to Work in Pakistan?, www.pide.org.pk

91 Ibid

SECTION 5:

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAWS IN RELATION TO CEDAW AND UNCRC

Child marriage violates the rights of the girl child to be free from all forms of discrimination, inhuman and degrading treatment, and slavery. This section analyses the different domestic legislation and human rights dimensions of child marriage in the context of UNCRC and CEDAW. Further, the section highlights the issues related to the ineffectiveness of these international treaties in the domestic legislation of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.

An effort has been made to establish a relationship between early marriage and fundamental human rights. The role of both the state and non- state actors have been analysed in the context of international and domestic legislation. All the three countries are signatories of UNCRC and CEDAW, yet the effectiveness of these treaties has not been visible even after several years. In order to understand the reasons of this ineffectiveness of the treaties, it is important to critically review both the treaties as documents and the level of their ownership by all three states.

The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women provides for the prohibition of Child Marriage in Article 16⁹². While child marriage is not referred to directly in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, child marriage is connected to other rights- such as the right to express views freely, the right to protection from all forms of abuse, and the right to be protected from harmful traditional practices - and is frequently addressed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The UNCRC prohibits State parties from permitting or giving validity to a marriage between persons who have not attained their majority⁹³. In the context of the UNCRC, “a child means every human being below the age of 18 years”.

The UNCRC is an important international treaty to be considered while discussing early marriages. There are 192 States as signatories of UNCRC, this makes it the most accepted treaty. The two countries who have not signed are Somalia as a result of their unstable government, and the United States, since the US believes the UNCRC conflicts with their Civil Liberties documents. The UNCRC includes civil and political rights (first generation rights) and social, economic and cultural rights (second generation)⁹⁴.

It took ten years to draft the UNCRC from 1979 to 1989. The UNCRC through recognizing children’s entitlement of human rights reflects a paradigm shift away from the view of the child as a beneficiary of privileges towards a more progressive view of the child as the bearer of legal rights under international law⁹⁵.

The articles of UNCRC which are relevant to highlight early marriage as a violation of human rights include;

Article 1: A child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

Article 2: Freedom from discrimination on any grounds, including sex, religion, ethnic or social origin, birth or other status.

Article 3: In all actions concerning children...the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

Article 6: Maximum support for survival and development.

92 Article 16, states: The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect,

93 Article 16(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989

94 Rangita (2007), op cit

95 Goonesekere, (1997), Children, Law and Justice: A South Asian Perspective

Article 12: The right to express his or her views freely in all matters affecting the child in accordance with age and maturity.

Article 19: The right to protection from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parents, guardian or any other person.

Article 24: The right to health and to access to health services; and to be protected from harmful traditional practices.

Articles 28 and 29: The right to education on the basis of equal opportunity.

Article 34: The right to protection from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.

Article 35: The right to protection from abduction, sale or trafficking.

Article 36: The right to protection from all forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspect of the child's welfare. (Source: Rangita de Silva de Alwis, (2007). Child marriage and the practice; Legislative Reform Paper Series, UNICEF, 2007, P5-6).

The other rights denied by the tradition of early marriage include;

- The right to not be separated from their parents against their will (Article 9).
- The right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas (Article 13).
- The right to rest and leisure, and to participate freely in cultural life (Article 31).

CEDAW the other important treaty has 98 signatories as of 2010. CEDAW aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. In addition to acknowledging the human rights and equality of women CEDAW also binds states to eradicate discrimination inherent in customs and traditions through effective legislation⁹⁶. In Articles 7, 8 and 9 the Convention highlights specific provisions to be adopted to guarantee women the full enjoyment of their civil and political rights on equal terms with men, both at national and international levels. The Convention also provides that betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect and that all necessary action, including legislation, must be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory⁹⁷. The articles which are related to child marriage include Article 1 about elimination of discrimination of all types against women, Article 16 (1) about equality for men and women for entering into marriage, and for choosing a spouse freely and entering into marriage with free and full consent and Article 16 (2) which states “*The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage.*”

In all the three countries in this study, efforts have been made to ensure child rights in the light of UNCRC. Some examples of these initiatives are the follows:

- In a case based on a child's right to food, the Indian Supreme Court in 2001 directed the government to provide free lunches in all government primary schools. Today, India's school midday meal Programme is one of the largest in the world, benefiting more than 100 million children⁹⁸.
- India introduced the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act in 2000 for children in custody⁹⁹.
- A law banning child marriage was passed in December, 2006 by India to address the weaknesses in the Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929¹⁰⁰. The law provides certain positive initiatives for the intervention of courts to prevent child marriages through stay orders¹⁰¹.

96 Article 2(f) and 5(A) of CEDAW

97 Article 16(2) of the CEDAW Convention, (1979)

98 PUCL (People's Union for Civil Liberties) vs Union of India and Others, 196/2001

99 India and UNCRC- Child Line India <http://www.childlineindia.org.in/Juvenile-Justice-Care-and-Protection-of-Children-Act-2000.htm>

100 According to this Act the age limit for a girl to be married was 15 years, therefore many cases of child marriages could not be resolved if the girls were 15 or above.

101 The Bill had been tabled in Parliament in 2004. It was then considered by a Parliamentary Standing Committee and a group of ministers before Cabinet approval was obtained earlier this year.

Steps taken by Bangladesh include;

- Raise in the age of criminal responsibility from 7 years to 9 years¹⁰².
- Primary Education Act 1993 which makes primary education compulsory for all.
- Women and Children Repression Prevention Act¹⁰³ which addresses violence against women and children including torture, sexual abuse, or any other type of violence.

Pakistan has tried to implement UNCRC through the following steps;

- The statement of country delegation team leader in the 52nd Session of the UN Committee on Child Rights which shares the Prime Minister of Pakistan's commitment to raise the budget for education from 2.5% to 4%, raising it gradually to 7% by 2015 making some legislation on child protection and establishment of child protection cells¹⁰⁴.
- The Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929) of Pakistan states that, "*whoever, being a male above eighteen years of age, contracts child marriage shall be punishable with simple imprisonment of one month, or with a fine of one thousand rupees, or with both.*" Under the Muslim Personal Law, a girl under the age of sixteen years is, in view of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, incompetent to contract a marriage.

CEDAW emerged as a women's rights treaty, the most comprehensive treaty and a wonderful addition to the international human rights mechanism. It highlighted women's specific differences and needs as an equal human being. Early marriage is an example of violence against girls in itself, as well as it gives way to a series of violent incidents which occur throughout a woman's life. CEDAW could have been used effectively by the countries in the study to formulate legislation against early marriages by using the overall framework of CEDAW to end discrimination against women (and girls). However, these states could not address the issue successfully through this international treaty.

Although there were provisions in the Protection for Women Act (PPC)¹⁰⁵ for protection of people from violence, and there were a few provisions regarding polygamy, women's maintenance and child custody under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO)¹⁰⁶ but domestic violence against women¹⁰⁷, was never considered under this clause. Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996, and since then a number of changes in the laws related to violence against women and girls have been made.

1. In 2006, the law against honour killing was passed, which declared killing in the name of honour as "murder"¹⁰⁸.
2. The notorious *Hudood Ordinances* were revised with a revision in laws related to rape in 2006. However rape in marriage is not covered under this law.
3. The Domestic Violence Bill was presented in the National Assembly in 2009, but could not be passed because of an objection from a religious group of politicians claiming it as un-Islamic.

In Bangladesh, after the ratification of CEDAW in 1984, several changes/new laws have been introduced to support women against violence, but the family laws are not uniform. Bangladesh has a high population of Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, therefore separate family laws operate under the general laws. The laws focusing on domestic violence are¹⁰⁹ the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1992, related to polygamy and divorce and the Family Courts Ordinance 1985, related to dowry, child custody, guardianship and maintenance.

102 Save The Children, Sweden (2010), United Nations Convention on Child Rights, Monitoring and Reporting.

103 BSAF (2007), Alternative Report on the Implementation of UNCRC in Bangladesh

104 Country delegation Leader's statement on 52nd Session of UN Committee on Child Rights in Geneva

105 Section 32, Pakistan Penal Code (1860)

106 Muslim Family Laws (Act 1961)

107 Domestic violence is related to early marriages as discussed in earlier Sections. Pakistan has no law to address this issue.

108 Protection of Women Criminal Laws Amendment, (Act, 2006)

109 <http://www.wecanendvaw.org/laws/Bangladesh>

India after signing CEDAW in 1993, has passed, 'The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005'. The Act recognizes all forms of abuse and violence against women in the home as a crime and provides protection from violence perpetrated by husband/partner and their families, and acknowledges rape in marriage as an offence¹¹⁰.

As apparent from the examples, all the three states have been trying to incorporate UNCRC and CEDAW in their domestic legislation. However, the statistics of early marriages in all the three states are still alarming. Except for India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have been unable to address domestic violence as a crime or the issue of early marriage which perpetuates domestic violence to a large extent. Let us reflect on the reasons for this ineffectiveness of international treaties.

CEDAW and UNCRC face many different challenges in terms of implementation. One; *Internal*, bring accepted within the UN system and by member States through various implementation procedures, reservations and reporting and two; *External*, resisting extremely effective and strong religious, cultural and social norms, in existence and being followed for a long time.

Internal factors which contribute to make CEDAW and UNCRC less effective include the following:

1. Reporting Procedures

The reporting and reinforcement are not legally binding to the signatory states. In the case of UNCRC, the reports are initially submitted two years after ratification, and every 5 years afterwards. Article 44 of the UNCRC elaborates states' binding for submitting the reports on how they incorporated the UNCRC in their domestic law. Similar bindings are there for CEDAW. These reports are the only form of enforcement and the Committees have limited authority to force the states to submit the report¹¹¹. Moreover, they do not have authority to force the states to incorporate the recommendations by the Committee in their domestic laws.

2. Reservations

The other reason for the ineffectiveness of these treaties is the Reservations on them. There is a general opinion that Reservations on a treaty during signing makes it less effective. These Reservations reduce the overall impact of the UNCRC in member countries. Currently 75 countries have Reservations to the UNCRC, which are often based on the cultural identity of the nation. Pakistan has lifted its Reservations from UNCRC¹¹² however it still has them on CEDAW. Bangladesh and India have Reservations on CEDAW, which allows them justification for not implementing it effectively¹¹³.

Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996 with a Reservation on Article 29(1). Bangladesh did the same in 1984 with a Reservation on Article 2 and 16(1c) whereas India signed the document in 1980, and ratified in July 1993 with Reservations on 5(a), 16(1), 16(2), 29(1)¹¹⁴. Pakistan and India has not signed or ratified the Optional Protocol of CEDAW while Bangladesh signed it in September 2000¹¹⁵. India put Reservations on 5(a), 16(1), 16(2) and 29 of CEDAW using the justification of vast geography, diversified culture and religions. Bangladesh put Reservations on Article 2 claiming it was in conflict with *Sharia* laws and *Sunnah*. Pakistan showed Reservations on Article 29 para 1 without giving any reason. India's Reservation to Article 16 (1& 2) shows its lack of ownership to the issue of domestic violence caused by forced marriages. Pakistan and India's Reservation on article 29 clearly indicates that they do not want any external interference in their legislative process, hence keeping the liberty to make their own laws according to their own choice. The Reservation of Bangladesh to Article 2 does not contradict with any religion as it is only about making non discriminatory laws.

110 <http://www.wecanendvaw.org/laws/India>

111 Riddle Jenifer, 'Making CEDAW universal: A critique of CEDAW's reservation regime under Article 28 and the effectiveness of the reporting process', *George Washington International Law review* 2002

112 Save The Children Sweden (2010), op cit

113 The reservations on CEDAW will be discussed in later para of this Section:

114 http://www.iwraw-ap.org/convention/reservations_parties.htm

115 Ibid

3. Limited efforts of governments in implementation of CEDAW and UNCRC

The states being studied have patriarchal social structures. Lobbying with governments to make laws related to women has been a challenge for women's rights NGOs. The proof that these states are not very supportive to implementation is quite clear from the level of Reservations they have imposed while ratifying CEDAW. The argument is further strengthened by the fact that they ratified CEDAW after 10 years of its inception.

In 1979, when the world was talking about a free world for women in the form of CEDAW which was adopted by the UN General Assembly, the same year was perhaps the most unfortunate for women in Pakistan when Zia-ul-Haq the army dictator introduced the Hudood Ordinances, which is discriminatory legislation against women in the country¹¹⁶. The fact that, it took 8 years for the Sexual Harassment Bill to be presented in the Assembly for its approval in Pakistan¹¹⁷, whereas the laws against women such as *sharia* law (Hudood Ordinances) were formulated, enacted and implemented in weeks shows the selective approach of the State. The Hudood Ordinances were defective and had inherent loopholes and legal grey areas. These Ordinances contributed to increasing the incidence of child marriages, because a girl's right to choose, and to make her own decision were strongly discouraged under these laws. Half hearted efforts of Indian and Bangladesh governments are also quite clear from the legislation mentioned earlier in this section, and their low effectiveness in addressing the issue of child marriage.

The external reasons for CEDAW and UNCRC being less effective include the following:

1. Resistance from the grassroots towards laws reflecting CEDAW

Many communities in these countries have strong religious and cultural customary practices which they are not willing to change. In fact whenever there has been an effort by the State to formulate a law regarding women, there was strong resistance from the communities. A community's lack of knowledge about national and international laws make it easier for patriarchs to build resistance against the laws. Even a majority of literate people do not know the details of CEDAW or UNCRC and hence rely on whatever is said by those they believe are knowledgeable¹¹⁸. States are responsible in this situation as well for not making enough effort to increase awareness among the communities.

Faith based organizations show strong resistance to adopting CEDAW and UNCRC as policy documents. The critique on CEDAW by such organizations is that it has challenged the family structure and respect of women as family traditional roles¹¹⁹. The resistance from the religious groups has been very visible throughout the history of these three countries. Resistance against the Sati Act in India and the Domestic Violence Bill in Pakistan verify these statements.

2. Less coordinated efforts by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Although the role of NGOs have been pro-active in improving the status of women and girls in society, however there have been serious gaps in coordinated efforts in effective implementation of these laws. There are approximately 85,000 NGOs in the South Asian region, 10,000 in Pakistan, 25,000 in India and 19,000 in Bangladesh¹²⁰. Gulzar quotes that these NGOs are supported by donors and hence cannot sustain themselves without donor support. He also highlights the lack of commitment among many NGOs as a reason for a lack of coordinated effort. The other reasons for this lack of coordination among NGOs, is due to lack of resources, less credibility as compared to the government and limited geographical coverage. It is obvious from the discussion that a lot is still required to make UNCRC and CEDAW effective tools to address violence against women and girls, and to eradicate the tradition of early marriage.

116 Shahnaz Iqbal (2007), Widening the base of feminist movement in Pakistan, in Building Feminist Movements and Organizations: Global Perspective, edited by; Lydia Alpizar Duran, et al

117 Efforts started in 2000, and the law was presented in the Assembly for the first time in 2008 and was passed in 2010.

118 Shahnaz Iqbal, op cit

119 <http://www.wf-f.org/CEDAW-ActionAlert.html>

120 Gulzar Sheikh, (2008) NGO Information; Role of NGOs in South Asia,

SECTION 6:

CEDAW AND UNCRC IN THE LIGHT OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND UNIVERSALISM

It has been established that early marriages are a violation of young girl's human rights. It has also been observed that the State of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are less committed than what is expected towards implementation of human rights treaties, which has resulted in weak legislation and even less implementation. To understand the reason behind the State's lack of ownership to UNCRC and CEDAW it is important to understand their response in the context of the philosophical debate on cultural relativism and universalism. All the three states are collective in nature with a greater focus on the community as a whole, hence following MacIntyre's theory. MacIntyre¹²¹ rejects the idea of human rights branding it as fiction, which is "as incapable of proof as are witches." To MacIntyre, a community is prior to the individual. An individual does not mean anything without his/her belongingness to the society he/she lives in. MacIntyre has perhaps ignored the fact that decisions made in a collective community are mostly by those who have power, and there is a chance that individuals within a community may suffer just for being obedient followers.

Human rights are Eurocentric to some scholars¹²², whereas to others they are universal. There have been interesting debates in favour of, and against the universality of human rights. In terms of providing justice, some philosophers keep individual in the center¹²³, while others argue to have a community as a central point which individuals belong to¹²⁴.

The ancient Greeks or Romans did not have the theory of natural or human rights¹²⁵. The notion of subjective rights only appears from the late Middle Ages. Mahoney quotes Aristotle saying, "*a natural commensurability exists between natural abilities and natural rights; those who have greater abilities have correspondingly greater rights*"¹²⁶. Fejfar quotes Hobbs as a positivist who believes that rights are arbitrary social conventions and can be changed or modified by people in order to satisfy their urge to gain power¹²⁷. In patriarchal societies like the ones under study, abilities are measured by the power which is mostly with men. Therefore CEDAW and UNCRC confront a patriarchal mindset and gender biased power when it comes to implementation.

To Bell, the question of universality of human rights is entangled with power politics, catalyzing the debate on cultural relativism and universalism. To Universalists, every person has/should have equal human rights. Universalists do not deny the importance of culture. However, they argue that the individual being is the same in all cultures so this similarity should overcome the cultures¹²⁸. This argument of Bell to have equality of individuals within cultures strengthens the importance of instruments like CEDAW and UNCRC to ensure equality for all including women and children.

Henkin looks at the universality of human rights as the concept that "*every individual has legitimate claims upon his or her society for defined freedoms and benefits; as per rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, incorporated into own laws of states, and translated into international legal obligations. Virtually all societies are also culturally receptive to those basic rights and human needs included in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) reflecting common contemporary moral intuitions. Other rights, however - notably, freedom of expression, religious and ethnic equality, and the equality of women - continue to meet deep resistance*".¹²⁹ Henkin in the second part talks about a selective reception of rights on the basis of culture and the grip of powerful groups who resist the rights of weaker groups like women and children.

121 MacIntyre (1984), *After Virtue* London Duck Worth

122 Makau Mutua (2002), *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique*

123 Rawls (1999) *Theory of Justice*

124 MacIntyre (1984), op cit

125 Mahoney (2007), *The Challenge of Human Rights: origin, development and Significance*

126 *Ibid* p 1

127 Fejfar (2006), *Hobbes, Locke, Natural Law and Natural Rights*

128 Bell (2001), *Negotiating Culture and Human Rights*

129 Henkins (1989), *Universality of the concept of Human rights*

In the context of women's rights, culture is always seen as an impediment. Emphasis is placed on obstacles or barriers rather than empowering women. Article 5A of CEDAW calls upon states to take appropriate measures to address all harmful traditional practices which hinder promotion and protection of women's rights¹³⁰. Brems argues that Article 4 of UNCRC forces state parties to use their maximum available resources to incorporate social economic and cultural rights of children into legislation¹³¹.

Rawls two principle theory justifies the need for having UNCRC and CEDAW as independent documents to ensure the rights of the less privileged. This also responds to critics who question the need for CEDAW or UNCRC when UDHR covers the rights of all human beings. His first principle is about equal right of all to the equal basic liberties, and the second focuses on distribution of resources with a principle of more benefit to the least advantaged. He argues human rights are universal because of their political force in all societies¹³².

For Cook, human rights are by virtue inherent of human dignity, and not dependent on privilege or legal power. Rights are given to those individuals or groups who are marginalized or powerless in a society. Conflict occurs when powerful groups or individuals lose their power or have fear to lose it by transferring it to others. This happens particularly in collective or religious societies where individual rights are ignored in the name of collective rights. Individuals are forced to focus on duties set by divine forces or by society¹³³. This explains the lack of commitment of states to formulate and implement laws related to women in a male dominated policy makers' group.

The international laws may provide a broader framework of systems and rights however, domestic laws are important to internal governance and the state has flexibility in following international laws¹³⁴. The debate shows that in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, culture has been one of the major justifications for not incorporating CEDAW and UNCRC in their true spirit. These countries might have signed these international instruments to gain political mileage at the international level but the commitment to incorporate them remains to be seen.

130 Almqvist (2005 P21), Human Rights, Culture and the Rule of Law

131 Brems (2001 P3.51), Human Rights: Universality and Diversity

132 Rawls (1999), The Law of People: with the idea of public reason revisited

133 Cook (1994 P977), Human Rights and Reproductive Self Determination

134 Higgins (1994), Problems and processes

SECTION 7:

EARLY MARRIAGES – THE WAY FORWARD

Eliminating child marriage needs a diverse strategy. On one hand laws need to be formed or strengthened by minimizing the loopholes and through effective implementation, and simultaneously detailed grass root action is required to bring attitudinal change among the communities of these countries.

Bringing legislative reforms to address early marriage

Issues relating to violence against women including child marriages in the subcontinent are intimately bound up with the legal system¹³⁵. Laws either do not exist, or are too weak to support girls to take stand against violence. There is no particular law for domestic violence in Pakistan. India and Bangladesh have some laws but these are too weak in spirit to support women. The legal reforms can be discussed in two different steps. One; improving the laws themselves and two; defining effective strategies to implement them effectively in all parts of the state.

As mentioned in earlier Sections, the laws on child marriage have serious loopholes making them weaker. The Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929) of Pakistan is discriminatory in defining the age for girls as 16 to be married as compared to that of boys as 18 years. Moreover, under this law marriage to a girl below 16 years is not dissolved, rather the culprit is punished, with one month imprisonment or a fine of Rs. 1,000 (US\$11) or both. Thus, under this law the punishment is not a deterrent and the marriage even after being reported remains in place, keeping the girl in a cycle of violence more intense than before the complaint of an early marriage. The need is to revise this law to ensure its effectiveness. The possible revisions could be to increase the punishment, resolve the marriage and increase the age of girls to 18 years before entering into marriage.

In Bangladesh, the age of a child is different in 36 different child related laws hence there is confusion due to these anomalous definitions of the girl child in different contexts and purposes¹³⁶. It is very detrimental especially for girls, leading to all kind of discrimination and violence including child marriages. Despite having the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act in Bangladesh women and girls are still victims of several cruelties¹³⁷. Perhaps one of the solutions to address this issue is that the laws should have a clear definition of the minimum age of girls as per international standards.

Effective implementation of prevailing laws is another challenge which these states face. India has very a comprehensive law on banning child marriage¹³⁸ however their weak implementation shows the lack of ownership within the legislative system. Although child marriages have been addressed by Indian and international policy makers, the reinforcement of these laws has been virtually impossible. The Indian government has portrayed itself as uncomfortable when dealing with personal laws within distinct communities that are not derived from grassroots movements¹³⁹. The possible intervention to address this issue could be to improve implementation mechanisms through building smaller units of the justice system, increasing awareness about the law and the issues, and through taking strict action against those who break this law.

The absence of women in policy making is one of the reasons that laws related to women are less effective. Traditionally law and practice reflects a male dominated society. A feminist legal methodology would be needed to recapture the experiences of women in a way that women's narratives become central to the law. The laws which exclude a gender perspective in their formation and interpretation fail to understand the reality of women's lives and the impact laws have on women's and children's lives, and hence perpetuate and further legitimate the practice of gender discrimination and violence against women¹⁴⁰. There are examples when women were involved in policy making regarding laws related

135 Marcus (1993), Violence against women in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Senegal and Yemen

136 BSAF's op cit

137 The Daily Star, June 30, 2007, quoted in BSAF's op cit

138 Prevention of Child Marriage Bill India, (2004)

139 Burns (1998), Though illegal, child marriage is popular in part of India

140 Rangita (2007) op cit

to women and children, which were more effective. The Ministry of Women and Child Development in India recommended removing the obscenity of child marriages, and as a result the Prevention of Child Marriage Act 2004 was passed¹⁴¹. In Pakistan the Women's Protection Act 2006 presented by women parliamentarians was a result of advocacy by women and women's rights activists to repeal the Hudood Ordinances of 1979. This Act addresses the protection of women from abduction, forced marriages, rape and all other forms of violence.¹⁴² A Committee of the Shariat Court comprised of three senior judges (all men) declared it un-Islamic and unconstitutional¹⁴³. Had there been a woman in this committee, the situation may have been different. The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act 2010 was again a result of advocacy from women workers and was presented by women parliamentarians¹⁴⁴. Despite the resistance by Islamic forces the law was passed by both Houses and is being implemented effectively¹⁴⁵. The difference in this law in terms of implementation is that women workers lobbied to form a prime minister's monitoring committee lead by women activists in order to ensure effective implementation¹⁴⁶. These examples show that laws can be strong and extremely effective if women are involved in the decision making process.

Attitudinal change at grass root level

The other important step is to bring attitudinal change at the grass roots. The practice of child marriage in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh is deeply rooted in cultural values and grounded in social structures. Shulman argues that despite laws that prohibit child marriage, the practice is still prevalent in many regions¹⁴⁷. It is a general belief that the state is responsible for change through using effective communication strategies, because ultimately the state is accountable to its people and to international institutions. In order to address the causes like lack of education, poverty and lack of employment facilities, NGOs and the state have taken some tangible steps. A holistic approach to bring attitudinal change through community trainings, involving young boys and girls in advocacy of the issue, and providing them education and employment opportunities may reduce the incidence of early marriages in these countries. Bangladesh took a step to providing a stipend to girls for education beyond primary level which in turn contributed to a reduction in early marriages in these communities¹⁴⁸. Similarly provision of vocational trainings and community meetings in these areas about the harmful effect of early marriages contributed towards its reduction.

Kanesat Hasan et al, reports that the DISHA¹⁴⁹ activities increased the average age at marriage from 15.9 to 17.9 years through focusing on youth and community attitudes towards early marriage, and providing youth with skills through peer education, youth groups and livelihoods training, in the Indian states of Bihar and Jharkhand¹⁵⁰. Pande et al, reported that during a multi partner study on the interventions for youth reproductive health and early marriages, the age of girls for marriage was increased from 16 to 17 years throughout the country. DSD Resource Center reports that a multidisciplinary approach was effective in India to reduce Child Marriages. The interventions under this multidisciplinary approach includes educating families and communities, girls education, law and policy initiatives, safeguarding girls' rights and providing economic opportunities¹⁵¹.

Involving boys to address the rights of young girl's was an innovative programme in Pakistan where boy scouts were trained to reach 100,000 households to educate them on the rights of girls to education and harmful consequences of early marriages. As a result a population of around 500,000 was educated by these boys¹⁵².

141 Ibid

142 Women protection criminal laws amendment (act 2006) <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2006/wpb.html>

143 <http://www.epakistannews.com/tag/women%E2%80%99s-protection-act/>

144 AASHA http://www.aasha.org.pk/Anti_Sexual_Harassment_Legislation_Background.php

145 <http://dailymtimespakistan.com/category/protection-against-harassment-of-women-at-the-workplace-act/>

146 Pak Pr Write <http://pakprwire.com/2011/02/22/meeting-of-ncsw-implementation-committee-on-sexual-harassment-at-workplace-act/>

147 Shulman, http://cis.uchicago.edu/outreach/archive/08-09/081118-Shulman_India-BackgroundReading.pdf

148 Pathfinder International (2006), Raising the Age of Marriage for Young Girls in Bangladesh

149 Development Initiative for Healthy Adolescent (DISHA)

150 Kanesathasan et al (2008), Improving Youth Sexual and Reproductive Health

151 GSD Resource Center (2011), Helpdesk Research Report: Evidence-based strategies for preventing child/early marriage

152 Innocent Digest 7, op cit

Organizing and building capacity of Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and women's groups can provide the best services, but they often lack support from traditional institutions, are poorly funded, and may have to operate in secrecy – attacked for undermining cultural values¹⁵³. Innocent Digest 7 suggests that a holistic approach of advocacy, awareness, and incentive based community level initiatives and legal reforms as major actions to address early marriages are useful measures to address the issue. The Digest further highlights the role of NGOs and international organizations to support local institutions and governments financially to take such initiatives¹⁵⁴.

The discussion shows that in all the three states interesting work has been done to address the issue of early marriages, which have the potential to be replicated. Although at smaller levels, but these initiatives have brought positive results to the lives of young girls. NGOs and International organizations need to play their role in community level change and in advocating with governments to improve the laws and their implementation. Governments on the other hand have all the resources and they need to divert them towards the rights of girls, and increase their efforts to eliminate early marriages.

153 Ibid

154 Innocent Digest 7, op cit

SECTION 8: CONCLUSION

The position of early marriages of girls in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh is alarming. The highest number of early marriages occur in South Asia. The second section of this paper highlighted the alarming data available for Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. This data highlights an urgent need to understand the issue and to take concrete action to reduce it. Early marriage has a strong link with violence against women and girls. It affects girls who are married at an early age, and it leads to a cycle of violence in which the girls, family and society suffers as a whole.

Deep rooted patriarchal structures encourages the status quo with reference to rights of women and girls in these states. This patriarchy is deeply embedded in the overall attitude of the society and policy makers. Lack of awareness, weak laws and implementation, deep rooted traditions like *vani*, *swara*, exchange marriages, dowry, bride price, poverty and honour related to the chastity of girls, different interpretations of religion, lack of education and employment opportunities for girls, and less effectiveness of international treaties are the main factors contributing to early marriages. All these factors are also a consequence of early marriages because they occur in the form of a vicious circle. It is more likely for a disempowered mother to transfer the same attributes to her daughter and so on.

Early marriages bring severe consequences to the lives of girls. It impairs the realization and enjoyment of their rights. Imposing early marriages on young girls affects the marriage relationship at an early age when they are not ready for married life. This deprives them of freedom, opportunity for personal development, and other rights including health and well-being, education, and participation in civic life. In some cases it also leads to maternal mortality due to severe complications of early sex and pregnancies. The denial of the girls' right to education and leisure is disempowering for them. Their self confidence is damaged and not allowed to flourish. This results in the dependence of these women for all minor and major issues on their male relatives. This disempowerment and dependence then contributes to poverty in society. The result is poor communities and states which then look for international financial support leading to further poverty.

All these impacts negate the meaning of the UNCRC and CEDAW's core protections for girls. UNCRC and CEDAW very clearly protect women and girls' right to freedom and to make their own decisions. The member states after signing the documents commit to protect the rights of women and girls through domestic legislation. All these states are signatories of these international treaties, however they have not shown a sincere commitment to incorporate them into domestic legislation. Half hearted efforts of these states have led to a lack of laws or weak laws to address child marriage, and the policy makers have never monitored the implementation of these laws. The result is that tradition persists and is protected by religious forces and patriarchal power structures.

The weaknesses in reporting mechanisms, reservations especially on CEDAW and limited efforts of states and strong resistance from the grass roots are reported to be the main reasons for affecting the value of these documents to the lives of women. States either do not report or delay reporting on progress to commitments. And they do not consider the recommendations of the Committee seriously. There is a need to make this reporting system more effective. This can be done by ensuring international financial or political support to these states with effective strategies to implement CEDAW and UNCRC. A regular monitoring system should be developed to give periodic feedback from the Committees to the states in addition to recommendations on their reports. A country based UN system needs to respond in an assertive manner, and local laws need serious revisions.

Theories of cultural relativism and universalism explain that because all the three states are collective in nature and believe in collective rights, even after making international commitments they do not feel obliged to fulfil them. Deep rooted patriarchal values reinforce this collectivism in order to secure their power and control. However, in order to get some political or financial gain they signed international treaties like UNCRC and CEDAW. States need to change their contradictory approach of showing a

different view at international level and a much darker view at domestic level. States need to consider the universality of human rights of women and girls, and should take effective measures to differentiate between collectivism and individualism in order to create a balance between the two. There is a need for these states to be sensitized enough to know that harmful traditions prevailing in society are promoted by powerful groups to suppress the powerless, while the state is representative of both. Traditions like early marriage are meant to suppress women and it is society which gets badly affected by this tradition.

This paper has explored a few examples of very strong and effective initiatives addressing early marriages taken by private institutions including NGOs, international NGOs and UN agencies in the countries in this study. All these organizations focused on the factors which contribute to reinforcing early marriage. The actions included increasing education, revising legislations, providing employment opportunities, raising community awareness through trainings and campaigns, involving men and youth, and supporting families to increase their income. However, their geographical coverage or scope was limited, because of lack of resources and absence of a legal structure which could sustain these efforts. The reports showed positive results of these interventions, indicating their potential to be replicated, and the best practices should be studied and reproduced in other areas if a serious and committed government is formed. Women also need to take an active part in improving the situation by being involved in policy making. Examples of the success stories in these states have been mentioned to illustrate when women were able to bring a positive change to the lives of other women. Also there are examples, when the absence of women in the policy making process resulted in serious flaws in the policies.

Unless the suggested measures are taken to address early marriage, this will continue to be a major impediment to the achievement of women's human rights in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

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SPO DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

The Evolution of Volunteerism in Pakistan

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ACRONYMS

ADRA	Adventist Development Research Association
CARD	Coastal Association for Research and Development
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CCB	Citizens Community Board
CIP	Community Infrastructure Project
EPS	Environmental Protection Society
HANDS	Health and Nutrition Development Society
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
KIDP	Kalam Integrated Development Project
LGO	Local Government Organization
NGO	Non- Government Organization
PFFF	Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum
PILER	Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research
PRSP	Punjab Rural Support Programme
SCOPE	Society for Conservation and Protection of Environment
SPO	Strengthening Participatory Organization
TVO	Trust for Voluntary Organizations
TCCR	Trust for Conservation of Coastal Resources
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VO	Voluntary Organizations
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature
YMCA	Young Women Christian Association

Evolution of Volunteerism in Pakistan

Background

This study¹ was undertaken to understand the pattern along which volunteerism evolved in areas which now constitute Pakistan. The study is based on the personal observations of the authors; collection of oral testimonies of people living in distinct geographic, ecological and administrative areas with a diverse ethnic composition, political history, and pattern of economic and social development; and a review of selected documents. Four rural settlements were selected; one each in coastal, desert, mountain and plain regions. A rural settlement which gradually became an integral part of a metropolitan centre was also selected as an urban site for the study. Oral testimonies were collected through in depth interviews with local opinion leaders, elderly men and community activists, focus group discussions and meetings with well informed individuals in the voluntary sector.

Due to the very diverse background, pattern of evolution, economic and political history of these areas, there was a remarkable difference in details available about the voluntary institutions and change in voluntary tradition over the last one hundred years and more. Exact dates and data were difficult to find due to a paucity of documentary evidence and dependence on memory recall for collecting information. Although a common methodology was shared with the authors of specific pieces, the content and presentation of content varied depending on the availability of relevant individuals and groups interviewed by the authors in each settlement.

A standard format has been used to represent the findings in each region and to allow for variation in details and in depth information for each settlement's history. The study has found evidence of a strong and widespread presence of voluntary institutions and tradition of volunteerism. The evolution of volunteerism has followed an almost identical pattern moving from community and tradition based voluntary practices to local charity and social welfare organizations to externally financed professional development organizations. The pace of change and timeframe of change was very different for each region.

A change in the spirit and form of voluntary work has displayed both positive developments and an erosion of traditional forms of social capital. This change has been welcomed and criticized by local social workers and political activists for strengthening professionalism at the cost of volunteerism and community spirit. Local activists and community members have also pointed to the need to strengthen "downward" accountability of professional development organizations to restore a community's control over the professionals. A description of the overall pattern of development of volunteerism in Pakistan and specific settlements in each region is given below.

Introduction

Volunteerism has very strong and deep roots in the history of areas which constitute Pakistan. Communities relied on volunteerism for provision of basic services and a social safety net, hospitality, dealing with emergencies and unusual economic demands, construction of public works, shortage of labour and access to justice. This widespread presence of volunteerism was well documented by colonial officers during the British rule. However, with the passage of time the state and the market began to encroach on voluntary space. This changed the scope of work, character, social role and financial needs of voluntary organizations. A trend which has been witnessed in various parts of present day Pakistan is the transition from local area based voluntary organizations, to welfare organizations to professionally managed and donor funded organizations. It has raised many new questions while answering some old ones.

1 Field based work for this study was done by Gul Hassan Kulmati, Mazhar Nawaz, Shahzad Ahmad, and Shaukat Sharar, and translation of Urdu field notes was done by Aizaz Baqir.

Due to industrial development, the rapid pace of urbanization and rural-urban migration, rural communities and economies started disintegrating and with them the traditional voluntary organizations. Older volunteerism was based on customs followed by communities which had strong social bonds going back to centuries of shared living. Whether related to the birth of a child or to grazing, sowing, harvesting, managing of commons, resolution of disputes, weddings and encounters with disaster and death, communities had well defined customs, norms and values to support one another. As rural populations started moving to urban areas new community bonds based on common interests emerged and charities, philanthropic institutions, social welfare organizations and interest groups emerged. This process started at a very slow pace in the early part of the twentieth century, accelerated in the 1960s and gathered momentum in the following two decades. Most of these organizations were driven by social, political and philanthropic causes, led by committed community workers and volunteers and financed by contributions of members, donations by well wishers and philanthropists and subsidies of the government.

In the 1980s, as Pakistan emerged as an important frontline state in the war against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, donor funding started pouring in from Western capitals and key multilateral and bilateral donors for social sector development in Pakistan. A new breed of voluntary organizations emerged in response to this funding. These new Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) also known as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), are run by professional managers, depend to a large extent on donor financing and determine their priorities and directions in line with availability of funds in the “community development market”. They aspire to follow the bottom-up approach but are compelled to pursue a top-down agenda, management culture, resource mobilization and community engagement approach. This does not imply the existence of a conspiracy theory, moreover, it points to the need to reflect on appropriate approaches for community mobilization, engagement of government and mobilization of resources to promote a demand driven, sustainable paradigm for community development in Pakistan. There are numerous good examples to learn from in this context.

Ironically all those indigenous NGOs that meet the donor requirement of community participation, social accountability and financial sustainability have been phased out of the donor’s arena. Donor agencies mostly support contractor NGOs who can follow the templates designed in financial capitals and deliver on a large scale to help them meet their “delivery targets”. Delivery in donor parlance means money spent, not the services delivered; sustainability means doing work well enough to continue receiving donor funding, and result based management means bypassing the “process” and following the templates. In every community people approached during the course of compiling this study have complained that NGO activists have turned into robots; if you put in the coin the robot will move if not the robot will stop. People complained that the old commitment to social causes and interaction with the community has been replaced by a new culture dominated by social *waderas*. This is a worrying sign and calls for a dialogue between various key players in the field of community development to define the path for supporting the voluntary sector to build on its strengths.

During this study the history of volunteerism in various regions of Pakistan starting from the coastal region of Balochistan to an urban settlement in Sindh, river plain and desert settlements of Punjab to a mountain community in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was studied and the pattern of evolution witnessed was very similar.

Commenting on the visible voluntary spirit in Punjab before the advent of British rule in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Director of Public Instruction in Punjab G.W. Leitner said that “There was not a single villager who did not take pride in devoting a portion of his produce to a respected teacher.”² He further added that with the encroachment of community space by the state and elimination of the priestly classes, nobility and local philanthropy, the situation changed dramatically. In Leitner’s words “nothing was done for indigenous schools except to injure or destroy them.”³ Effectiveness of local

2 Dr. G.W. Leitner- *History of Indigenous Education in Punjab since Annexation and 1882* (reprinted by) Sang e Meel Publications, Lahore 2002, Introduction.

3 Ibid pp 3.

voluntary institutions can be gauged from Leitner's statement that "in backward districts, like that of Hushiarpur, the Settlement Report of 1852 shows a school to every 19.65 male inhabitants (adults and non adults), which may be contrasted to the present portion of 1 government or aided school to every 9,028 inhabitants. ⁴"

During this process communities were robbed of social and intellectual capital and foundations were laid for their impoverishment and dependence. Substituting government funds for local contributions and English for traditional languages further damaged the voluntary system for the dissemination of education. In Leitner's words "The boy who brings home his Urdu lessons does not often read it out, even to his Mohammaden parent. The lessons of the schoolmaster are, therefore, not continued in the pupil's home, and they are not extended to his brothers and sisters as would be the case if they were given in his real vernacular...the present system retards female education, and stops the former supply of female teachers trained in their own families".⁵ This may partly explain why the training materials, modules and case studies developed in English have not become part of the local voluntary culture despite investment of billions of dollars in the capacity development of right holders and duty bearers.

Local volunteers and voluntary organizations were not only engaged in social services and mutual help but also in construction and maintenance of Public Works, resolution of disputes, investigation of crimes and financing productive activities. A view of the situation in Multan reveals that in 1938 "there were 386 cooperative societies in Multan District and 75 *panchayats*⁶ and 569 indigenous schools."⁷ Multan was the second district in the province where cooperative societies started in 1904.⁸ There were numerous other forms of voluntary organizations as well. As noted in the *Gazetteer* of Multan for 1923-24, "In 1924 Multan had 186 Credit Societies, 4 Silt Clearance Societies, 2 Landholding Societies, 2 Cattle Purchasing Societies and 2 Secondary Financing Institutions."⁹ These Societies were guided, supervised and subsidized by the local government but mainly depended on voluntary donations of time and resources by local communities. An in-depth analysis of the evolution of volunteerism in selected areas of Pakistan is given below.

4 Ibid pp 2.

5 Ibid pp 2.

6 Syed Muhammad Aulad Ali Gilani *Muraqqa e Multan* Jazib Publishers, Lahore , (reprinted) 1995, pp159.

7 Ibid pp 160.

8 *Gazetteer of The Multan District* 1923-24 pp176 Sang e Meel Publications, Lahore 2001 pp 176.

9 Ibid pp176.

Section 2: The City – Malir and Gadap

Background

People living in the distant areas of Malir including the area of Karachi Kohistan, and Gadap Union Council still seem to be living in the pre 1900 era. Before Malir became part of Karachi lands here were owned by both Muslims and Hindus. The Malir and Thudoo rivers flowed on both sides and water was available in abundance. Vegetables were taken from the farms to Lee Market on camels or camel carts. Camels were also the main source of transporting people, and were available for rent too. Poor people would work as farm labourers. There was no concept of going to urban areas for work. As the population was low, people knew each other within a radius of 15 miles. They shared each other's happiness and grief. The *Panchayat* system was introduced to Muslims by Hindus.

Early History of Volunteerism

The *Panchayat* system existed in Malir for centuries. In the early days a person would be elected as a leader (*wadera*) to unite and discipline the people and make decisions at the village or settlement level. With the passage of time these *waderas* became autocrats. Traditionally *waderas* played the role of a leader, and when problems arose, the people would gather around them and solve their issues through collective efforts. These problems included small disputes, illnesses, education and debt repayments. There was a strong *Panchayat* system, which was later taken over by *waderas* who misused their authority for personal gains.

With the increase in population, people felt the need to establish societies and associations. They would choose reputable persons of good character as heads of societies, and these societies had no other office bearers. People would submit all their donations to the leader and he was free to use these donations at his discretion. There was no concept of a formal office building, and any mosque or school building would be used as an office. There were no regular meetings, and people would gather whenever there was a mishap or when a serious problem occurred. In the meeting an appropriate response was decided and people were assigned different duties accordingly. The leader would supervise all the activities. Accounts were presented for scrutiny every year on Eid, and sometimes accounts were also presented for review every week after Friday prayers. The Hindus were ahead of Muslims in this, because they had established religious centres which were also used as offices for social activities. Both Hindus and Muslims would gather at village / settlement level to discuss their collective problems.

The Muslims laid the foundations of *Mullah Maktab* schools. Cooking and eating utensils and other ancillary items were purchased for collective use at festivals and community events. Wells and other water courses were cleaned collectively. After the rains there would be an announcement by all the village heads to gather at a particular farm for collective work. The villagers would gather and bring their oxen along to plough one field after the other. This voluntary work was called *wengar* or *begar*, and this activity still exists in remote rural areas around Karachi.

When marriages or a death occurred, people would give some money to the host family as a gesture of good will. This custom was common among both men and women and called *phorr*. Some people were assigned the duty of inviting guests, and they went door to door with a sheet of cloth and after receiving an invitation, the invitee would throw some coins on the sheet and this amount was called *dongor*. After the creation of Pakistan printed cards were used as invitations, but the old tradition still exists in some villages. When a marriage took place, friends and villagers worked together. They would fetch wood from the mangroves near the sea, to be used as fuel for cooking. Boats were provided voluntarily for this purpose, and special cooks would cook the food. Cooking utensils were provided by welfare organizations or the mosque administration. There was a tradition of *daip* (cash donation) and every one would contribute according to their capacity. The donations would usually range from rupees ten to fifteen, and these donations would be sufficient to meet marriage expenses. This tradition was equally popular among rich and poor villagers. Over the years, this community spirit has declined and is now very rare.

Due to an increase in the urban population, the rural areas declined and with changes in the weather pattern the level of rainfall also decreased. Due to sand and stones collection from rivulets, agricultural lands were damaged. Now very little agriculture is left in the area and suburbs of Jokrobh, Landhi, Memon Goth, Darsano Channo, Kathore, and Gadap. Hence, rural society has become a memory in many areas as these have turned into shanty towns and the nature of the problems faced by the people have also changed. After 1960 new social organizations emerged in these areas with government cooperation and participation. These social organizations were formed with the participation of newcomers in the remaining villages of these shanty towns.

Social Welfare Organizations for Local Causes

When the British took over Sindh in 1843, they made their headquarters in Karachi. Clubs, gymkhanas, hotels, printing press, theatres, cinema houses, bookstores, hospitals, medicine shops, child and mother care centres, leprosy and other dispensaries, veterinary hospitals, animal care clinics, and animal water points were established all over the city. In this way a new and modern concept of social work was introduced, that had not existed before. In 1845, the British founded the Munisk Hope Lodge to improve the social environment. In 1880, the Sind Club and Widows' Home were established. In 1886, Karachi Gymkhana was established, and in 1891, the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) was formed. These were all social institutions.

Following in the footsteps of the British many local influential persons also established gymkhanas, hospitals and social welfare associations for the benefit of their respective communities. The Parsi Gymkhana was established in 1893, and the Sindh Gymkhana was established in 1900. In 1923 Rabindranath Tagore Dramatic Club's foundation stone was laid by Rabindranath Tagore himself. In 1924, the Hindu Gymkhana and in 1927 Haji Abdullah Haroon Muslim Gymkhana was established. During the same year the Parsi Ladies' Industrial Home was also established as a place for young women to learn sewing.

Anjuman Musalmanan-e-Punjab was established in 1924. It is a registered social welfare organization which is still working. Anjuman Muslim Khwateen, Jawahar street was founded in 1930, the Hindu Ladies' Industrial Home was set up in 1928, and the Young Men's Muslim Association came into being in 1933. In 1921 Adario Welfare Association was founded in the name of the Commissioner's wife of those days, and it is still the best welfare institution of its kind. All these institutions were established in the municipality's limits; outside the municipal limits there was no concept of such institutions.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, there were four famous *madrassas* in Karachi. People would send their children to these *madrassas* where books, instruction, boarding and lodging were provided free. People also donated generously to these *madrassas*. Schools were properly established when a local Board of Schools was formed after 1900.

In the society of those days, men and women worked together in the fields and this practice continues to this day. There were fishermen's settlements in coastal areas where men and women conducted their respective duties together. Women did not wear the *hijab* and interacted with men without any restrictions. A semi tribal system was prevalent that exists even today. The political and social environment was also affected by this system.

Organizations such as the Zamindar Abadgar Society, Goth Sudhar Tehreek¹, and Malir Cooperative Society came into existence in the areas of District Local Board Karachi after 1920. Zila Zamindar Abadgar Association was established in 1925. Goth Sudhar Jamaat was founded in Karachi in 1929. This organization held its meeting every year. At that time Karachi taluqa had a population of four thousand.

In 1929 a women's wing for the welfare of women was created under the auspices of Goth Sudhar Jamaat.

1 Goth Sudhar Tehreek was started by G.M. Syed before Partition. It is different from Goth Sudhar Sangat started by Khan Muhammad Panhwar

In 1930, the same people established the Karachi Zila Maldar Conference. Malir Abadgar Cooperative was also formed the same year in Karachi Zila Cooperative Conference. All these institutions created awareness among the people of Malir, Ibrahim Hyderi, Landhi and Gadap about their local problems. The government established sanitary committees in the rural areas of the District Local Board Karachi in 1894. These committees comprised 3 to 7 members each. The head of the committees was called the Chairman. Committee meetings were held once a month. The local medical officer was one of its members, and to meet the cost of the sanitary project, half the amount was collected by the villagers, and the remaining half was contributed by the local board and district government

Organizational work for social welfare began after 1947. The Sindhi Memon Cooperative Society was formed in 1954 in Memon Goth. Before that everybody would work together without the platform of any organization. An organization by the name of Anjuman Nojawan-e-Baloch was formed in 1966. The Anjuman paid specific attention to education, especially women's education and housing. Due to the efforts of a footballer, a football ground of international standard was built in the area. During 1970 to 2000 so much work was done for social welfare that no other precedent of this kind can be found in the history of social welfare. All this work was done on a self help basis. In 1970, there was no tradition of women's education in these areas. Subsequently social welfare organizations were established in all the mohallahs. Many organizations were registered during the 1980s. Links with government departments increased. Many of the social workers became members of the Union Council and Zila Council. Social workers played an important role in local politics as well, and during the decade of the '90s women moved ahead of men in education.

Political organizations established themselves after increased social awareness took place. Due to the social work in those days, women became increasingly aware about education, health and society's norms and rules. They worked jointly with men and participated completely in social work. Women also represented the country in international organizations. Many social workers projected the problems of their areas at international platforms, and social workers from Malir visited foreign countries and honoured their country.

Sahreen Suth and Sajag Samoodiani were the most prominent women's organizations in the area and played an important role in the progress of women. Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum, which projected the problems of fishermen at the national and international level, was also founded by social workers of this area. Many seminars and protests were organized to project the problems of health, education, and sanitation.

These problems were brought to the attention of relevant government authorities. Social organizations in Ibrahim Hyderi struggled to project the problems of the fisheries sector. Fishermen from Sindh and all over Pakistan were united on the platform of Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum (PFFF). There are more than 5000 members of this organization and Fishermen Day is celebrated each year with full zeal and fervour. Recently two other organizations of fishermen, such as Karachi Stage Welfare Association (KSWA) and the Trust for Conservation of Coastal Resources (TCCR) have also been formed after conflicts or difference with PFFF.

The first registered organization of Malir's rural areas was the Pir Sarhindi Social Welfare Organization. It is now an inactive organization. Later another organization Wadhela Baluch Samaji Behood was founded which was registered in 1977. Its main focus was on health and education, especially women's education. There was no tradition of girl's education after grade five. However, in 1978 the first batch of girls completed their matriculation as a result of efforts by this organization. The organization worked hard for this purpose. A bus was arranged to bring teachers from the city because there was not a single teacher in the rural areas. In addition, another organization Anjuman Nojawan-e-Baloch and Anjuman Samaj Behood also united all the social workers on one platform. The latter organization also played an active role in creating women's organizations such as Sahreen Suth which was parallel to another organization called Sajag Samoondiani, and they both worked independently. During the popular days of social welfare organizations, some other organizations including Muslim Welfare Kichi

Tanzeem and Muhammadan Welfare Association were also formed.

This was a dynamic period in the evolution of social welfare. There was no self projection, and collective thinking was an important feature of the organization. There was neither a lot of money nor any concept of donor agencies. Individual donations and other financial contributions helped implement any programme, and everyone worked all night and day. Zila Council, Karachi would extend financial help, and people were motivated towards changing society for the better. Everyone was concerned with working to solve the problems of the people. Many nationalists and mainstream politicians also benefitted from this rising trend of social work.

Many social workers were also members of political parties. Hence, social organizations overlapped with political associations. Despite differences in the nature of political and social work there was a sense of unity. The work of these organizations attracted international NGOs, which was the result of the consistent efforts of social workers. This social awareness is still prevalent and due to this awareness ordinary men and women have also begun to participate in politics which no longer remains the domain of the feudal class and wealthy individuals. Undoubtedly, all these developments were due to the efforts of social workers and organizations, which occurred in phase two of the evolution of social welfare.

Era of Professional Organizations

The third phase started in the year 2000. During this phase social workers and organizations received scientific and technical training for developing project proposals and managing projects. The influence of donor agencies increased. In the past, many tasks were performed together and problems were solved collectively. In the third phase organizations were assigned specific tasks. Gradually the collective spirit declined and the quality of work suffered. Different national and international NGOs started working in the rural areas of Malir after 2000. These included Health and Nutrition Development Society (HANDS), Shirkat Gah, Aurat Foundation, Society for Conservation and Protection of Environment (SCOPE), Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Baanhn Beli, Adventist Development Research Association (ADRA), Sind Education Foundation and SPO. These organizations adopted scientific techniques of work. They focussed on training, and it was a new phenomenon for social workers. Seminars in hotels and meetings with diverse people broadened their horizons. The concept of working for a salary also spread among social workers, and due to funding by donor organizations the concept of self help declined.

Donor agencies had their own agendas or demands, and ground realities were ignored by them. Donors worked in specific fields, hence, community based organizations which had broad objectives and worked in various fields narrowed down their goals, such as running a health centre, school or training programme. The remaining social issues were ignored, and many good projects were developed, but social workers were alienated after receiving training and financial assistance.

An increase in funds led to corruption within organizations, and many NGOs emerged overnight. In order to impress donors, some organizations decorated their offices with expensive furniture, beautiful charts, and colourful reports, and had their projects approved. However due to corruption, social workers lost their reputation within the community. So currently, social organizations depend on donor agencies for their survival.

Now many social workers behave mechanically like robots; whenever a coin is inserted, they move otherwise they stop. They give preference to donors' needs over people's needs. Among them are those who have lost hope, who are disinterested in the problems of the people and remain, confined to a narrow agenda. Hence, contradictions are becoming acute and local organizations are in the process of fragmentation.

Many local organizations are also on the verge of extinction. This problem has resulted from social organizations following donor agencies' guidelines instead of concentrating on the real issues faced

by the people. Now the term *Samaji Waderas* (social lords) is commonly used. People think that donor agencies are producing these social lords, because now they are condescending to the poor who wear plain clothes. Thus, it is necessary to pay attention to this situation and revive the old spirit of equality. Social workers must refuse to behave mechanically motivated by money. In order to revive old traditions, it is essential to pay attention to the ground realities in specific areas. Otherwise the trust and dignity of social workers cannot be revived. We will have to break the norm of big hotel seminars, luxury vehicles and other privileges related to projects.

Section 3: The Plains- Sarai Saddhu

Background

Sarai Saddhu is situated in the Ganji Bar area of Punjab. This area once comprised jungles between the rivers Ravi and Bias. To some extent nineteenth century societal values are still in existence. This vast area of the jungle is spread over a length of around one hundred and twenty-five miles. In the midst of the jungle, a six or seven mile wide tract of land was just a barren flat piece, bereft of plants and trees. That is why this area is called Ganji Bar (Bald Forest).

Early History of Volunteerism

In 1876, when the British took control of Multan, Sarai Saddhu was just a little village. This area assumed greater importance in the past due to its location on the bank of the River Ravi as most travelling and trading activities were carried out through the river. The main source of livelihood was farming. Sarai Saddhu like other villages produced all its needs including grain, tools and utensils. Spiritual leaders (like the Maulvi and Brahman) of every faith were settled here. Artisans and workers like barbers, cobblers, blacksmiths, oilmen, butchers, weavers, carpenters, water carriers, folk singers, and sweepers were there to serve the local community. The barber would provide the services of hair-cutting, match making and cooking at wedding functions. The village worked as a very elaborate, strong and coordinated economic unit. Although this strong organization was based on mutual economic relations, yet its terms and conditions were neither written nor fixed. Instead voluntary cooperation and mutual understanding was the cornerstone of this system. The non-farming community extended voluntary help to the farmers and in return received medicines, fodder, cash, grain and some other rewards. Labourers or non-farmers consisted of almost 1/3 of the village population.

Farmers would jointly plough each other's fields. An announcement for ploughing a field of a particular farmer would be made in a local mosque and on hearing this announcement all the farmers would get together to plough that particular field. Similar cooperation would be witnessed on the occasion of harvesting, crop collection and storage. Water courses were also cleaned by working in collective groups. This activity was called *begar* or *wangar*. In addition other forms of collective social traditions were also in place. This resulted in social cohesion based on sharing common grief and happiness. These traditions included rituals for sharing the economic and social burden of birth, circumcision, engagements, marriage, death, hospitality, fun fairs and other social events.

Whenever someone fell ill, the people would enquire after their health and put some money under his/her pillow, because during an illness the patient could not work to earn a living. In this way the patient was provided financial help. This tradition was called *puchni*. On the occasion of someone's death the relatives of the deceased would feed the bereaved person and this ritual was called *moo'n chohli* and everyone who came to condole was also served a meal. On the occasion of death close relatives would pool money to serve meals to the bereaved family members and it was called *bhaji*. This *bhaji* money was written in a note book as a record so that the same amount of money could be returned to the person who contributed it, on some other similar occasion.

Whenever a marriage procession arrived from a distant area in the village, food and accommodation was arranged for the guests by the villagers collectively. On the day of the *valima* (meal hosted by the bridegroom) the guests would also give a *salami* (gift in cash) to the bridegroom or his parents and this was also written in a register as a record so that the same amount could be returned to the contributor on a similar occasion. This practice still exists and in this way marriage expenses do not become a burden and are shared collectively.

In those days, there were no proper offices or monthly meetings in any organisations. Neither was there any concept of constitutions or manifestos. There were some verbal laws that had informal social approval and violators of these laws would become outcasts. People had mutual respect and trust, and

before starting any new activity people would gather in a mosque or someone's *bethak* (guest room). Everyone helped one another and there was social cohesion.

A strong *Panchayat* system was in place to resolve disputes. At village level a well reputed person would be chosen as *Panchayat* leader. Decisions were taken at a mosque or house of the village head-man. Hindu temples and community centres were also managed by *panchayats*. Mullah-Maktab (religious schools) established by Muslims were also collectively financed and managed by the community. To become a local leader, one had to be very active in volunteer organizations. In fact it was a social rule to presume that anyone active in social work would also be active in other fields of life. Hence, people would prove themselves by working as volunteers for the welfare of the community. Actually, sharing the moments of joy and grief, consoling and supporting one another, extending help to one another and working jointly in the fields was a routine in the village.

Social Welfare Organizations for Local Causes

After the creation of Pakistan the rise of a consumer goods industry replaced local artisans, the non farmer unskilled workers migrated to cities in search of new jobs; millions of people from East Punjab (India) migrated to Multan and the social fabric in the village started disintegrating. Old community institutions fell apart. After 1960, under official patronage and cooperation, many social organizations emerged. The Social Welfare Department devised new laws for the registration of welfare organizations, and with official cooperation and patronage many social organizations also began to register themselves in these low income settlements.

At the time of Independence there were ten *madrassas*, big and small in Multan. People would send their children to these *madrassas* for education where they were provided free boarding, lodging and books. Soon after Independence the Anjuman Islamia Multan established an Islamia Intermediate College in the city for the improvement of education. This college was upgraded to a degree college in 1959. The Anjuman also acquired the abandoned buildings of Hindu Schools, namely; Sanain Dharam Middle School and Sanain Dharam High School. These schools were renamed as Aam Khas Bagh High School and Islamia High School Haram Gate. Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam in the Cantonment area established a High School in 1952, and a girls' school in 1955 which was subsequently upgraded to a high school.

Era of Professional Organizations

Social work began on a large scale under the People's Work Programme after 1970. During this period, different organizations were registered in urban neighbourhoods and low income areas. With the technical and financial help of the government, these registered associations organized the people by utilizing all the resources and endeavoured to create a spirit of self help and mutual cooperation among the people. That was the time when social organizations grew in number and size. In the last decade of the 20th century prominent organizations working in Multan included the Pakistan Youth League; Deaf and Dumb Welfare Society Multan (1964); All Pakistan Women Association; Divisional Rabita Council Multan (1970); Pakistan Girl Guide Association (1963); District T.B Association Multan (1969); Hadee Welfare Society; Idara Tahafuzz Beenai Multan (1965); Social Services Society Multan (1963); Awani Committee for Development; Pattan Taraqiati Tanzeem; Dehat Dost Tanzeem; Awaz Foundation; Roshni; TVO and SPO.

After 1990, international organizations started to increase in numbers in Southern Punjab. These agencies paid attention to this area due to the good work of some local organizations. In the year 2000, the government planned to transfer powers to the local government. The work of NGOs was appreciated during this period. Social organizations established themselves on a technical and scientific basis. Social workers were given intensive training, and a project culture prospered. In the past, social organizations would perform different tasks and solve many problems collectively. Then due to the intervention of donors, every organization had to work in its own thematic area. Financial assistance and regular salaries were established for volunteers and social workers increased their income. The spirit

of volunteerism and social service declined and local level organizations became inactive. Training courses for volunteers, and seminars and meetings were regularly held in five star hotels, and a new trend emerged.

Project development became the main focus of attention. Workers were now more interested in the salary packages and donor funding, and the concept of self help disappeared. To bring change in the behaviour of local people, specific projects were given priority. Ground realities were ignored on the priority and the agenda of donors. The projects looked very good on paper, but social workers were becoming strangers to their own people. In the past people were united and tried to solve their problems collectively and would maintain contact with government functionaries. But now they chase donor agencies and most of their time is spent in search of people who can design a project for them. Government departments also do not perform their duties properly. Donor funds have changed the life style of social workers. Now, they have cars, large salaries and other facilities and do not care about the issues or problems of the poor. As a result they neglect social problems, and political and national level issues are also ignored. Sensible workers are aware of this kind of negative trend, but even they are not willing to renounce the benefits.

Hence, professionalism has replaced volunteerism. And even this professionalism is turning into commercialism. Corruption has replaced welfare in the new generation, and NGOs have become people who want funds and have no vision of their own. Due to this increase in funding social workers' living standard have improved. In this environment individuals have become more powerful than institutions. Their autocratic attitude has harmed the formation process of organizations. Therefore, it is time to open debates and discussions so that social workers are encouraged to challenge this emerging trend, and the attitude of donors is changed. This shift in attitude is needed to revive the confidence of people in social welfare organizations.

Section 4: The Desert –Chobara in Thal

Background

Union Council Chobara is situated in district Layyah of Thal Desert. Nearly ten percent of the cultivated area in this Union Council is irrigated by canal water. The remaining area consists of small or big sand dunes where most of the crops depend on rainfall. The rainy season (July-August) is very important for the growth of these crops. However, there is no regular pattern of annual rains in Thal so the harvest often depends on chance and good luck. An aerial view of the area shows that it can be divided into the north-east along the rivers in three natural zones: the eastern zone adjacent to the river Indus where the Thal Canal was dug during the 1950s, which is sandy and clayish and gives a view of eastern openings to five rivers; the Middle Zone where in the midst of sand dunes, some small tracts of flat land were used for farming through well waters, and the remaining sandy land was covered with natural jungle or grazing fields; the western belt adjacent to the river Jhelum and Chenab where there were thick jungles of *Jaal* and *Jand* (bushy tree or plant species). The natural jungle, spread over an area of 17,000 square kilo meters, was a grazing ground for millions of cattle. However, as a result of the Green Revolution initiated by the state during the 1960s, the jungle has been cleared to pave the way for cultivation of crops which can grow in the rainy season.

Due to complete depletion of forests and grazing fields in the area, people now have very little cattle and make their living through cultivation of crops which grow in the wet season. Pluses are the only crop of the area. As tube wells run on expensive diesel, to use generators to water a small cultivable area is not feasible so there is very little cultivation. Due to a decline in cultivation of these crops and very limited alternate opportunities of livelihood, poverty is increasing and small or landless farmers are forced to live below the poverty line. Hence indebted and landless farmers are rapidly shifting to urban areas in search of jobs.

Before the introduction of the canal-system, *kachi* (lower plain of river Indus) was very fertile and agricultural production was in abundance. The people adjacent to *Thal* were also prosperous. During the dry season, the herd keepers would go towards the *kachi* area and when the river would flood its surroundings these people shifted to the pastures of *Thal* along with their herds of cattle. The (female) camel raisers of *Thal* would migrate towards the opening of the river Chenab or banks of the river Indus on the other side. During floods and in the dry season, people on both sides would migrate to each other's area and as a result a tradition of hospitality and cordiality was initiated and continues even after the passage of centuries. This was a classless society.

Early History of Volunteerism

The area has its own history of volunteerism. As a result of the Green Revolution of the sixties, its cattle raising business vanished and therefore, volunteerism also took a new form in the area. In the feudal society, any work that is done for the landlord without wages is called *begar*. In Thal, voluntary work is considered a service and called *apar*. For instance, if an owner of a herd of cattle could not graze his cattle for some days, this service was then performed by a neighbour or any other co-worker, until that person was again able to resume his duties. This voluntary work was also called *bhaji*.

In this simple cattle raising society, a unique system of voluntary help sustained itself for centuries. A "barter system of mutual services" remained in force until the advent of the agricultural system. It was a tradition of the community to arrange for milk giving an animal, such as a goat or buffalo to a neighbour who did not have any, so that he would also enjoy the "blessing" of milk. No household was without the "blessing" of milk in the community. Most people's needs were fulfilled on a voluntary basis. The problem of food security was also solved by the community and no individual was left on his own. If a settlement of ten houses had a sufficient quantity of grain to consume for a whole year, and two households had no share in it, they would also be provided the whole year's quota and nothing would be charged from them. When their next crop was ready for harvest, the same quantity would be returned

by the two households. A system of helping one another voluntarily was firmly established. Camels were available on rent for carrying goods and people from one place to another. And the camel owners would provide one service free, and that was carrying a patient to the doctor. The *khojis* (detectives) would also provide their services free, to help catch a thief. They had a respectable status in the community. A more appreciable service was that of treating poor and helpless animals without any monetary consideration and many other services of this kind were also provided voluntarily.

During the 1950s, one fourth area of the Thal desert came under canal irrigation due to a canal dug by the Thal Development Authority. Consequently, more than one million acres of land in the four districts of Thal came under cultivation. More than 0.6 million acres of land was allotted to the farmers belonging to the eastern district of Punjab on easy conditions so that the area could become cultivable. An astonishing fact is that not a single landless native of Thal was allotted even a six acre plot of land on these conditions. At that time, the native people depended on grazing for their livelihood to feed their cattle. People would graze their goats, buffalos, and camels in the vast natural jungles. There was prosperity and people were satisfied. Cattle were like a cash crop, and a little cultivation was done through water from wells. The basic source of livelihood was cattle rising while farming was just a secondary activity. Tens of hundreds of cattle were provided water from wells. After the decline of the livestock sector and a sudden shift towards seasonal farming, the people in rain fed areas of Khushab, Mianwali, Bhakkar, Jhang, Layyah and Muzaffargarh faced economic hardships. Due to the disappearing jungle and the decline in hundreds of medicinal herbs, grass, and rare kinds of shrubs, many precious species of animals, such as deer, rabbits, jackals, wolves, and snakes have also become extinct.

Marriage expenses were usually shared by family, friends and well-wishers. The family and friends of the bridegroom would also contribute according to their capacity. Some would send a gift of a goat for a wedding lunch or dinner. Each friend would gift a whole goat and in this way many goats would be collected for the occasion. Similarly, wheat, rice and raw sugar were also provided as *bhaji* and returned to the contributor on the occasion of his marriage or any other social event. *Bhaji biraderi* would be given to a person or family outside the clan. And within the clan, there was a tradition of *naindr* (Cash). However, *bhaji* in the form of clothes, *charpoys*, and woollen bed sheets are still given as gifts even today. Another traditional aspect of *bhaji* in the form of a goat, cow, wheat and rice has been destroyed by the market economy. The *bhaji* given on the occasion of *dastar bandi* at the death of a male head of the household is called *pagana*, while *bhaji* given on the occasion of the death of the women is called *hadia*.

These indigenous people depended on a classless and simple economy for their livelihood before 1960. The cattle raising society was a crime free society. In the past there were some crimes of theft. As footprints of thieves were easily traceable in the sands, it was difficult for the thieves to be fearless. There were sporadic incidents of scuffles or fights. The institution of *sath parheen* (*panchayat*) was known to be very effective and reliable. The members of the *panchayat* did not necessarily come from influential or powerful families. As good character was the basic condition for membership, therefore, many people doing unskilled work, such as, barbers, carpenters, cobblers and sweepers also served as members of the justice committees. The other mediators, belonging to *Jat* or various other clans, had to be of good character. Due to moral and social pressure, no mediator dared to be impartial. Till 1960 not a single case of murder was ever reported in the police station. The cases of illegal grazers encroaching upon the grazing fields of others and consequent fights or scuffles were reported and are part of the record of the police station. After the shift from cattle raising to agriculture and consequent development of the latter, the nature of crimes has changed and the rate of crime has also increased. Gradually, the voluntary mediation committees' role has also come to an end and now disputes are taken to law courts for settlement.

Social Welfare Organizations for Local Causes

Local level *saths* (reconciliatory committees) have been destroyed. As people have lost trust in the formal courts for the last thirty or forty years, therefore local mediation committees are coming into use again. These committees have been hijacked by clever and opportunist individuals and ultimately influential people will benefit from them. Today's *saths* are much like the original *panchayats*.

The scattered population of Thal, however, is the biggest hurdle in the way of education. In the past there were no regular schools or *madrassas* in the area but due to cultural literacy some basic education was imparted in the vernacular. Religious learning was available in nearly all the settlements of Thal. *Haveli* (courtyard) or *bethak* (male guest room) schools were opened in two Union Councils of Chobara but due to lack of proper monitoring, fifty percent of the schools were closed down during the first year of inception. The government of Punjab started the Punjab Literacy Programme in 2002 to spread education across the entire Thal desert. In addition to the Punjab Literacy Programme, a formal education project is also being run with the help of the National Education Foundation in district Layyah. However, the role of the foundation is very limited. With the cooperation of Action Aid, and Pakistan Welfare Society limited help was provided to the voluntary teachers of two or three non-formal schools in Union Council Chobara, but these schools were closed at the end of the project. NGOs play a negligible role to spread education in the limits of the union council and *tehsil*.

Like in other parts of the country, mosque schools was also started in Thal during the 1980s. Along with the teaching of the Holy Quran, education of religious affairs according to specific sects was also imparted. However, the government syllabus was not available in these schools although the teachers working in these mosque schools were able to find part time jobs in government schools. Members of the Hindu community opened a Bharatri School to provide education to their community in Layyah city. They were well aware of the importance and significance of welfare work. In fact, this incentive by the Hindu community inspired the wealthy muslim farming community (Qazis) to open a middle school in Rehmanabad. Qazi landlords opened the school in a small village of their clan. This school was upgraded to a high school during the 1970s. It is situated in the precincts of Tehsil Chobara and was nationalized in the 1970s.

As cattle were in abundance in Chobara, therefore, people would drink milk instead of water. Milk was considered a complete diet and grain was like a secondary diet. Wheat and other grains were imported from the lower plains of Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers. Milk was abundantly available in every household. People were healthy and free from disease. Meat was available in abundance. According to a narrative, "people were enviously healthy. Cattle were mostly free of disease, because their food was also natural."¹ Occasionally, people would have ordinary illnesses like coughs, and flu during the dry winters.

Era of Professional Organizations

Punjab Rural Support Programme (PRSP) entered Thal in 2007 in the canal area and helped farmers in brick lining the water courses. PRSP invests 80 percent of the cost and small farmers 20 percent in these projects. However, small or medium farmers of rain fed areas of Thal cannot improve their water channels due to their inability to invest 20 percent themselves. Due to expensive inputs such as diesel, oil, chemical fertilizer and pesticide most of the farmers have discarded farming through tube wells.

The Pakistan Welfare Society is active within the limits of Union Council Chobara. This organization briefly worked for non formal schools and is now working to create awareness about collective grazing rights. International and national NGOs provide funds to this organization. Members of one family played an effective role in the formation of the organization, and are now involved in governing it.

1 Narrated by Mazhar Nawaz Baloch resident of Chobara-May 1,2012

This year another organization Rural Community Development Service has also started working in the area. This organization is based in Lahore and has an office in district headquarter Layyah. It has started a study on common problems of the area. Another organization “Awami Development Organization” with its office in Layyah has started welfare work in the limits of union council and tehsil Chobara. It was also formed by the people belonging to an influential family and they also have a majority in its governing body. The Health and Peace Foundation is also active in Barani Tehsil Chobara and its office is situated in district headquarter, Layyah. It has participated in the Polio Campaign, and also established a free Eye Camp. Other organizations such as Tareemat Sanjh, Sanjhee Soch, Sojhla Foundation and Seeva, have not done any prominent work in the limits of Barani Tehsil. Al-Nawaz Development Organization was established in 1993. This organization is also under the influence of only one family. It claims it gives computer training to village women. It helps government in health and other problems. The office of the organization and its president’s residence are in the same building.

The services provided by such organizations are similar to government institutions in quality and philosophy. The only difference is that government departments provide limited services and that too in a patronizing way. NGOs are also promoting a parasitic culture among the common people. At this time the relation between communities and organizations at grass root level is that of a guilty nouveau riche and a beggar. In the words of an ex-Chairman of the Union Council; “conditions of common people have not changed, instead they have been spoiled. People think that it is the charity money from white men. Obtaining funds from foreign countries is not a sin².” This is time for collective reflection. We must contemplate ways of saving the community from being corrupted. We also have to find the reasons behind the collapse of a centuries old system of volunteerism, because the present system of volunteer work is like a disease that weakens the soul. So finding the answer to this question is the responsibility of every sensitive human being.

2 Allah Nawaz Khan Ex-Nazim Union Council Chobara-May 1,2012

Section 5: The Mountains: Marghazar Valley Swat

Background

Swat is a district of Malakand division, in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province with approximately two million inhabitants and a rich natural resource base. The role of voluntary organizations in Swat region evolved with changing political circumstances. It presents a unique case of transition from a tribal society to a princely state to integration in the nation state of Pakistan. From the fifteenth century AD onward the region was inhabited by the Yusafzai tribe of Pukhtuns and till 1915 it was a tribal society divided into two groups (*Dallas*) with a unique blend of power balance and resource management. Local tribesmen used to distribute all landed properties every ten years (in some periods after five years) and moved from one settlement to another. Different groups and classes had different rights of resource use. These rights were very elaborate and well defined.

The tribes of Swat valley formed their own state in 1915 through a consultative process. A Legal Framework based on local customs and Islamic principles not in conflict with local norms was established. Pashtu was declared the state language and the people agreed to pay one tenth of their produce as tax to run state affairs. The ruler expanded the state territories by annexing Shangla, Buner and almost half of Kohistan District.

Based on an agreement between the British Viceroy in Delhi and the *Wali* of Swat signed in 1926 the landed properties were permanently allotted, new employment opportunities were created by the state and modern health and education facilities started to emerge. The tribal social system gradually conceded to the state but was not fully abandoned. A formal judicial system was put in place to improve access to justice and the justice system was made simple and responsive. During this period certain functions of the Two Group System (*Dallas*) were taken over by the state. Formal voluntary institutions and political activities in an organized form were banned, and business was mostly in kind.

In 1947, the state exercising its choice of accession associated itself with Pakistan. In 1949 the crown prince became the *Wali* but the governance system remained intact and modified gradually in view of local conditions and outside demand. The state revenue improved and subsequently social services, employment opportunities and infrastructure improved. Swat, having natural beauty, a peaceful environment and rich archaeological heritage attracted tourists from Pakistan and abroad which contributed to revenue generation and creation of employment opportunities and boosted trade.

Early History of Volunteerism

The earliest voluntary support mechanism in existence in Swat was the *jirga*. The *jirga* used to resolve issues related to justice, social security, performance of rituals, and protection of the resource base. A *jirga* is composed every time a dispute between two parties needs resolution. Due to its critical importance, the composition of the *jirga* is made in such a way as to ensure that it has the ability to implement its decisions. The composition of the *jirga* depends on the nature of the issue and the concerned parties' broader consent is necessary to select members of the *jirga*. It usually included elders of both sides in a dispute and social elite of the village. This framework is community based, because traditionally the natural and productive resources were owned and managed by the communities. To maintain and expand communal infrastructure the communities used to contribute human resource. This practice was called *ashar*. Tribal families also had to contribute human resources on a reciprocal basis for different functions and this was called *tall*. The *dalla* (faction) representation was visible in all these mechanisms, necessary for power balance.

Although ownership of the resources belonged to the land owning class who had claims on properly defined shares of land assets (share was accumulation of different productive units, like agriculture land with irrigation system and without irrigation, cattle shed, house size and so on) but the artisans (landless members of the tribe) also had certain rights in return for providing services to the community. Villages were self-sufficient and only imported salt and raw sugar in exchange for honey.

Social Welfare Organizations for Local Causes

During the 1980s the Social Welfare Department started functioning in Swat and gradually the practice of registering organizations was accepted. In Swat, especially Mingora, the process started earlier and the first community based organization was registered by some activists in Islampur village of Marghazar valley in 1982, with the focus on improvement of services, reconciliation of disputes and environmental conservation. Gradually new groups emerged to construct religious schools. In the 1980s professional associations as well as labour unions and traders' federations were formed to protect the interests of their members and negotiate on their behalf with the government and employers. Migrant worker's remittances increased and a phase of urbanization accelerated as the livelihood system in the hills started to collapse. Demand for municipal services increased and hillside low income dwellings emerged around Mingora.

With the collapse of the USSR and end of the Afghan war, a market economy started to dominate the state and local culture and gradually the state lost its regulatory authority. In the early 1990s the first formal non government organization by the name of Environmental Protection Society (EPS) registered itself under the Societies Registration Act and lobbied for environmental conservation and improvement of service delivery and governance. In the early eighties bi-lateral projects like the Social Forestry Project and Environmental Rehabilitation Project started to rehabilitate the ecological ecosystems and improve livelihoods. And the Kalam Integrated Development Project (KIDP) started functioning in the upper parts of the valley. These projects formed community organizations, built their capacities to improve livelihood systems and established links of their beneficiary communities with the market.

Era of Professional Organizations

In the nineties capacity building organizations emerged at the national level and started their activities in Swat by establishing partnerships with local NGOs. Some of the multilateral projects during their exit created new institutions and societies to continue their activities in the post project period. Carvan emerged as a successor to the Kalam Integrated Deployment Project (KIDP), Lasoona replaced the Social Forestry Project, and Hujra came into being to take over from the Environmental Rehabilitation Project. It is not certain how successfully they fulfilled their mandate, however they survived by gradually modifying their role.

In this period some voluntary organizations supported by indigenous philanthropists also emerged. Swat Scout Open Group formed Khpal Kor Foundation (KKF) to provide education to orphans. This organization, in a very scientific manner, provided education in the private sector and accommodated orphans. It is considered a national success story and has gained international recognition. Islampur a centre of cottage industry was selected by the Community Infrastructure Project (CIP) to engage the community on a cost sharing basis for infrastructure improvement. According to the locals it was difficult for the communities to pay in cash and they were able to utilize almost 40 percent of the funds. However, it gave impetus to other communities to opt for such type of community organizations to avail such opportunities.

At the same time a religious group the Tanzim Nifaz -e Sharia Mohammadi (TNSM) demanded the replacement of Anglo Saxon laws with Islamic laws emerged. TNSM accelerated its activities and compelled the government to amend the laws. During this turbulent time poverty increased, livelihoods declined infrastructure deteriorated and the governance system became extremely inefficient. At this time religious and market based ideologies tried to carve out space for introducing their institutional framework. This resulted in squeezing the space for state apparatus. Private educational and health institutions mushroomed and people began to invest in private businesses. Urbanization accelerated to gain new business opportunities and a pursuit of money as a new value started to penetrate; demand for dowry became a normal practice; weddings turned into commercial events; real estate prices escalated and the traditional value of community bonds started to wither away.

During the first decade of the 21st century devolution of political power to Local Government took

place to ensure participation of communities, decentralize authority and improve resource management and revenue generation. Local political and social activists actively participated in the process and the whole governance landscape changed. New legislation under Local Government Organizations (LGOs) made it compulsory to spend 25 percent of the development budget through voluntary organizations registered as Citizen Community Boards (CCB). This proved to be a onetime activity and could not support the emergence of true voluntary organizations. It also sharpened disputes among social and political activists.

A renewed wave of religious extremism started in 2004 with the emergence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban. They condemned the official judicial system for its failure to impart justice and called for armed struggle to replace the whole system. Supporters of the Taliban constituted the new power elite in Swat. New elites supported this process and some traditional elites which were not supportive of the Taliban also joined hands with them. Women and youth in considerable numbers actively supported the Taliban and in 2007, and they openly challenged the government's writ. Schools were destroyed and infrastructure damaged. An alternate justice system emerged and the people started approaching it for resolution of disputes. The use of force became a norm to impart justice and resolve issues. Some pockets of the valley came under complete control of the Taliban. Market, state and voluntary organization started to lose ground. Developed business enterprises like tourism, horticulture and services sector were badly affected. The elites and business class along with the skilled and working class began to migrate to find alternate livelihoods.

Dislocations caused by armed conflict and floods between 2008-11 created institutional gaps for providing access to justice. Realizing the severity of the problem UN systems have supported the establishment of Reconciliatory Councils at Union Council level to reduce the load on the judiciary and retain community based mechanisms for dispute resolution. At Marghazar valley the Reconciliatory Council (*Musalehati Jirga*) is established in the Union Council office. But the *jirga* members are active members of a coalition partner in the present government and apart from some ex-councillors aggravated parties seldom approach them as they have little or no knowledge about this facility. Weak coordination, conflicting interests and confusing institutional frameworks have created a fluid situation. As a result resources are not tapped properly, investments are not channelized and unemployment ratio is increasing, especially among the youth. Women have comparatively more freedom and the ratio of female enrolment in educational institutions and mobility has also increased dramatically.

Wither Volunteerism?

Voluntary Organizations (VOs) face new challenges in the present social context. The nature of relationship between voluntary organizations and communities, state and private philanthropists has radically changed during the past decades. VOs have to take difficult decisions in responding to community priorities, mobilizing resources and resisting the temptation of implementing the donor's agenda through lucrative projects. External funding and changing priorities have adversely affected the credibility and relevance of VOs. This has happened due to a donor focus on result based management of their own agenda rather than supporting local institutional development for self sustaining activities. As a consequence the perception of VOs has changed. According to one respondent volunteers are opportunistic, the state is oppressive and the market is exploitative". If this statement is considered correct then there is a need for a value system that paves the way for self reliance, pluralism, development of social capital, respect for nature and inclusive development. While volunteerism has continued to play a key role in lifting people above the poverty line, demanding their rights and improving their livelihoods, VOs have not been able to maintain their strong bonds during successive phases of their evolution.

In the early phase volunteerism revolved around the fulfilment of individual and collective needs which required collective action for generating economies of scale. Collective contributions in cash and kind at the time of birth, illness, marriage, death, sowing and harvesting seasons, and construction of public works and for supporting institutions engaged in human development, and cultural and spiritual values depended on strong community bonds and further reinforced it. Voluntary customs fulfilled the needs

which are met now by banks, insurance companies and development administration. Localized presence, voluntary staff, financial self sufficiency, incremental development; effective response to emergencies, and simple operating and management systems were the hallmark of VOs. Community leaders were committed to community service, their motive was spiritual well being and they worked on community priorities. Voluntary work was anchored in local traditions.

During the second phase VOs moved out of close knit communities, focused their attention on social welfare - education, health, helping the disabled and destitute, building prayer halls and maintenance of graveyards- and formation of civic and cultural bodies and civil rights and professional interest groups. VOs also took initiatives to provide civic amenities and patronize art and culture. Instead of working among communities based on kinship and area of residence VOs starting working among communities based on common interest. Their character changed from being predominantly mutual help associations to charity and welfare organizations. This period characterized the beginning of the non- profit organizations. VOs in this period were held in high esteem for supporting noble causes in the larger public interest. Their resources were drawn through charitable contributions rather than customs based on provision of reciprocal help in times of need.

During the last and most recent phase a large number of NGOs have shifted their attention to thinking globally and acting locally. Some of the issues addressed by VOs include poverty alleviation, improvement of basic service delivery, development of innovative development models and their replication, environment protection, alternative energy, right based development, good governance, gender participation and advocacy for policy change. Most of these NGOs have followed inclusive approaches. Their hallmark is professionalism, large scale of operation and close interaction with international donors and NGOs. There are NGOs in all sizes, shapes and colours but professionalism and donor funding distinguishes them from their earlier incarnations. It has turned most of them into contractors following a donor driven agenda in most cases. Key challenges faced by these NGOs include responsiveness to local needs, strengthening financial partnership with beneficiaries and institutional sustainability. Another important challenge faced by these NGOs is the development of character traits conducive to community based solutions, entrepreneurial outlook and institutional sustainability. On this account modern, large scale professionally managed NGOs/CSOs have a lot to learn from indigenous NGOs and the voluntary tradition.

Indigenous voluntary organizations achieved community ownership and sustainability in three different ways: i) building a wide base of supporters who donate to their cause, ii) providing services at an affordable fee to their beneficiaries, iii) creating endowments to generate resources to finance their running expenses or a combination of these elements. Donor funded organizations have received funds for project implementation not for institutional development or establishment of service delivery systems which can enable NGOs to recover charges for continued provision of services to their beneficiaries. Donor conditionality has brought into being VOs which rise and fall with donor funding. This kind of assistance has created a social capital deficit which is contrary to the expressed intentions of most of the donors. This calls for regular exchange of ideas between donors, government and NGOs to institutionalize voluntary support systems for community development.

Some of the key recommendations to strengthen volunteerism are: i) provision of funds for institution building and endowment making rather than “result based management” in terms of service delivery ii) encouraging geographic focus to show significant impact on small scale rather than marginal impact on large scale iii) investing in research for developing low-cost, self financing and sustainable development models iv) supporting private public partnership- between government, academia and media- to end donor dependence and enhance social accountability v) development of knowledge systems for sharing sustainable solutions in line with the socio economic conditions of the poor. It calls for setting up a permanent roundtable consisting of CSO, government, corporate sector, media, research and academic institutions and donors and holding a parallel session of CSOs on the sidelines of the Pakistan Development Forum; investing in processes rather than expenditure based delivery targets and strengthening institutions rather than destabilizing institutions in the name of capacity building.

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